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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines whether ownership concentration, board of directors, audit 
committee and ethnicity of directors affect conservative accounting.  Additionally, 
this thesis examines whether the impact of firms’ governance on conservatism is 
moderated by ownership concentration.  Previous evidence has suggested that 
conservative accounting controls the agency problem, but so far, there is no 
evidence that it is applicable in Malaysian firms, as firms are closely held by the 
controlling shareholders.   
 
This thesis employs panel data on Malaysian listed companies observed over 
seven years from 2001 to 2007.  Malaysian firms are chosen as the sample 
because they provide a useful setting for the study of ownership concentration and 
enable us to identify whether strong governance attributes in firms with 
controlling shareholders function effectively. 
 
Conservatism is measured using two approaches: (a) an accrual-based method 
from Givoly and Hayn (2000) and (b) asymmetric timeliness from Basu (1997).  
Substantial shareholders are used to proxy for ownership concentration, and are 
classified into: (a) inside shareholders who are executive and non-executive 
directors, and (b) outside shareholders who are not involved with the 
management.  Four characteristics of the board of directors are identified: board 
composition, board size, board skill (proxied by board tenure, board financial 
expertise and multiple directorships) and CEO duality.  Three characteristics of 
the audit committee are specified: audit committee composition, financial 
expertise and audit committee meeting.  This thesis focuses on two ethnic groups: 
Malay (Bumiputera) and Chinese directors, who sit on the board of directors and 
the audit committee.   
 
The empirical results show that the existence of controlling shareholders can lead 
to significantly lower accrual-based conservatism, but they do not influence 
asymmetric timeliness.  In contrast, none of the board and audit committee 
attributes appear to determine accrual-based conservatism; but board composition, 
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board financial expertise, audit committee composition, audit committee financial 
expertise and audit committee meeting are significantly associated with 
asymmetric timeliness.  Results in this thesis surprisingly show that, independent 
directors on the audit committee are associated with lower asymmetric timeliness 
and this finding remains after using alternative measures.  This thesis provide no 
evidence that board size, board skill (proxied by directors’ tenure and multiple 
directorships) or CEO duality are associated with conservatism.  The ethnic 
groups influence conservatism but the evidence is mixed, implying that there 
could be other factors that explained the directors’ behaviour than their ethnicity 
per se.  The analysis of the moderating effect confirms that firms’ governance has 
positive influence on conservatism.  However, ownership concentration 
negatively moderates the relationship between firms’ governance and 
conservatism.   
 
The implication from these findings is that the great power that the controlling 
owners exert may diminish the role of financial reports in controlling and 
monitoring the management.  The merits of conservatism as a governance 
mechanism do not seem to function appropriately when its application is 
determined by the controlling parties, who are supposed to be subject to its 
control.  Policy makers and regulatory bodies should interpret this evidence as 
motivation for them to strengthen their enforcement of legal shareholder 
protection.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (1980) SFAC No.2 notes that assets and 
liabilities are frequently measured in the context of significant uncertainties.  
Managers are allowed to use their own discretion in providing accounting 
estimates as not all aspects of accounting are covered by professional standards 
(Chung, Firth, & Jeong-Bon, 2003).  For instance, the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board (MASB) does not provide detailed rules on financial reporting 
principles, thus allowing flexibility for managers to use their discretion in 
determining reported earnings (Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005).  The estimation 
made could be neutral, aggressive or conservative.  This thesis focuses on 
conservative accounting because empirical studies showed that it has a significant 
role in reducing agency conflict.   
 
Conservatism is traditionally defined as accounting practices that “anticipate no 
profit but anticipate all losses” (Bliss, 1924).  Basu (1997) depicts conservatism as 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings which require higher verification to 
recognise good news as gain than to recognise bad news as losses.  Givoly and 
Hayn (2000, p. 292) define conservatism as ‘a selection criterion between 
accounting principles that leads to the minimisation of cumulative reported 
earnings by slower revenue recognition, faster expense recognition, lower asset 
valuation and higher liability valuation’.  All of these definitions acknowledge 
that earnings reported under conservative accounting are understated rather than 
overstated. 
 
Empirical studies have documented that conservatism reduces agency conflict as 
it limits over payment of incentive to managers (Kwon, Newman, & Suh, 2001), 
allows for early detection of negative net present value projects as it immediately 
recognises expected losses (Ball, 2001, p. 127), limits managers’ opportunistic 
behaviour (W. D. Brown, He, & Teitel, 2006; Q. Chen, Hemmer, & Zhang, 2007; 
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Watts, 2003) and reduces information asymmetry between managers and outside 
shareholders (LaFond & Watts, 2008).  Further, conservatism is more useful in 
controlling the cost of suboptimal managerial decisions than if the earnings were 
measured neutrally or liberally (Kwon, 2005).  The benefits of conservatism in the 
agency relationship, ultimately improve the usefulness of financial statements 
(Ball & Shivakumar, 2006) and increase firm value (Watts, 2003). 
 
It has long been recognised that contracting parties use accounting numbers to 
reduce agency costs (e.g.: Watts & Zimmerman, 1978).  In the Malaysian context, 
conservatism may be useful in reducing agency conflict between the majority 
shareholders and minority shareholders.  The traditional agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders is not relevant in Malaysian firms because their 
ownership is highly concentrated in the hands of the large shareholders 
(Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000; M. H. Lim, 1981; Tam & Tan, 2007; 
Zhuang, Webb, Edwards, & Capulong, 2001).  According to Shleifer and Vishny 
(1997), the power of controlling shareholders in East Asian economies deprive the 
minority shareholders of their rights and become indisputable in an environment 
of a weak legal system and ineffective corporate governance.  In Malaysia, this 
phenomenon is most likely to occur as it has weak enforcement of the legal 
shareholder protection (Krishnamurti, Sevic, & Sevic, 2005).  Debt financing 
could monitor management (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) but in Malaysia, 
disciplining managers through debt financing is ineffective due to its immature 
financial market (Suto, 2003; Tam & Tan, 2007).  Moreover, the role of the 
hostile takeovers to discipline opportunistic managers is almost non-existent in 
Malaysia because the ‘large shareholder’ group often includes the CEO or the 
group has an affiliation with top management (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  As the 
abovementioned mechanisms fail to reduce agency conflict in Malaysian firms, 
this thesis is interested in identifying if it is possible to employ accounting 
conservatism to this effect. 
 
Evidence on ownership concentration is inconclusive but weak shareholder 
protection, ineffective monitoring via debt financing and the absence of hostile 
takeovers allow the controlling shareholders to make decisions that provide 
personal benefit.  Though evidence exists to show that conservatism is effective in 
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reducing agency conflict, less is known about its applicability in Malaysia.  The 
application of conservative accounting is within the discretion of the controlling 
shareholders and can be explained from two competing arguments.  The first 
argument relates to the entrenchment effect, whereby controlling owners use their 
power to extract firm wealth for personal benefit.  Hence, the controlling 
shareholders may choose not to employ more conservatism so that they can 
conceal their expropriation activities.  The second argument relates to the 
substitution effect, where the controlling shareholders, having closely monitored 
the management of the firm, do not require conservatism to monitor management.  
Under both effects, controlling shareholders favour less conservatism. 
 
Consistent with other countries, Malaysia encourages listed firms to follow the 
best practices of corporate governance.  Two important governance mechanisms 
discussed in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance are board of directors 
and audit committee, consistent with their significant role in overseeing the 
financial reporting process (Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson, 2006).  This thesis expects 
the board of directors and audit committee to demand more conservatism because 
it assists them in the governance role.  However, previous studies claimed that the 
controlling shareholders are the cause for the ineffective corporate governance 
system in Asian countries.  It was argued that the controlling shareholders may 
change the conduct of the board of directors and audit committee.  For instance, 
the dominant power of controlling shareholders in Malaysia would determine the 
setting of the firms’ internal governance such as to appoint outside directors who 
are in favour of the controlling shareholders.  To investigate the adverse effect of 
ownership concentration on the firms’ governance structure, this thesis examines 
whether the controlling shareholders impede the effectiveness of the firms’ 
internal governance mechanisms in employing more conservatism.  This is done 
by examining the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the 
relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism. 
 
In addition to the corporate governance effects on conservatism, this thesis also 
examines ethnicity of the directors, following Gray’s (1988) proposition that the 
concept of individualism and uncertainty avoidance determine conservatism.  
Previous studies have examined these concepts in relation to Malay and Chinese 
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groups in Malaysia; and hence the outcomes of the studies are used as a reference 
for this thesis. 
 
The next section presents the objectives, the motivations and significance of this 
thesis.  The structure of this thesis is presented in the final section. 
 
1.2. Objectives of this thesis 
 
It is the aim of this thesis to identify the relationship between corporate 
governance and conservative accounting.  Additionally, ethnicity of the members 
of the board and audit committee is examined following Tsakumis (2007) who 
claimed that culture impacts on the judgement that applies to the choice of 
accounting rules.  Further, this thesis is interested in identifying if concentrated 
owners limit the effectiveness of firms’ governance. 
 
In order to fulfil the above objectives, this thesis addresses the following research 
question, 
 
“What are the factors that influence accounting conservatism in Malaysian firms? 
 
In addressing the primary question, this thesis examines the following factors in 
detail: 
 
1. Does ownership concentration influence conservative accounting? 
2. Do the board of directors and audit committee influence conservative 
accounting?  
3. Does ethnicity influence conservative accounting? 
4. Does ownership concentration influence the effect of firms’ governance on 
conservative accounting? 
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1.3. Motivation for this thesis 
 
This thesis is pursued for several reasons that highlight the need to examine 
conservatism practices in Malaysian firms.  The motivation factors are discussed 
as follows: 
 
1. Accounting Conservatism and Agency Conflict 
 
This thesis is motivated by the results from previous studies that accounting 
conservatism can control moral hazard problems resulting from agency conflict.  
Since the agency problem in Malaysia is high (Kallunki, Sahlstrom, & Zerni, 
2007), and Malaysian firms practise high earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 
2006) and high insider trading (Ameer & Othman, 2008), it is important to 
examine the level of conservatism practices in Malaysian listed firms.  Previous 
studies documented that various mechanisms implemented to deter the 
opportunistic behaviour of the controlling shareholders are ineffective.  La Porta, 
Lopez-De-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) reported that Malaysia is ranked 
relatively highly on anti-director rights, which is a measure of the strength of the 
legal system in favour of minority shareholders against managers or dominant 
shareholders in the decision making processes.  However, the existence of strong 
legal protection of shareholders does not resolve the agency problem as 
Krishnamurti et al. (2005) stated that the enforcement of the system is poor.   
 
According to Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006), many mechanisms 
implemented in Malaysia to monitor the controlling shareholders are not working 
soundly.  Minority shareholders cannot rely on the board of directors because the 
majority of Malaysian firms’ board are dominated by the large shareholders.  The 
large institutional shareholders are unable to protect the minority shareholders’ 
interests because they are often subject to political pressure.  For instance, the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established as a channel for 
the minority shareholders to report their concern.  Its effectiveness is however, 
questionable because the founding members are institutional shareholders in 
government link agencies (GLC) which are subject to political interference.  
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Satkunasingam and Shanmugam (2006) further noted that the board of directors 
of the MSWG who are from these founding members, may not take action against 
the company that appointed them to the MSWG. 
 
The lack of an effective agency tool motivates this thesis to investigate whether 
conservatism is useful to reduce the agency conflict in Malaysian firms.  This is 
done by examining factors that determine conservative accounting in Malaysian 
financial statements. 
 
2. Determinant Factors 
 
It is important to understand factors that influence conservatism so that firms can 
assess the significance of those factors on the firm’s financial reports.  The 
following empirical evidence encouraged this thesis to investigate the determinant 
factors of conservative accounting in Malaysian firms.  Ball, Robin and Wu 
(2003) found that Malaysian managers and auditors have low incentives for 
transparent reporting especially for losses.  Among four common law countries 
that they examined from 1984 to 1996; Malaysia was ranked third in terms of 
transparency.  They argued that the result is inconsistent with the common law 
system where accounting standards promote transparency through its shareholder-
based model that resolves asymmetric information by way of public disclosure.  
Similar results were reported by Bhattacharya, Daouk and Welker (2003) who 
examined uninformative or opaque earnings among 34 countries including 
Malaysia.  One of the proxies used in their study is the opposite measure of 
conservatism, namely earnings aggressiveness.  The study showed that Malaysian 
firms are ranked amongst countries that have aggressive earnings and Malaysia 
ranked in 9th place, as having severe earnings opacity.  Whilst the above studies 
implied that Malaysian financial reports are less conservative, a recent study 
carried out by Vichitsarawong, Eng and Meek (2010) showed that conservatism in 
Malaysian financial reports increased after the post Asian financial crisis (1999-
2004) as compared to the pre-crisis period (1995-1996).  They suggested that 
corporate governance reform after the financial crisis may have had a positive 
influence on the conservatism.  This thesis complements the above studies by 
investigating factors that influence conservatism in Malaysian firms. 
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3. Ownership Concentration 
 
Previous studies showed that ownership structure in Malaysian firms is highly 
concentrated (Claessens et al., 2000; M. H. Lim, 1981; Tam & Tan, 2007; Zhuang 
et al., 2001).  Although closely held firms suffer less agency conflict between the 
managers and shareholders; they deal with greater conflict between the majority 
and minority shareholders.  The use of ownership structure to reduce agency 
conflict suggested by agency theory ultimately does not solve the agency conflict.  
Positive accounting theory suggests conservative accounting to control the 
opportunistic behaviour of the managers including the controlling shareholders.  
However, there is concern that controlling shareholders in Malaysian firms may 
apply less conservatism as Tam and Tan (2007) noted that major shareholders in 
Malaysian firms are entrenched.  It is unlikely that controlling shareholders, who 
have decision making power in the firms, employ a mechanism that can limit or 
disclose their opportunistic behaviour.  Dargenidou, McLeay and Raonic (2007) 
argued that when agency conflict is controlled through close monitoring by large 
shareholders, these shareholders put less reliance on the financial reports, and thus 
adopt less conservative accounting.   
 
If the predicted effect is proven, then it implies that majority shareholders can 
expropriate firms’ wealth and delay reporting or even conceal their activities from 
the financial reports.  This condition could adversely affect the interests of the 
minority shareholders.  The results from this thesis provide empirical evidence on 
the effect of ownership concentration on conservatism, so far not investigated by 
other studies on Malaysian firms.   
 
Additionally, previous studies argued that corporate governance in Asian 
countries generally, is not effective due to the influence of controlling 
shareholders.  Very few studies have directly tested the adverse effect of 
controlling shareholders on the firms’ governance, such as reported by Cho and 
Kim (2007).  To our best knowledge, no study for Malaysian samples has directly 
tested the moderating effect of ownership concentration on the effectiveness of the 
firms’ governance.  This thesis, therefore, will fill this gap and contributes to the 
literature. 
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4. Internal Governance Mechanisms 
 
Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) highlighted that the reliability of the financial 
reporting process depends on corporate governance and management control 
philosophy.  Specifically, an absence of appropriate supervision from the board of 
directors and audit committee will encourage management to employ earnings 
manipulation techniques.  This thesis examines board of directors because they 
are responsible for reviewing the adequacy and integrity of the financial reporting 
system and are accountable to the stakeholders for firm performance.  The audit 
committee is considered as one of the pillars of accountability because it supports 
the boards’ role to oversee the financial reporting process.  
 
Conservatism is an important tool in agency conflict and if it is applied 
effectively, can increase firm value, and hence protect the interests of the minority 
shareholders (Watts, 2003).  Board of directors and audit committee 
characteristics that lead to higher conservatism indicate that good governance 
practices lead to better monitoring and produce transparent financial reporting.  
Most studies that assess the effectiveness of the board of directors or audit 
committee on financial reporting relate to earnings management, firm 
performance, financial distress status and disclosure on corporate social 
responsibility.  None so far has assessed the internal governance structure of 
Malaysian firms with conservative accounting.  A survey study carried out by 
Ismail and Abdullah (1999), examined the perception of financial analysts on 
accounting conservatism.  The study reported that 73% of the financial analysts 
agreed that conservatism improves earnings quality and perceived that the audit 
committee influences conservatism.  However, the study did not provide empirical 
evidence on the association between audit committees and conservatism. 
 
5. Existing Evidence 
 
Empirical evidence on the link between corporate governance and conservative 
accounting mostly is available in developed countries.  For instance, UK studies 
was performed by Beekes, Pope and Young (2004) who focused on the board 
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composition.  Several studies examined the effect of corporate governance on 
conservatism of US firm:  A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) examined the 
characteristics of the board of directors, G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) 
focused on the financial expertise in the audit committees but include other 
attributes of the board of directors and audit committee as well, LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) focused on the managerial ownership and Lara, Osma and 
Neophytou (2009) employed an aggregate measure of the board characteristics.  
Spanish study was carried out by Lara, Osma and Penalva (2007) who examined 
the effect of aggregate measure of board characteristics on conservatism.  Shuto 
and Takada (2010) examined managerial ownership and conservatism of Japanese 
firms whilst Kung, Cheng and James (2010) examined concentrated ownership 
and conservatism of Chinese firms. 
 
This thesis is motivated to identify whether the results of UK and US studies hold 
in Malaysia since they have dispersed ownership as opposed to the highly 
concentrated ownership in Malaysian firms.  Particularly, a majority of the board 
of Malaysian listed firms are dominated by the inside substantial shareholders 
who may influence the behaviour of the rest of the board members.   
 
6. Ethnicity 
 
Tsakumis, Campbell and Doupnik (2009) stated that national culture directly 
influences conservatism as this accounting practice involves judgement.  Malaysia 
is a multiracial country, where its economy has clearly distinct capital segments 
divided along ethnic lines (Jesudason, 1989).  Different aspects of culture (i.e., 
ethnicity and demography) could influence business and accounting disclosure 
practices and audit services (Haniffa & Cooke, 2002).  Malaysia’s population of 
26.75 million is composed of Malays 54.2%, Chinese 25.3%, Indians 7.5% and 
others 13% (Ninth Malaysia Plan 2006-2010).  Malays and the indigenous group 
in Sabah and Sarawak are collectively known as Bumiputera.  Different ethnic 
groups in Malaysia, therefore, may have different interpretations of the accounting 
rules especially when this involves their own judgement.  Hence, the common set 
of financial reporting rules across countries is not sufficient to ensure international 
comparability of financial statements.   
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Rees (2004) emphasised that the study of accounting differences and identifying 
causes for the difference is a valid focus for academic study.  So far, there is no 
evidence in Malaysia on the relationship between ethnicity and conservatism.  
This finding will have significant implications for the global harmonisation of 
accounting (Tsakumis, 2007). 
 
1.4. Significance of this thesis 
 
1.4.1. Contribution to Theory 
 
Agency theory suggests that conflict between managers and shareholders could be 
reduced through managerial ownership and good structure of governance 
mechanism.  Many corporate governance studies, which centred on agency 
theory, do not find conclusive evidence to support the theory.  Hence, 
complementary theories were developed in the literature to explain evidence not 
consistent with the agency theory, namely stewardship theory, resource 
dependence theory and managerial hegemony theory. 
 
Findings from this thesis will strengthen our understanding of the relevance of the 
abovementioned theories in explaining the behaviour of the governance practices 
and financial reporting in the Malaysian business environment.  Additionally, this 
thesis offers evidence consistent with positive accounting theory which suggests 
that conservative accounting as a useful tool to reduce agency conflict.  Many 
studies only focused on assessing the effectiveness of corporate governance 
structure in reducing agency conflict, by examining firm performance, earnings 
management and disclosure.  In addition, to evaluate the effectiveness of 
governance structure in Malaysian firms, the main outcome from this thesis will 
show whether the existing governance structure is effective in promoting another 
agency tool that is, accounting conservatism.  
 
Evidence from US and UK are supportive of the positive accounting theory as 
firms with good governance structure employ more conservative accounting.  The 
outcome of this thesis will reduce the gap on corporate governance literature and 
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provide evidence whether the same tool can be employed in emerging economies 
like Malaysia.   
 
1.4.2. Contribution to Policy Makers and Regulatory Agencies 
 
The Malaysian code on corporate governance largely follows the UK code which 
emphasises sound governance principles for the prosperity and accountability in 
the business.  In 2007, the code had been revised to strengthen the roles and 
responsibilities of the board of directors and audit committee.  Among others, it 
highlights the composition of the board and the importance for the independent 
non-executive directors to have an independent oversight function.  Despite the 
effort to promote best governance practices in Malaysian firms, many scholars 
argued whether the same standard of governance in developed countries can 
function effectively in a country which has a different legal system, business 
culture and corporate structure.  Particularly, Malaysian business ownerships are 
dominated by large shareholders who always have influence on the management 
of the firms.  Due to poor enforcement of legal protection on shareholders and 
ineffective market discipline in Malaysia, the controlling shareholders are free to 
act in their own best interest rather than for the company as a whole. 
 
Results from this thesis become an input for the relevant authorities to plan and 
design policies that are most suitable for Malaysian business culture.  Bank 
Negara Malaysia, Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia and the Malaysian 
Institute of Corporate Governance, or other regulatory bodies, will benefit from 
the findings of this thesis, as the findings promote understanding the effect of 
concentrated ownership on the quality of the financial statements. This will help 
the authorities to evaluate the current listing requirements and assess the existing 
ownership structure in Malaysian firms.  Additionally, this thesis will provide an 
understanding and awareness to the relevant parties of whether the current 
governance practices produce the expected outcome.  Understanding the effect of 
internal governance structures on conservatism also allows the authorities to 
assess the effectiveness of the firms’ governance structure.  Findings from this 
thesis will be an eye-opener for the authorities to understand the status of agency 
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conflict in Malaysia, and hence initiate and formulate an effective, yet powerful, 
tool to overcome agency conflict created by the controlling shareholders.  The 
authorities will be able to emphasise suitable methods to overcome any loophole 
within the system. 
 
1.4.3. Contributions to Researchers 
 
Many previous studies examined the link between corporate governance and 
financial reports on a short term basis.  The benefit of panel data methodology 
explained and employed in this thesis will motivate researchers to examine a more 
extensive period so that the results can be generalised and provide meaningful 
interpretations.  Additionally, ownership concentration is a unique factor in Asian 
countries like Malaysia, but studies which have investigated Malaysian firms did 
not incorporate ownership concentration into their studies.  The outcome from this 
thesis may highlight the influence of the concentrated owners on the financial 
reports and the corporate governance mechanisms employed by the firm.  
 
The outcome of this thesis will benefit researchers because it provides empirical 
evidence relating to agency conflicts in developing countries such as Malaysia.  
The unique setting of Malaysia provides additional knowledge on the effect of 
concentrated ownership and ethnicity on conservative accounting.  This thesis 
contributes to the literature on corporate governance studies and may encourage 
more studies on corporate governance and conservative accounting. 
 
1.4.4. Contribution to Users of the financial statements 
 
Financial information is used to assess the firm’s financial position in order to 
forecast the firm’s future prospects.  The users of financial statements include 
financial analysts, investors, creditors, managers and executives who will use the 
outcome from their analysis in decision making.  Understanding factors that 
influence the financial statements will moderate dependence on financial 
statement figures and build confidence in decision making. 
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Financial analysts: Financial analysts who help businesses to make investment 
decisions, would analyse the financial reports and follow up with interviews with 
the firm’s representatives to gain better insight into the firm’s prospect and 
managerial effectiveness.  Therefore, the results of this thesis are significantly 
important to them as the results will highlight factors that contribute to the 
conservatism practices of the firm and help them to assess the financial report 
effectively. 
 
Investors: Empirical evidence showed that Malaysian firms practice earnings 
management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and perform insider trading (Ameer & 
Othman, 2008).  Haat, Rahman and Sakthi (2008) claimed that there is an 
expectation gap between the information disclosed in the financial reports and the 
way the information is used by investors for decision making.  This reflects the 
loss of confidence in the truthfulness of information provided by the firm when 
the shareholders use other reliable sources of information instead of the annual 
report.  Therefore, it is important to explore the influence of corporate governance 
on accounting conservatism; since conservatism has been associated with reliable 
financial information as it controls managers’ expropriation activities.   
 
Findings on the effect of ethnicity on conservative accounting provide insight as 
to whether financial reports in Malaysian firms are comparable to those in other 
countries.  The result will guide investors to decide whether financial statements 
in different countries are comparable and help them to decide whether that 
country is worth the investment. 
 
Creditors: Creditors will also benefit from this thesis because the results may 
provide a basis for assessing their client.  Since previous studies showed that 
creditors demand higher conservatism, they may become more alert to firms 
which may possess characteristics contributing to lower conservatism. 
 
Managers and Auditors: The results of this thesis are useful to management who 
are concerned with the financial reporting quality and corporate governance 
practices in their firms.  The concentrated owners and management should learn 
from this thesis that their impact on conservative accounting is recognised by 
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other users; hence this should discourage them from expropriating firms’ wealth 
for their own use. 
Knowing the effect of concentrated owners and internal governance mechanisms 
on conservatism would be an advantage to the auditors.  The auditors will be able 
to plan the audit task and to focus on accounting figures that are within the 
discretion of the management.   
 
1.5. Study Design 
 
This thesis uses two measures of conservatism: one is accrual-based and the other 
is asymmetric timeliness, and examines if ownership concentration, board of 
directors, audit committee and ethnicity impact conservatism practices in 
Malaysian firms.  Additionally, this thesis investigates if ownership concentration 
moderates the effect of firms’ governance on conservatism.  The sample for this 
thesis is Malaysian listed firms observed over seven years from 2001 to 2007.  
Accordingly, this thesis employs a panel data regression model that is suitable to 
analyse longitudinal data.  Data used in this thesis were obtained from Datastream 
and online annual reports.  The outcome from the analysis provides evidence on 
the relationships between the explanatory variables and conservatism. 
 
1.6. Definitions of Term 
 
Throughout this thesis, the term conservatism is used interchangeably with 
accounting conservatism, conservative accounting and conservative financial 
reports.  Further, since this thesis uses accrual based conservatism and asymmetric 
timeliness as measures of conservatism, they are used in place of conservatism to 
correspond with the results obtained in this thesis. 
 
1.7. Structure of this thesis 
 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.  Chapter 2 reviews previous 
evidence on conservatism, ownership structure, board of directors, audit 
committee, ethnicity and moderating relationship.  Chapter 3 presents the 
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conceptual framework of this thesis and hypotheses development.  Chapter 4 
presents the methodology, which explains the sample used in this thesis and 
measurements of the variables.  Chapter 5 presents the descriptive analysis and 
main findings.  Finally, chapter 6 presents the discussion on the results, the 
conclusions, the implications and limitations of the study followed by suggestions 
for future research. 
 
1.8. Summary 
 
This chapter provides an overview of the roles of accounting conservatism in the 
agency relationship and briefly explains the relation of conservatism with the 
corporate governance mechanisms examined in this thesis, namely concentrated 
ownership, board of directors and audit committee as well as ethnicity of 
directors.  Further, this chapter presents the objectives, motivations and 
significance of this thesis. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Agency theory argues that an increase in share ownership may reduce agency 
conflict.  Initiated from agency theory, many studies have investigated the 
influence of corporate ownership on firms’ economic activities and financial 
reporting.  Additionally, board of directors and audit committee are important 
governance mechanisms to control managers’ opportunistic behaviour.  Whilst it 
is expected that these mechanisms reduce agency conflict, it is not as effective as 
those in developed countries. 
 
This chapter reviews extensive research works on ownership structure, internal 
governance and financial reporting.  This chapter begins with the overview of 
corporate governance in Malaysia.  Next, it discusses theories underlying the 
studies followed by the previous empirical evidence on accounting conservatism.  
The reviews were further extended to the ownership concentration, characteristics 
of the board of directors and audit committee and ethnicity of directors in relation 
to their effect on firm performance and financial reporting.  The review on 
moderating relationship was presented in the end of the chapter. 
 
2.2. Corporate Governance in Malaysia 
 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997 imposed pressure on the Malaysian government 
to strengthen its corporate governance system.  It was argued that highly 
concentrated ownership and weak boards of directors were the cause of the crisis.  
The presence of concentrated ownership in Malaysia however, is not a surprise as 
it had long been acknowledged by M. H. Lim (1981).  In 1998, Finance 
Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) and Malaysian Institute of 
Corporate Governance were formed, to review and reform corporate governance 
system in Malaysia.  Subsequently, FCCG produced the Malaysian Code on 
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Corporate Governance in March 2000.  The code covers four areas relating to 
board of directors, director’s remuneration, shareholders and accountability, but is 
principally directed at increasing the efficiency and accountability of the board of 
directors.  Even though compliance with the code initially was voluntary, in 2001 
it was made mandatory by the Bursa Malaysia for listed firms to disclose the 
extent of their compliance (or justification for non-compliance) with the code.  
Figure 2.1 displays the Malaysian Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Malaysian Corporate Governance Regulatory Framework 
 
Source: 
http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/regulation/corporate_governance/framework.
html 
 
The Malaysian High Level Finance Committee defines corporate governance as, 
“the process and structure used to direct and manage the business and affairs of 
the company towards enhancing business prosperity and corporate accountability 
with the ultimate objective of realising long term shareholders value, whilst taking 
into account the interests of other stakeholders”.  Corporate governance is 
important from both economic and finance perspectives.  The economic aspect 
views that efficient corporate governance structure is able to allocate scarce funds 
to investment projects with the highest returns.  The finance aspect views its 
importance in protecting invested funds and in generating returns.  Ultimately, 
effective corporate governance should result in reliable financial reports from 
which investment decisions can be made that yield adequate returns (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1997).   
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The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance is largely modelled on the UK 
code which recognised the importance of sound governance principles for 
business prosperity and accountability.  Following the Anglo-American approach, 
the model is commonly referred to as the “shareholder model” or “market model”.  
This model displays the unitary system where the board of directors is the highest 
governing body in the company.  Under this system, the individual (outside) 
shareholders do not generally influence the direction of the firm (Keasey & 
Wright, 1993) but require independent outside directors to monitor the 
management including the CEOs.  To be considered independent, the directors 
must pass the general test of independent as stated in Para 1.01 of Bursa Malaysia 
Listing requirements: “independent of management and free from any business or 
other relationships which could interfere with the exercise of independent 
judgment or the ability to act in the best interests of the company as well as not 
related to relatives, major shareholders or executive directors of the company and 
not the professional advisers, nominees of directors, officers within the last two 
years or certain parties contracting with the company”. 
 
The Malaysian firms’ board were largely independent from the management as 
indicated by the ratio of the independent directors on the board and the separation 
of role between the CEO and the board chairman (S. N. Abdullah, 2004, 2006a).  
In fact, board independence was a practice of some companies even before the 
code on best practices was introduced.  S. N. Abdullah (2004) reported that about 
20% of Malaysian companies during 1994-1996 sample period combined the roles 
of chairman and CEO.  Saleh et al. (2005) reported for year 2001, 45% of 
Malaysian listed companies combined the roles which was lower than the 80% 
reported for US companies.  Though the studies suggest that the Malaysian board 
is independent from management, the effectiveness of the independent directors in 
Asian countries to ensure sound corporate governance, is still in doubt, because 
controlling shareholders appoint the entire board of directors (Allen, 2000).  
Hence, the requirement in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance that 
firms should appoint at least one third of independent non-executive directors on 
the board, which is aimed to balance the board composition and to avoid any 
dominant group of members, does not warrant board independence.  It was argued 
that over a longer period, the independent judgment of the non-executive directors 
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may be diminished because they are bonded to the insiders, making them more 
sympathetic, or having interests closely aligned with the insiders.  Tan Sri Zarinah 
Anwar, who was then the Chairman of Securities Commission Malaysia, stated 
that the appointment of the independent directors is “substance over form” as 
shown by the persistent failure to detect wrongdoing in firms (Pascoe & 
Rachagan, 2005).   
 
Empirical studies showed that independent directors had no impact on the firms’ 
outcome.  S. N. Abdullah (2004) examined data in 1994-1996 and found that 
independent directors on the board had no influence on firm performance.  S. N. 
Abdullah (2006b) examined data in 1998-2000 and reported that non executive 
directors were only effective during financial crisis because in that period, 
investors expected them to produce timely financial reports.  Saleh et al. (2005) 
who observed 2001 data, found that a greater proportion of independent directors 
on the board could not limit earnings management.  Rahman and Ali (2006) 
focused on the period 2002-2003, after the introduction of the Malaysia Code on 
Corporate Governance, and found that only board size had a significant influence 
on earnings management, with no influence attributable to board and audit 
committee independence, CEO duality, tenure, members’ financial expertise and 
number of audit committee meetings. 
 
Due to the strategic roles of the board of directors, the best practice of corporate 
governance allows some specific tasks to be delegated to its committees.  One of 
them is the audit committee to assist the board in monitoring the firm’s financial 
position.  The formation of the audit committee has been made mandatory for all 
listed companies since 1993, but a one year grace period (1994) was allowed for 
listed companies to comply.  A survey carried out by Sori, Mohmad and Hamid 
(2001) found that in 1994, only 56% and 24% of the sample on the main board 
and second board companies respectively, complied with the requirement.  
Further, the compliance by all sample firms was only achieved in 1998.  Bursa 
Malaysia emphasises the quality of the audit committee members: Para 
15.09(1)(b) of the listing requirements require that a majority of independent 
directors must sit on the audit committee and Para 15.09(1)(c) requires that at 
least one member is financially literate.  Based on 2002 data, Haron, Jantan and 
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Pheng (2005) showed that some companies violated this requirements where 9% 
of companies’ audit committees did not have members with financial expertise 
and 13% of the companies did not have a majority of independent directors in 
their audit committee.  The results suggest that lack or delay in complying with 
the regulation is a clear indication of weak enforcement. 
 
Malaysian firms are obliged to follow the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements, 
but evidence suggests that not all elements emphasising on the audit committee 
have significant impact on the firms’ outcome.  Al-Murisi and Abdullah (1997) 
found that length of formation and independent directors on the committee did not 
improve the committee effectiveness.  Instead, the presence of accountants on the 
committee was found to be of the utmost importance.  Supporting the evidence, 
Rahmat, Iskandar and Saleh (2009) found that financial expertise on the audit 
committee was inversely related to the firm’s financial distress status.  Audit 
committee size and members’ independence; however, were not significantly 
different from the non financial distressed firms.  Hence, the results support the 
guideline in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia 
listing requirements that firms must appoint financial expertise on its audit 
committee; but more needs to be done to strengthen the independent element of 
the board and its committee. 
 
Since the creation of Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance, corporate 
governance standards in Malaysia are perceived have been improved following 
the outcome from the Malaysian Corporate Governance Survey in 2002 (Shim, 
2006).  The results of the survey among others showed that most of the Malaysian 
private limited companies (PLCs) had segregated the CEO and chairman roles; 
and the PLCs recognised that transparency and disclosure in the capital market 
enhance the confidence of investors.  Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) noted that 
corporate governance reforms in Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
might have contributed to higher conservatism in the countries, after the 1997 
Asian financial crisis relative to the pre-crisis period.  However, Tuan Abdul Alim 
Abdullah, the former CEO of Companies Commission of Malaysia stated that 
compliance on the best guidelines was still at a low level as firms still experience 
corporate abuses, conflicts of interest, failure in maintaining proper accounting 
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records and reporting false information (Pascoe & Rachagan, 2005).  The 
perception that corporate governance in Malaysia is ineffective in reducing 
agency problems led to the suggestion that the system is merely a ceremonial 
rubber stamp (Mallette & Fowler, 1992), form over substance, (Pascoe & 
Rachagan, 2005), window dressing (Shim, 2006) and box ticking (Haat et al., 
2008).   
 
2.3. Ownership Concentration in Malaysia 
 
Thillainathan (1999) reported that a joint survey carried out by FCCG, the KLSE 
(now known as Bursa Malaysia) and PriceWaterhouseCoopers in 1998, revealed 
that substantial shareholders became members of the board of most Malaysian 
listed companies; more than a quarter of them were also involved in the 
management of the companies.  This interference of the substantial shareholders 
will jeopardise the interest of the minority shareholders.  Highly concentrated 
ownership was a contributing factor in the financial crisis in 1997 and remains a 
problem today.  In the post-financial crisis, the ownership concentration become 
more entrenched through ownership structure (Tam & Tan, 2007).  Highly 
concentrated ownership in East Asian countries can be explained from two 
different views.  The political view, on the one hand suggests that ownership 
concentration arises as a natural response to high managerial agency costs (Roe, 
2003).  On the other hand, the legal view suggests that shareholders concentrate 
their shareholding to overcome poor legal investor protection (La Porta et al., 
1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  La Porta et al. (1998) suggested two possible 
reasons for highly concentrated ownership in countries with weak investor 
protection.  Firstly, large capital investments allow the shareholders to closely 
monitor the management.  Secondly, low protection discourages the small 
shareholders from paying shares at a high price, hence low demand from them 
indirectly stimulates ownership concentration.  Ultimately, concentrated 
ownership substitutes legal protection.  Another contributing factor for highly 
concentrated ownership is corrupted or ineffective outside governance 
mechanisms such as product markets, labour markets and takeover markets 
(Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, Bruton, & Jiang, 2008).  Malaysia specifically, was 
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ranked relatively high in legal protection for shareholders (La Porta et al., 1998) 
but the enforcement of the law is weak (Krishnamurti et al., 2005).  Further, 
Young et al. (2008) stated that the board of directors itself needed institutional 
support, so that they could function effectively, but it appears that the institution 
itself is not effective.  Similar point was raised by Barton, Coombes and Wong 
(2004) that good governance practices could not be achieved when there is weak 
enforcement of legal regulations, insufficient well-trained accountants and 
disruption of cultural factor in the board room. 
 
Thillainathan (1999) explained four types of control and cash-flow rights groups 
in Malaysian companies.  The first group is the management-control that refers to 
dispersed ownerships where managers have control rights but have little or no 
cash flow rights.  Very few Malaysian firms fall in this group.  The other three 
groups are shareholder-control that are categorised as follows: (a) direct majority 
stake with controlling rights, (b) direct minority stake with controlling rights and 
(c) indirect stake through pyramid and cross-shareholding.  The pyramid structure 
enables the shareholders to obtain outside capital into the founding group while at 
the same time retaining the capital within the group.  These poor structures lead to 
less transparency and prevent good governance systems.  Many Malaysian 
companies are in group (a) and (b) whilst many public companies are in group (c).  
In group (c), the control rights of the shareholders far exceed their voting rights 
because of wide control including controlling rights in subsidiaries or associated 
companies of the listed companies.  As noted in Singam (2003), majority 
shareholders who gained control through cross-shareholding have less concern in 
the business; but have great interest in nominating the board (Rachagan, 2010).  
Thillainathan (1999) also noted that the firms’ resources are commonly passed 
among the majority shareholders without due regard to accepted principles of 
bookkeeping and accounting.   
 
Since large shareholders govern the firms (Thillainathan, 1999), they do not rely 
on legal aspects to protect their investment.  Legal protection is important to the 
minority shareholders but if concentrated owners substitute the legal protection, 
expropriation by the large shareholders could adversely affect the interest of the 
minority shareholders.  Singam (2003) acknowledged that expropriation activities 
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of the controlling shareholders include paying a special dividend to themselves, 
entering into unfavourable business transactions with other companies that they 
have control of, or engaging in excessively risky projects, that benefit them but 
put other stakeholders at the risk of failure.  The controlling shareholders also 
abuse the power they have in firms, which commonly results in less transparency, 
opaque financial transactions and misuse of funds raised (Solomon, 2007).  The 
behaviour of the controlling shareholders could be driven by incentive that are 
different from the minority shareholders; the large shareholders invest not because 
they want to maximise their wealth but more to maximise the private benefits 
associated with control and empire building (Thillainathan, 1999). 
 
Many studies have argued that corporate governance in Asian firms does not 
function effectively mainly due to the weak legal system or poor enforcement, 
high concentrated ownership and family-controlled types of companies (Allen, 
2000; Globerman, Peng, & Shapiro, 2011).  In addition, the relevant authority did 
not enforce the regulation, as one example provided in Bidin (2009) shows that no 
action was taken even though firms failed to file annual accounts or to hold an 
AGM.  Yet, the only measure taken by the Companies Commission of Malaysia 
was suggesting that the directors attend a training program, with no indication of 
its benefit being relevant to the problem.  Further, the corporate governance model 
in UK was designed to reduce the conflict between managers and shareholders, 
hence the same model may not be able to reduce conflict between controlling and 
minority shareholders (V. Z. Chen, Li, & Shapiro, 2011) 
 
2.4. Theoretical Background 
 
Corporate governance studies were motivated from the agency perspective 
whereby firms employed governance mechanisms to control agency conflict in 
firms.  Ownership structure, board of directors and audit committee are internal 
governance mechanisms developed to meet this purpose.  Additionally, empirical 
studies showed that accounting conservatism can also govern the firm as it 
reduces managers’ opportunistic behaviour and increases firm value (Watts, 
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2003), hence complementing the monitoring role of the other governance 
mechanisms. 
 
2.4.1. Agency Theory 
 
Agency theory deals with the contractual relationship between the agent 
(manager) and the principal (shareholders) under which shareholders delegate 
responsibilities to the manager to run their business.  This theory argues that when 
both parties are expected to maximise their utility, there is good reason to believe 
that the agent may engage in opportunistic behaviour at the expense of the 
principal’s interest.  Jensen and Meckling (1976) modelled this condition as an 
agency relationship where the inability of the principal to directly observe the 
agent’s action could lead to moral hazard, thus increasing agency cost.  To reduce 
the conflict, it was suggested that managers own shares of the firm so that their 
interests are in line with shareholder’s wealth maximisation.  The traditional 
manager-shareholder conflict, however, is not relevant to firms with highly 
concentrated ownership.  According to Hannsmann cited in Rachagan (2006, p. 
268), other than manager-shareholder conflict and company-other contracting 
party conflict, the conflict between majority shareholders and minority 
shareholders is more relevant in the Malaysian economy due to its highly 
concentrated ownership structure.  This conflict indicates that the controlling 
shareholders (including managers) expropriate the interest of the minority 
shareholders for their own private advantage (Fan & Wong, 2002).  
 
Large shareholders can easily monitor managers because they have more access to 
information and thus have more knowledge of decision making (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986).  However, since the large shareholders’ investment is less 
diversified, and they thus have limited liquidity, they are exposed to financial loss 
if the firm experience difficulties.  This constraint may encourage them to extract 
a private benefit at the expense of the minority shareholders.  As large owners 
have effective control of the firm and also because they oversee the financial 
reporting policies of firm (Fan & Wong, 2002), they can, and will, conceal any 
expropriation from the financial reports.  Leuz, Nanda and Wysocki (2003) 
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affirmed that the incentive to avoid external monitoring and loss of reputation 
encourage the dominant shareholders to conceal their behaviour.   
 
In addition, agency theory points out the role of the board of directors to monitor 
both the majority shareholders and management; and to protect minority 
shareholders’ interests (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  It was suggested that the board of 
directors could help reduce agency costs because it holds ultimate control over 
management even though some of the decision functions are entrusted to top 
management.  Sound corporate governance should be considered as a vital means 
in reducing agency conflict especially when it functionally accommodates the 
interest of all shareholders.  Complementing the board role in monitoring the 
management, resource dependence theory suggests the board be represented by 
outside directors to enhance flow of information and reduce uncertainty and 
secure firms’ resources.  Pfeffer & Salancik (2003) suggested that the board act as 
a ‘co-optative’ mechanism that links firms with the external environment in 
accessing resources, exchanging information, developing inter firm commitment 
and establishing legitimacy. 
 
Managerial hegemony theory views the board of directors as a legal fiction that is 
ineffective in reducing agency conflict, if the management dominates the board 
(Mace, 1971).  As a ‘co-optative’ mechanism, the board is flexible and easy to 
implement as management may control the selection of the outside directors 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  Management may appoint outside directors who have 
less knowledge about the business, hence making them dependent on the 
information supplied by the managers.  Or the outside directors are motivated 
merely by the financial incentive from the board seat and desire the reputation 
associated with board membership (Kosnik, 1987).  Directors who have weak 
attributes are less likely to challenge the management decision.   
 
2.4.2. Positive Accounting Theory 
 
The firm is considered as ‘nexus of contracts’ (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), where 
it has a contractual relationship with various groups of people such as employees, 
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creditors, government and public, simply referred to as the stakeholders.  Positive 
accounting theory is associated with the contractual view of the firm where 
accounting is used as a tool to facilitate the formation and performance of the 
contract by mitigating the contractual costs that may arise from the agency 
conflict.  In contrast to normative theory that seeks to determine the appropriate 
structure of managers’ incentive to reduce the agency conflict, positive accounting 
theory predicts and explains actual accounting practices and focuses on analysing 
the agency costs arising from the contractual arrangement between the owners and 
top management of the firm (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  This theory posits that 
managers make accounting choices tailored to their needs to increase their wealth 
through compensation incentives, to avoid violation of debt contract or to 
minimise political cost.  Positive accounting theory, thus suggests that accounting 
choices such as conservatism are desirable to limit managers opportunistic 
behaviour, without which managers are able to extract firms wealth for their 
private benefit. 
 
2.5. Prior Studies 
 
The existing evidence on the relationship between accounting conservatism with 
ownerships structure, board of directors and audit committee is scarce, despite 
many empirical studies documenting the merits of conservatism in the agency 
relationship.  Further, those studies that examined conservatism and corporate 
governance were mostly conducted in developed countries.  To understand and to 
assess the role of these governance mechanisms on conservatism, the 
effectiveness of those mechanisms are reviewed based on other aspects of 
financial reporting that commonly exist in the literature.    
 
This review starts with the merits and downsides of conservatism.  Next, findings 
from previous studies are classified according to the factors examined in this 
thesis namely; ownership concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit 
committee characteristics, ethnicity and moderating relationship. 
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2.5.1. Accounting Conservatism  
 
Accounting conservatism practices have been the subject of a long–standing 
debate as to how they affect the quality of the financial statements.  Discussion on 
conservatism has appeared in the literature since the 1960s (e.g. Devine, 1963; 
Sterling, 1967) and continues to the present.  Financial Accounting Standard 
Board (FASB) (1980, para. 92) stated that: “......introduces a bias into financial 
reporting, conservatism tends to conflict with significant qualitative 
characteristics, such as representational faithfulness, neutrality, and comparability 
(including consistency)”.  FASB however, affirmed that conservatism should not 
arise from deliberate consistent understatement of net assets and profits.  
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) (2007, para. 37) stated that 
deliberate action to understate assets or incomes; or overstate liabilities or 
expenses and creation of hidden reserves would result in non-neutral information 
and reduce the quality of reliability. 
 
The auditors, audit committee members and management are struggling to define 
the concept of quality (Jonas & Blanchet, 2000) because financial reporting 
quality is a vague concept which has led many studies to focus on factors that 
constrain the achievement of earnings quality such as earnings management, 
financial restatements and fraud (Cohen, Krishnamoorthy, & Wright, 2004).  
Consistent with the accounting standards board, Jonas and Blanchet (2000) 
affirmed that accounting information that meet the desired qualitative 
characteristics should be faithful, verifiable, neutral and consistent.  They 
however added that, the quality of the financial reports could be viewed from 
different approaches, either from users need or for shareholders’ protection.  The 
users view quality financial reports as those that provide relevant and reliable 
information for decision making.  For shareholder protection, quality of the 
financial reports is viewed as those that provide full and fair disclosure and does 
not contain misleading information.  In conservatism however, there is a trade-off 
between relevant and reliable.  Conservatism may be less relevant due to the bias 
in understatement of the earnings, but it provides reliable information as to the 
reported figures, which minimised managers’ opportunistic behaviour and provide 
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for timely reporting on potential loss.  One important effect of conservatism noted 
by Kirk and Siegel (1996, p. 55) is “.... prudent reporting based on healthy 
scepticism build confidence in the results and in the long run best serves all of the 
divergent interests that are represented by the [FASB’s] constituents”. 
 
The importance of conservatism was highlighted in a survey carried out by 
Graham, Cannice and Sayre (2002) that financial analysts treated conservative 
financial reports as more important than the underlying reported earnings of the 
firms.  Their results suggest that accounting conservatism adds value to the 
financial reports; plausibly because it produces clean and reliable accounting 
figures.  Q. Chen et al. (2007) found that conservatism reduced managers’ 
incentive to manage earnings.  They argued that managers managed earnings to 
fulfil investor expectations to avoid adverse effect on the share prices.  Since 
conservatism recognises losses in a timely manner and delays the recognition of 
gains until they are verified; it reduces the impact of the news on the share price 
and in turn limits the incentive for earnings management.  The findings of Iyengar 
and Zampelli (2010) proved that conservatism produced reliable financial reports 
as managers’ incentive was tied to the accounting performance.  To a certain 
extent, these findings do not support Penman and Zhang (2002) who claimed that 
conservatism adversely affect the quality of the earnings.  Specifically, they 
reported that conservatism increased unrecorded reserves in high growth firms, 
and when the growth of the investment was reduced; the release of the reserves 
inflated future income.  Of a similar view, Sen (2005) pointed out that 
conservative accounting may lead to unsustainable high future earnings.  In 
contrast to steady growth firms, future earnings of growth firms are higher 
because the growing investments are able to sustain higher levels of future 
earnings.  When the steady growth firms wanted to show higher earnings, they 
would mimic the quality of the growth firms by making an adverse selection 
decision, such as cut back on investments (and thus depreciation on invested 
assets) in the short run or choose less conservatism.  It was argued that, even 
though asymmetric timeliness, which measures conservatism, reduced earnings 
persistence (Basu, 1997), it benefits the borrower in terms of lower borrowing 
costs (A. S. Ahmed, Billings, Morton, & Stanford-Harris, 2002). Consequently, 
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equity holders may prefer timeliness of loss even though it impairs the earnings 
persistence (DeFond, 2010).   
 
Much evidence supports conservatism’s advantages to firms particularly as an 
agency tool.  The governance role of financial information depicted in Figure 2.2 
shows that financial information produced as a result of conservative accounting, 
disciplines managers on project selection and prevents expropriation activities.  
Bushman and Smith (2001) argued that information in the financial reports 
provides direct and indirect inputs to corporate control mechanisms, which 
promote efficient governance of corporate control.  Consistent with this argument, 
the findings of Ball, Robin and Sadka (2008) showed that IPO firms employ 
greater conservatism as demanded by the market and regulatory authorities for 
timely loss recognition upon going public.  Additionally, Sun and Liu (2011) 
reported that firms employed higher conservatism when they were closely 
monitored by financial analysts. 
 
The findings of Lara et al. (2009) showed that the impact of not controlling 
opportunistic behaviours earlier is harmful to the firms’ wealth.  They reported 
that UK bankrupt firms in their study sample showed a decrease in conservatism 
and aggressive earnings management prior to firm failure.  In contrast, Francis 
and Martin (2010) showed that financial reports of firms with more profitable 
investments, which were measured by bidder's announcement returns and by 
changes in post-acquisition operating performance, were more conservative.  
Their evidence implies that conservatism disciplines and encourages managers to 
maximise the shareholders’ wealth. 
 
. 
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Figure 2.2: Governance Role of Financial Information 
(Source: Bushman and Smith (2001)) 
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As a governance tool, conservatism is significantly important in debt contracts and 
executive compensation contracts (Watts, 2003).  In debt contracts, creditors favour 
conservatism because they are concerned with the lower bound measure of a firm’s 
net assets before granting loans (Beneish & Press, 1993).  In liquidation cases, 
conservative accounting is applied to determine the value of the net assets; where 
possible losses are taken into account leaving out the unverifiable gains.  The 
dividend covenant in debt contracts also demonstrates conservatism so that managers 
are obliged to meet the minimum net assets to repay the creditors.  A. S. Ahmed et 
al. (2002) proved the significant role of conservatism in debt contracts as firms with 
conservative financial reports were ranked higher in debt rating and had lower cost 
of debt.  Further, Zhang (2008) showed that conservatism benefits the lender in 
terms of an early signal of possible debt violation and that advantage was shared 
with the borrower in terms of lower interest costs.  Managers have the advantage of 
holding private information and may use the information to profit themselves 
(LaFond & Watts, 2008).  Additionally, managers enjoy limited liability and limited 
tenure that enable them to escape from their poor decisions (LaFond & 
Roychowdhury, 2008) and such decisions may be detrimental to the shareholders’ 
wealth.  For instance, managers who require excessive compensations may overstate 
earnings and avoid outflow funds such as foregoing positive net present value 
projects.  Or, they may accept negative net present value projects in order to foster 
“empire-building” or manipulate stock price (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007).  
Conservatism is important in executive compensation contracts because possible 
losses as a result of managers’ decisions are shown immediately in the financial 
reports; hence managers are not overpaid (Watts, 2003).   
 
Based on the theoretical argument that shareholders incur agency costs in order to 
reduce agency conflict, Kwon (2005) showed that conservative accounting was 
useful in controlling the suboptimal managerial decisions relative to earnings 
reported neutrally or liberally.  Conservatism also lowers asymmetric information 
and enhances value relevance of earnings, thus strengthening its role as a governance 
mechanism.  H. Lin (2006) showed that conservatism is effective in revealing 
managers’ private information on projects undertaken by the firm.  The study 
indicates that for a good project, managers are willing to employ conservatism as 
they could enjoy compensation in the period the project produces cash flow.  
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However, managers who undertake bad project are declining to employ conservatism 
because they will lose compensation in any such period.  Hence, the decision to 
employ more or less conservatism signals the prospects of the project undertaken by 
the managers.  LaFond and Watts (2008) asserted that accounting conservatism 
reduces asymmetric information as it provides hard information on verifiable gains 
and discloses possible losses which managers might decline to reveal.  With lower 
asymmetric information, managers are constrained from hiding unfavourable 
information.  Hui, Matsunaga and Morse (2009) investigated the effect of 
conservatism on management earnings forecasts; and showed that increase in 
conservatism reduced the frequency and timeliness of the earnings forecast.  The 
result is consistent with the role of conservatism in reducing information asymmetry 
and future uncertainty.   
 
With regard to the value relevance of earnings, Kim and Kross (2005) argued that 
timely recognition of bad news in earnings might affect the firm’s ability to generate 
future cash flow, which indeed makes it more pertinent for cash flow projection.  In 
order to test the notion, the study grouped the sample firms into a ‘conservatism 
increasing’ industry and a ‘conservatism not increasing’ industry.  The results 
showed that the explanatory power of the earnings to predict future cash flow 
increased in the ‘conservatism increasing’ group but not in the other group.  The 
evidence implies that conservatism improves the predictability of future cash flows.  
W. D. Brown et al. (2006) argued that the value relevance of earnings was reduced 
due to managers’ opportunistic behaviour in using accounting choice that favours 
their personal interest.  Since conservatism constrains managers’ expropriation 
activities, it therefore increases the value relevance of earnings particularly in 
countries with higher accrual intensity. 
 
2.5.2. Ownership Concentration 
 
The traditional agency conflict suggests that managers involved with daily business 
activities, tend to create asymmetric information and expropriate shareholders’ value 
(Bhasa, 2004); specifically by seeking higher salary, perquisites, job security and 
even direct exploitation of the firm’s cash flows (Eriotis, Vasiliou, & Ventoura-
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Neokosmidi, 2007).  Managers who hold private information have an incentive to 
use it for a private advantage that would result in violation of debt contracts, receive 
excessive compensation and overstate the financial figures to transfer shareholders’ 
wealth to themselves (LaFond & Watts, 2008).   
 
It was suggested that; managers’ interests would be aligned with those of the 
shareholders if they become part owners of the firm.  Managerial ownership however 
is not a solution to the agency conflict in East Asian countries because their 
ownership structure is highly concentrated.  In East Asian countries, conflict 
between majority shareholders and minority shareholders is more prevalent as 
decision made by the controlling owners may jeopardise the interests of the minority 
shareholders.  The controlling owners, who are in fact the management of the firms, 
or control the managers of the firms, can access managers’ private information and 
may take advantage of their controlling power to extract firms’ wealth for their own 
good.  According to Shleifer and Vishny (1986), the large shareholders have an 
incentive to proceed with expropriation activities to protect their investments.  The 
conflict of interest created by the concentrated owners, particularly the insiders, is 
the main issue in emerging economies.  Klassen (1997) however argued that inside 
concentrated owners have less incentive to be involved with income increasing 
behaviour through manipulation of accounting reports or to conceal their activities 
from the financial reports, as they communicated the firm value to the capital market 
through other channels than the financial reports alone.  However, Ball et al. (2003) 
stated that resolving asymmetric information through insider communication reduces 
timeliness in accounting earnings and reduces the quality of the financial reports and 
its disclosure.  Gomes (2000) argued that expropriation is costly to the concentrated 
shareholders because their wealth may be reduced if the minority shareholders 
discount the share price.  Whilst that assurance was based on bonding costs i.e. 
agents guarantee not to pursue action harmful to the principal (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), Young et al. (2008) argued that such care for reputation and credibility may 
be diminished in crisis periods; and the controlling shareholders choose to 
expropriate.   
 
Many studies have highlighted the unfavourable effect of concentrated ownership 
such that it may distract from capital allocation efficiency (Maher & Andersson 
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2002) and firms may employ weak internal controls, and thus increase the risk of 
expropriation (Bozec & Bozec, 2007).  Gibson (2003) stated that majority 
shareholders expropriated especially when they are also creditor, manager or 
customer; thus they can extract rents from the firm through these relationships.  With 
the decision power in firms, the managers may gain private benefit by diverting firm 
resources or spending funds on unprofitable projects (Lemmon & Lins, 2003).  In the 
Malaysian context, controlling shareholders increased their profit through related 
party transactions or earnings management (Rachagan, 2006).  The controlling 
shareholders not only expropriated but also concealed their behaviour through self-
interested accounting choices and concealed firm performance from outsiders to 
avoid disciplinary action (Korczak & Korczak, 2009).   
 
The entrenchment effect of the concentrated owners is adversely affecting the 
accounting information.  Concentrated owners produced less informative earnings to 
conceal their expropriation activities and to avoid outside monitoring, hence 
reducing the credibility of the information for outside shareholders (Fan & Wong, 
2002).  This finding is consistent with the finding of Haat et al. (2008) who found no 
association between corporate governance and transparency, or between 
transparency and corporate performance.  They argued that the users did not use 
annual reports for investment decisions due to it reporting less relevant information, 
or because of the availability of other credible and easily accessible sources of 
information.  The manipulation of financial information and less reliance on the 
reports however implies that concentrated owners may have more freedom to pursue 
their personal agenda.  Chin, Kleinman, Lee and Lin (2006) examined earnings 
forecasts of Taiwanese companies and found that firms with concentrated ownership 
structure issued less accurate and more optimistically biased forecasts.  They argued 
that concentrated owners used their power to manipulate the earnings in order to 
protect and promote their own economic position.  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) 
examined Malaysian listed firms and found that concentrated ownership increased 
the accounting returns but not the market returns.  Their results imposed doubts on 
the reliability of the accounting figures, while Dalton and Dalton (2005) argued that 
the accounting based measures are subject to managerial manipulation more than the 
market measures.   
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Ownership structure was evidently inversely related to conservatism, but the 
argument that explained the direction of the relationship varied.  For US firms that 
have dispersed ownership, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) argued that lower 
managerial ownership led to higher agency conflict; and thus the shareholders 
demanded for more conservatism.  Kung et al. (2010) who examined Chinese listed 
companies argued that, firms with concentrated owners employed less conservatism 
because the owners resolved asymmetric information through private 
communication.  Shuto and Takada (2010) examined Japanese firms and showed that 
managerial ownership at low and high levels were inversely related to conservatism, 
while at the intermediate level of ownership, they were positively related.  Consistent 
with LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008), Shuto and Takada (2010) argued that 
conservatism was employed to reduce agency conflict.  High managerial ownership 
indicates lower agency conflict, hence conservatism is needed less.  The actual 
motive for adopting lower conservatism at high ownership levels may not simply be 
due to lower agency conflict.  Evidence showed that concentrated ownerships do 
more harm than good particularly to the minority shareholders.  Fan and Wong 
(2002) and Chin et al. (2006) showed that concentrated owners created agency 
conflict between controlling owners and outside shareholders.  Further, high insider 
ownership were more likely withholding bad news in order to delay or avoid loss of 
wealth (Kothari, Shu, & Wysocki, 2009).  If managerial ownership does substitute 
conservatism as evident in LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) and Shuto and Takada 
(2010) or because concentrated owners have closely monitored the managers and 
have less concern on the financial reports (Ball et al., 2003; Dargenidou et al., 2007), 
it is believed that the wealth of the other shareholders could be adversely affected.   
 
Although managerial ownership helps to align common interests with shareholders, 
up to a certain point, the managers may become entrenched as their ownership 
increases.  Ding, Zhang and Zhang (2007) however reported that at an initial stage, 
the entrenchment effect led the owners to manage earnings upward, but reduced 
when cash flow rights reached beyond the point of full control.  The same effect may 
not be apparent in Malaysian firms due to its pyramidal and cross-shareholding 
structure of ownership, as explained by Thillainathan (1999).  Inside concentrated 
ownership adversely affects the corporate governance system, not only because they 
are the main reason that firms engage in earnings management (Leuz et al., 2003) but 
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also because they get to choose less effective internal governance mechanisms.  For 
example, where CEO and chairman positions are not separated, where there is lower 
proportion of non-executive directors on the board and no appointment of a non-
executive director as the chairman (Lasfer, 2006).  Horner (2010) argued that 
managerial entrenchment increases with an increase of directors’ equity ownerships 
in firms; and hence predicted that at low levels of equity ownership, directors choose 
to separate CEO and chairman roles but turn over combine roles when their 
ownership increases. 
 
S. N. Abdullah (2006b) showed that inside ownership should be neither too low nor 
too high, for the good of the firm, as both conditions can lead to financial distress 
status.  Similar findings were reported by Sanchez-Ballesta and Garcia-Meca (2007) 
on earnings management and Ming and Gee (2008) with regards to firm financial 
performance.  For Polish listed companies, Korczak and Korczak (2009) reported 
that earnings information improved only when the managerial ownership was 
between 25% and 50%, indicating that excessive managerial ownership is 
detrimental to the firm value.  Further evidence indicated that inside controlling 
shareholders were associated with low firm performance (Schiehll, 2006), low level 
of corporate social responsibility (Ghazali, 2007) and high earnings management 
(Sarkar, Sarkar, & Sen, 2008). 
 
Much evidence suggested the harmful effect of inside concentrated owners; but the 
outside concentrated owners are potentially an effective monitor.  The findings of 
Yeo, Tan, Ho and Chen (2002) suggested that outside large shareholders were good 
monitors in reducing earnings management as the shareholders improved 
informativeness of the earnings.  This is supported by Azofra, Castrillo and Delgado 
(2003) for Spanish firms as the outside large shareholders reduced earnings 
management.  However, Schiehll (2006) did not find an association between outside 
concentrated ownership and firm performance for Canadian firms, whilst Rahman 
and Ali (2006) found no association between ownership concentration and earnings 
management for Malaysian firms.  Rahman and Ali (2006) however, did not 
distinguish between internal ownership and outside ownership concentration as 
examined in Yeo et al. (2002) and Schiehll (2006).   
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Overall, the results of previous studies suggested that the inside concentrated owners 
have detrimental effect on the firm value whilst the outside concentrated owners are 
a good governance mechanism.  
 
2.5.3. Board of Directors Characteristics 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and Keasey and Wright (1993) suggested that the board of 
directors represent the highest form of internal control to monitor top management 
including the CEO.  Four characteristics i.e. board composition, board size, 
director’s skill and CEO duality are among important attributes of the board.  Jensen 
(1993) argued that these factors influenced the board’s role in monitoring managers.  
Director’s skill is an important factor because directors with a good understanding of 
business operations can effectively review the financial reports (Lanfranconi & 
Robertson, 2002).   
 
2.5.3.1. Board Composition 
 
Board composition refers to the participation of outside directors, also known as 
independent directors, on the board.  Relative to a separate system of control and 
decision, Fama and Jensen (1983) acknowledged that internal managers dominate 
the board because they can perform better if they are in the capacity to control and 
make decisions.  However, they further noted that dominant insiders are less likely to 
survive in a competitive business because of a lack of separation between decision 
management and decision control.  Hence it was suggested that the presence of 
independent directors on the board ensures board independence from the 
management, as it clearly segregates the management and control tasks.  In addition, 
independent directors can solve disagreements among the internal managers or 
between the internal managers and residual claimants. Thus, boards comprising 
independent directors will provide a counter balance so that the insiders do not take 
advantage of their position and sacrifice the shareholders’ wealth.  Based on the 
resource dependent view of Pfeffer and Salancik (2003), the presence of independent 
directors on the board will enhance the flow of information, and hence protect the 
firm resources and reduce uncertainty.  
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Previous studies investigating the effectiveness of independent directors on the board 
have mainly suggested that independent directors have a positive influence in the 
firm.  Beasley (1996) examined financial statements fraud, and compared board 
composition between firms where fraud occurred and those where no fraud occurred.  
It was reported that firms with no fraud had a higher proportion of independent 
directors.  Empirical studies also showed that independent directors are an effective 
monitor to the financial reporting process.  Evidence on UK firms produced by 
Peasnell, Pope and Young (2006) showed that independent directors reduced 
earnings management and the effect was more pronounced when the firms’ pre-
managed earnings were below threshold.  Additionally, findings of Koh, Laplante 
and Tong (2007) on Australian firms and Benkraiem (2009) on French firms, all 
support the significant role of the independent directors in mitigating the earnings 
management.  A UK study carried out by Beekes et al. (2004) and a US study by A. 
S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) both found that high proportions of independent 
directors were associated with high levels of conservative accounting.  A Spanish 
study carried out by Lara et al. (2007) also linked conservatism with the board of 
directors but used an aggregate index as a proxy for a strong board.  The study 
showed that strong boards incorporated bad news into earnings significantly faster.  
Weak boards, conversely, captured the good news faster than the stronger board.  
The evidence suggests that independent directors employ more conservatism to assist 
them in monitoring the management.  Ameer, Ramli and Zakaria (2010) reported 
that performance of Malaysian listed firms was high when their board of directors 
were represented by a majority outside directors relative to those represented by a 
majority inside directors. 
 
Although independent directors will enhance the monitoring efficiency of the board, 
concentrated owners are less likely to appoint them to the board.  The findings were 
presented by Dahya, Dimitrov and McConnell (2008; 2009) who examined firms 
with concentrated ownership from 22 countries.  They showed that independent 
directors improved firm value especially in a country with weak legal protection for 
the shareholders.  However, only some of the concentrated owners chose an 
independent board and it was mainly due to the need for outside financing to fund 
their investments.  In a similar vein, Setia-Atmaja (2009) examined concentrated 
ownership of Australian listed firms, and found that firms with concentrated 
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ownership had fewer independent directors.  They also reported that closely held 
firms with less independent directors, underperformed firms with more independent 
directors.   
 
Empirical studies have also shown that independent directors in firms with 
concentrated ownership are ineffective in improving governance of the firm.  P. 
Klein, Shapiro and Young (2005) reported that independent directors in firms with 
high concentrated ownership had a significant negative effect on firm value of 
Canadian firms.  S. N. Abdullah (2004) examined Malaysian listed firms for the 
period between 1994 and 1996, and reported that independent directors had no 
influence on firm performance.  Investigating New Zealand firms, K. Ahmed, 
Hossain and Adams (2006) found no association between independent directors and 
earnings informativeness.  A further study by S. N. Abdullah (2006b) for the study 
period 1999 to 2001, also failed to find any association between independent 
directors and financial distress status.  This evidence is consistent in suggesting that 
one contribution to the Asian financial crisis was the weak corporate governance 
associated with ineffective independent directors.  Rahman and Ali (2006) found no 
association between independent directors and earnings management for the period 
2002 and 2003.  Using data from 2002 to 2005, S. N. Abdullah, Yusof and Nor 
(2010) did not find an association between independent directors and financial 
restatements.  The evidence suggests that independent directors have no direct 
impact on the financial reports but the findings of Salleh, Stewart and Manson 
(2006) showed that independent directors promote other governance mechanisms.  
They argued that these directors were associated with higher audit fees because they 
demanded quality audit service. 
 
Overall, the results from the abovementioned studies imply that independent 
directors play an important role in governance but to effectively improve the 
governance, these independent directors must be sufficiently independent in practice 
to be able to limit the expropriation activities of the controlling shareholders from 
the minority shareholders. 
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2.5.3.2. Board Size 
 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) argued that firms should not appoint too 
many directors to the board and suggested a maximum of seven or eight directors.  
According to Lipton and Lorsch (1992), directors on a large board are less likely to 
criticise the policies of top managers, hence are subject to CEO control.  Further, 
large board tends to involve less meaningful discussion since too many directors are 
involved in the discussion, making it both time consuming and difficult to achieve 
cohesiveness.  Further, a large board is less effective due to slowness in decision 
making, is more risk averse and creates a free rider problem i.e. one member is 
depending on other members to monitor management.  Jensen (1993) recognised that 
overcapacity is caused by changes in physical technology, organisational practices 
and management technology.  However, too many people within the same 
geographical location cannot work together effectively.  Supporting Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993), Judge and Zeithaml (1992) found that a large 
board was less involved in strategic decision making and Forbes and Milliken (1999) 
reported that a large board led to a problem of coordination.   
 
Supporting a small board, empirical studies reported that large board size was 
associated with low firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; Mak & Li, 2001), 
high earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and low earnings informativeness 
(K. Ahmed et al., 2006).  Chang (2009) reported for Taiwanese firms, indicating that 
an increase in board size led to an increase in the occurrence of financial distress 
status.  They showed that the board size of financially distressed firms was 9.24, 
which was higher than those of the healthy firms with an average of 7.24.  The 
findings confirm the suggestion by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) that 
if board members exceeded 8, the board is ineffective.  Findings of Vafeas (2000) 
showed that a small board led to higher returns-earnings suggesting that fewer board 
members are better informed on the earnings of the firm.  Recent evidence from 
Larmou and Vafeas (2010) showed that for a significantly small board, adding more 
members increased the share return but when the size reached a certain limit, adding 
more directors would reduce performance.   
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In opposing arguments, Dalton and Dalton (2005) suggested that a large board offers 
a broader pool of knowledge and expertise, but Jensen (1993) argued that the 
problem of coordination in large board size can outweigh the benefit.  Also, Dalton 
and Dalton (2005) argued that fewer members on the board occupied themselves 
with decision making, and hence become less effective in monitoring the 
management.  The results from Akhtaruddin, Hossain and Yao (2009) partly 
supported the Dalton and Dalton’s (2005) argument, by reporting a positive 
relationship between board size and voluntary disclosure, though the positive effect 
was due to more independent directors on the board.  Nevertheless, evidence on 
board size is indeed mixed.  Bonn, Yoshikawa and Phan (2004) examined firms in 
Japan and Australia, and reported an inverse relationship between board size and 
performance for Japanese firms, but no association for the Australian firms.  Pietra, 
Grambovas, Raonic and Riccaboni (2008) reported that a large board reduced firm 
value only in small and medium firms, but not significantly in large firms.  Based on 
the complexity of the firm’s business, Coles, Daniel and Naveen (2008) reported that 
a large board was beneficial to complex firms because they have greater advisory 
needs, a larger degree of diversification and higher financial leverage.  In summary, 
a large board provides a better exchange of skill and knowledge but there is more 
risk that many members will be unable to coordinate well, and will create free rider 
problems. 
 
2.5.3.3. Board Skills 
 
Three relevant types of skill are examined in the literature, namely tenure of 
independent directors, financial expertise and multiple directorships, detailed as 
follows. 
 
Board Tenure: Firm-specific expertise 
 
Directors, who served on the firms’ board for a longer period, would have greater 
understanding about the firms’ businesses and eventually become more competent.  
Buchanan (1974) suggested that directors with firm-specific skills are more 
committed to the firm, which in turn increases their effort to achieve the firm’s goal.  
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Opposing this expertise hypothesis, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) preferred that there is 
a time limit for the directors serving on the board otherwise, the seasoned directors 
may assume some of the CEO functions.  Their suggestion implies that long time 
relationships between the independent directors and the management would impair 
the independence of the board, and hence defeat the purpose of having independent 
directors in the firm.  The management friendliness hypothesis proposed by Vafeas 
(2003) indicates that seasoned directors are more likely to befriend the management 
and become less effective in monitoring the managers.  He found that outside 
directors serving for twenty years and more became affiliated with the management 
as these senior directors were preferred in the nomination and compensation 
committee.  The finding suggests that the basis for the director’s appointment was 
more on preference than qualification.  Further, he claimed that longer tenure relates 
to the attrition process as they found that directors’ participation on committees and 
additional directorships reduced eventually with longer service.  
 
The empirical evidence on board tenure is mixed.  Peasnell, Pope and Young (2005) 
examined UK firms and reported that outside directors with longer tenure reduced 
earnings management, implying that directors are more competent to curb earnings 
manipulation.  Rutherford and Buchholtz (2007) showed that longer tenure reduced 
asymmetric information within the firms as it led to frequent information exchange 
with the other committees in the firms.  However, it did not determine the quality of 
the information gathered by the board, and did not lead to more proactive 
information seeking.  The findings of Chang (2009) indicated that board tenure was 
not a contributing factor to financial distressed status of the Taiwanese firms, though 
majority members of the non-financial distress firms’ board were senior directors 
relative to those in the financial distressed firms. 
 
Board financial expertise 
 
To monitor the financial reporting process, the directors must have accounting 
knowledge in order to produce quality financial reporting either to control 
manipulation or to make information more transparent.  Lanfranconi and Robertson 
(2002) pointed out that the collapse of Enron and WorldCom was due to the lack of 
knowledge of their board members.  Specifically, in the Enron case, the board 
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members did not understand its complex financial planning structures that used 
‘special purpose entities’.  In the WorldCom case, the board members had no 
knowledge of basic accounting principles, as they were not aware of expenditure 
being capitalised instead of expensed.  Hence, in the two cases one could ask how 
effective the directors were in carrying out their duties. 
 
Empirical studies showed that financial expertise is an important determinant of 
quality financial statements.  The findings of Agrawal and Chadha (2005) on US 
firms highlighted the importance of accounting knowledge among the outside 
directors.  Initially, they found that independent directors did not determine the 
probability of firms being required to restate their accounts.  However, when the 
study tested outside directors with financial expertise, the result was significant.  The 
finding implies that outside directors are effective in reducing the probability of 
financial restatements only if they have financial expertise.  Guner, Malmendier and 
Tate (2008) examined several types of financial expertise including financial 
executives, finance professors and bank executives.  The study reported that bank 
executives acting as directors on the board benefit the creditors but not the 
shareholders.  Specifically, bank executives were associated with higher debt though 
the firms had low investment opportunities.  The findings on the non-bank finance 
executives however confirmed that, this type of financial expertise promotes better 
governance as it led to less value-destroying acquisition. 
 
Very few studies explored financial expertise on the board as they focused more on 
the financial expertise of the audit committee.  Although the board assigned its 
committee with the oversight role of the financial reporting process, the quality of 
the reports remained the responsibility of the board members.  As noted by Volpe 
and Woodlock (2008), many boards have been charged to review major issues on 
accounting principle and financial statements presentation.  Hence, knowledge on 
accounting and financial aspects are of the utmost importance.  However, the 
highlight from the Volpe and Woodlock (2008) survey of 160 Fortune companies 
showed that the board members had a lack of knowledge on financial and accounting 
issues including basic accounting.   
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Overall, the empirical evidence showed that directors must have financial expertise; 
otherwise it may impair their ability to monitor the management, and hence be 
unable to detect irregularities in the financial reports. 
 
Multiple directorships: Firm-governance skill 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) suggested that outside directors develop reputational effects 
which reflect on them as an expert in decision control.  The value of the outside 
directors primarily depends on their performance as internal managers in other 
companies.  Accordingly, they signal to the market that they are expert in decision 
control, aware of the importance of separate decision control and are capable of 
working in the decision control system.  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) however argued 
that multiple directorships can adversely affect the directors ability to monitor the 
management as they are distracted by the affairs of other organisations.  The findings 
of Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2003) did not support the busyness hypothesis 
as suggested by Lipton and Lorsch (1992); since they found that directors with 
multiple directorships participated in other committees and attended more committee 
meetings.  Their findings support the reputational effect as suggested by Fama and 
Jensen (1983); since the firms’ abnormal returns increased subsequent to the firms’ 
announcement of the appointment of additional directorships.  Fich and Shivdasani 
(2006) argued that Ferris et al.’s (2003) findings could be driven by the methodology 
choices and econometric specifications as the study utilised cross sectional analysis.  
Fich and Shivdasani (2006) used panel data and reported that firms where the 
directors had three or more directorships experienced lower market to book ratios as 
compared to firms where directors had fewer directorships.  The results remain after 
using an accounting-based performance i.e. ROA.  Their additional analysis further 
heighten the belief that multiple directorships are associated with weak governance 
because these busy directors were less likely to remove the CEO of poor performing 
firms. 
 
Further, it was argued that multiple directorships improve information sharing on 
legal actions against other firms, thus avoid the same pitfall and litigation.  However 
Schnake, Fredenberger and Williams (2005) found that that multiple directorships 
were associated with an increased number of legal investigations brought against the 
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firms.  Their evidence is consistent with Schnake and Williams (2008) who found 
that multiple directorships negatively affect firm performance.  The study argued that 
informational advantage gained from other firms may be lost due to lesser amounts 
of time spent in the firms.  Saleh et al. (2005) showed that multiple directorships 
were effective in reducing earnings management only in firms with negative 
unmanaged earnings.  The study argued that directors in loss making firms are more 
likely to be replaced than those of the profit making firms and the result could have 
been driven by the motivation to secure their employment instead of reflecting their 
competency.  Other empirical studies not supporting multiple directorships were 
evidenced by low market performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), low accounting 
conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and high earnings management 
(Sarkar et al., 2008). 
 
2.5.3.4. CEO Duality 
 
CEO duality refers to the leadership structure where a company’s CEO also acts as 
chairman of the board.  Two competing theories that explain the consequences of 
this structure are agency theory and stewardship theory.  Agency theory argues that 
CEO and chairman roles should be separated since board responsibilities are to 
monitor the management including the CEO.  The stewardship theory perceives that 
the duality roles improve the leadership as there is no information breakdown 
between the CEO and the board.  Leadership structure adopted in UK and US 
provides an example of adopting these conflicting views (Coombes & Wong, 2004).  
UK follows the separate structure on the ground that the duties of CEO and chairman 
are different, thus split roles are crucial for board independence.  There are no 
recommendations on the leadership structure for the US firms but they need to 
provide justification for their selection. Those who combined the two roles believe 
that CEO acting as chairman is mostly beneficial in terms of communication, as it 
facilitates decision making. 
 
Consistent with the agency theory, Jensen (1993, p. 866) argued that CEO cannot 
become the chairman of the board because the chairman needs to independently run 
the board meeting, oversee the process of hiring, firing, evaluating and compensating 
the CEO.  Supporting the stewardship theory, Brickley, Coles and Jarrell (1997) 
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claimed that the dual role may diminish incomplete communication between the 
CEO and chairman, thus reduce internal conflicts and inconsistencies in decision 
making.  Furthermore, the CEO’s knowledge about the business allows timely and 
optimal decisions, resulting in better firm performance.  Similarly, A. Klein (1998) 
stated that inside directors possess more knowledge and expertise about firms’ 
activities which outside directors might lack.  Accordingly the dual role allows the 
CEO-chairman to utilise the information and increase the effectiveness of the board.  
Daily and Dalton (1997) referred to the joint structure as strong leadership and the 
separate structure as effective monitors.  It was suggested that the joint leadership 
provides a positive signal that the firms have a strong leadership and it is considered 
as a more efficient and reasonable form of governance.  Nevertheless, practitioners 
and financial communities prefer the separate structure as it works as a monitoring 
mechanism.  Farooque, Zijl, Dunstan and Karim (2007)  found positive impact of 
CEO duality on the financial performance of Bangladesh firms, and hence argued 
that owner-specific attributes such as entrepreneurial skill could have increased the 
firm value. 
 
Mixed evidence on the effect of leadership structure suggests that neither agency 
theory nor stewardship theory is superior.  However, most evidence suggests that the 
combined structure is harmful.  For example, Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) 
reported that firms that combined the CEO and chairman roles were more likely 
subjected to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for infringement of GAAP.  
A. Klein (2002) found that CEO who held a position in the nominating and 
compensation committees, manipulated the earnings by increasing the absolute value 
of discretionary accrual. Muniandy (2007) reported that Malaysian firms that 
combined the CEO and chairman position were associated with higher audit fees.  In 
contrast, the split structure is more efficient as it is associated with more accounting 
conservatism (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) and such firms performed better 
than firms’ board with duality roles (Rahman & Haniffa, 2005).   
 
Despite the complementing findings on the split of CEO-chairman roles, the findings 
of S. N. Abdullah (2004, 2006b), A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and Chang 
(2009) were not supporting agency theory or stewardship theory as CEO duality was 
not associated with firm performance and accounting conservatism.  Cornett, Marcus 
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and Tehranian (2008) reported that the combined structure had no influence on the 
earnings management of US listed firms.  Dahya, Garcia and Bommel (2009) 
showed that there was no difference in firm performance whether the firms split or 
combine the CEO-chairman.  Other studies showed that leadership structure is 
dependent on other factors.  For instance, Faleye (2007) found that CEO duality was 
beneficial to firms with a complex business; and might not harm shareholders’ 
interest if the CEO is a reputable person as the CEO may controls his or her 
behaviour to protect the reputation.  Lam and Lee (2008) reported that the joint 
structure benefits the non-family firms whilst the separate structure benefits the 
family firms.  The board of the family firms were more likely to be dominated by the 
insiders; hence chairman should be independent from the management to avoid 
conflict of interest.  Ramdani and Witteloostuijn (2010) performed a cross country 
analysis on Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea and Thailand and tested the effect of 
CEO duality on different levels of performance.  Their findings showed that CEO 
duality was beneficial for average performing firms but not significant for low 
performing firms and top performing firms.   
 
2.5.4. Audit Committee Characteristics 
 
The audit committee plays an important role in corporate governance as it is charged 
with the oversight role of the financial statements.  A vigilant audit committee 
ensures that probability of fraud on financial statements is reduced (Rezaee, 2003).  
Previous studies evaluated the effectiveness of the audit committee, amongst others 
on the composition of independent directors on the committee, the proportion of 
financial expertise on the committee and frequency of the committee meetings held 
per year.  
 
2.5.4.1. Audit Committee Composition 
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance stated that the audit committee be 
composed entirely by non-executive directors, with a majority independent directors.  
The recommendation is consistent with the merit of having outside directors, who 
could resolve any disagreement among internal managers and reduce conflict 
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between internal managers and residual claimants (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Further, 
it was argued that independent directors were less reluctant to question management 
decisions or policies (McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996) and provide a balance of 
power on the relationship between the board and management (McCabe & Nowak, 
2008).  Zain and Subramaniam (2007) proved this argument as they found that 
internal auditors put a significant trust in the independent directors to raise any 
controversial issues, especially from audit committee members with significant 
knowledge of investment.   
 
Much evidence suggests that audit committee independence mitigates agency 
conflict in the firms.  McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) documented that firms 
with financial reporting problems were less likely to have independent directors on 
the audit committee relative to firms with no financial problems.  Muniandy (2007) 
found that CEO duality increased audit fees; but the relationship was mitigated by 
the presence of independent directors on the audit committee.  The result of the study 
implies that auditors perceive that audit committee independence promotes a reliable 
accounting process.  The findings of Saleh, Iskandar and Rahmat (2007) further 
showed that audit committee independence led to lower earnings management.   
 
Whilst the studies suggest that audit committee independence enhances the quality of 
the financial reports, the findings of Owens-Jackson, Robinson and Shelton (2009) 
indicate that independence did not eliminate occurrence of fraud in reported 
earnings, even if the committee was comprised wholly of independent directors.  
This evidence is consistent with the results from meta-analysis carried out by 
Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) which indicates that audit committee independence is 
more effective in improving the quality of the audit than the quality of the financial 
statements.  They found that audit committee independence had a weak relationship 
with accounting accruals and in avoiding financial restatements but was strongly 
associated with auditor ratification and averting auditor resignation.  In a different 
context, Mustafa and Youssef (2010) reported that audit committee independence 
was not effective unless the independent directors are financial experts.  S. N. 
Abdullah et al. (2010) found that financial restatements increased with the proportion 
of independent directors on the audit committee.  Their result has two implications: 
firstly, the independent directors are effective, as noted by Pomeroy and Thornton 
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(2008) in that the independent directors revealed the need for the restatements, which 
often indicated a low quality of financial reporting.  Secondly, the independent 
directors are not effective, consistent with the Rose and Rose (2008) argument that 
financial restatements occurred due to earnings management and earnings 
manipulation, but were not detected by the members of the audit committee. 
 
In respect to conservatism, so far there is no study that investigates its association 
with audit committee independence except by G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008).  They found that audit committee independence did not influence accounting 
conservatism for US firms.   
 
2.5.4.2. Financial Expertise 
 
The attributes of financial experts as defined by the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) are to be attained through education and experience as (a) public 
accountant or auditor, (b) a principal financial officer, controller or principal 
accounting officer of an issuer, or (c) from a position involving the performance of 
similar functions (Bedard & Gendron, 2010, p. 189).  This definition was later 
broadened to include CEO or president (Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2003); following comments received by the SEC that the characteristics to be 
considered as financial experts are too restrictive, hence firms may not able to find a 
qualified one.  The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance indicates that all audit 
committee members must be financially literate and at least one should be a member 
of an accounting association or body (Securities Commission, 2007).  The Bursa 
Malaysia adopts the same condition in its listing requirements but has specifically 
stated that (a) at least one director must be a member of Malaysian Institute of 
Accountants, or alternatively, (b) must have at least three years working experience 
with (i) academic qualifications as listed in Part I of the First Schedule of the 
Accountants Act 1967, or (ii) a member of one of the recognised bodies list out in 
the Part II of the First Schedule of the Accountants Act 1967.  The definition of 
financial experts employed in Malaysia is therefore, strictly applied to directors who 
have qualifications and experience in accounting and finance. 
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With reference to the impact of the inclusion of non-accounting experts by the SEC, 
several studies have been carried out on US companies.  DeFond, Hann and Hu 
(2005) tested the market reactions upon the firms announcement of the appointment 
of accounting financial experts versus non-accounting financial experts on the audit 
committee.  The study revealed that the market reacted positively to the appointment 
of the accounting financial experts but not to the appointment of the non-accounting 
financial experts.  A similar result was reported by Davidson, Xie and Xu (2004) 
indicating that the market perceives financial expertise as a good monitor of the 
financial reports.  G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) examined the effect 
of accounting financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise on 
accounting conservatism and audit fees.  The main objective of their study was to 
identify which of the two types of financial expertise contribute to better governance.  
The studies found that only accounting financial expertise led to higher conservatism 
and lower audit fees, and then conditional upon a strong governance structure in the 
firms.  Similarly, J. Krishnan and Lee (2009) identified that firms faced with high 
litigation risks demanded financial expertise on the audit committee, and conditional 
upon strong governance structure in the firms.  Further, Dickins, Hillison and Platau 
(2009) performed a survey on the financial analysts or supervisors of US investment 
banking firms.  The study aimed to identify which of the financial attributes 
influence analyst confidence in the financial statements.  The study showed that the 
financial analysts were more confident if the source of the expertise was accounting-
based rather than supervisory-based i.e. the CEO.  The above findings therefore, do 
not support the inclusion of non-accounting financial experts adopted by the SEC.  
Complementing the above results, the finding of Goh (2009) suggests that non-
accounting financial experts are more relevant in the supervisory form of the task 
than in monitoring the financial reporting process.  It was evident that the non-
accounting financial experts were effective in the remediation of material 
weaknesses in internal control, whereas the accounting financial experts did not have 
a significant impact.   
 
McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) pointed out that a Certified Public Accountant 
(CPA) on the audit committee enhances the committee awareness of any issues in 
financial reporting, accounting and auditing.  Comparing the financial problems and 
non-financial problems of US companies, the study showed that those with financial 
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problems were less likely to have a CPA on their audit committee.  Similarly, Rose 
and Rose (2008) who performed an experimental study on highly experienced audit 
committee members found that, members with less accounting knowledge were 
more likely to rely on insufficient managers explanation on the accounting 
judgement relative to those with more accounting knowledge.  They affirmed that 
lack of accounting knowledge may give more freedom to the managers to manipulate 
the financial statements. 
 
Empirical studies have documented that financial experts contribute to better 
governance as they reduced aggressive earnings management (Bedard, Chtourou, & 
Courteau, 2004), associated with lower probability of financial restatements and 
fraud (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004), led to less financial restatements (Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005) and reduced misappropriation of assets (Mustafa & Youssef, 2010).  
DeZoort and Steven (2001) identified that audit committee members who possessed 
audit-reporting knowledge but not financial-reporting knowledge, provided a greater 
support for auditor in the dispute over material accounting policy choice issue, with 
client management.  However they argued that, high levels of accounting knowledge 
might have driven a great diversity of opinions among the members of the audit 
committee.  Yatim et al. (2006) produced contrasting results as they found that 
financial expertise on the audit committee of Malaysian firms led to higher audit 
fees.  They argued that higher fees may be related to quality of audit services 
demanded by the financial experts.  Rahmat et al. (2009) showed that independent 
directors on the audit committee of Malaysian firms were associated with low 
occurrence of financial distress status. 
 
Nevertheless, evidence also documented the insignificant effect of financial experts 
on the audit committee as they were not associated with financial restatements (J. W. 
Lin, Li, & Yang, 2006), did not reduce earnings management unless the committee 
members were active (Saleh et al., 2007) and did not explain the occurrence of 
variation between the unaudited and audited accounts of Malaysian firms (Raman & 
Saidin, 2009). 
 
Generally, much of the evidence indicated that financial expertise on the audit 
committee is a significant attribute of effective audit committee.  However, in some 
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cases the financial experts may not perform effectively if they do not get support 
from other governance mechanisms. 
 
2.5.4.3. Audit Committee Meetings 
 
The audit committee meeting provides an avenue for the committee members and 
auditor to discuss issues pertaining to the financial statements.  The auditor would 
not only evaluate the compliance of the financial statements with the accounting 
standards but also express judgement about the firm’s accounting choice of 
principles, disclosures and estimates (Kirk & Siegel, 1996).  This discussion would 
make directors more aware of issues that might require special attentions and 
eventually improve the quality of the financial reports.  The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance stated a minimum of two audit committee meetings to be held 
per year without the presence of the executive directors (Securities Commission, 
2007).  The actual number of audit committee meetings held per year however 
depends on the company’s terms of reference and the complexity of the company’s 
operation (Saleh et al., 2007). 
 
Frequency of audit committee meeting is commonly used in empirical studies to 
assess the diligence of its members.  Menon and Williams (1994) argued that 
frequency of meeting is a crude measure to assess the committee activity because it 
does not truly reflect the work accomplished or the effectiveness of the committee in 
achieving quality financial reports.  However, less frequent meetings do reflect lack 
of monitoring as inactive audit committees are unlikely to monitor the management 
effectively.  The use of audit committee meeting to proxy for active committee was 
also noted by Raghunandan and Rama (2007) who acknowledged it as the only 
publicly available quantitative measure that signals the diligence of the members. 
 
Most empirical studies showed that frequent audit committee meetings lead to 
favourable outcomes.  Anderson, Mansi and Reeb (2004) showed that creditors 
recognise the positive effect of active members on the reported earnings, as they 
found that frequent meetings led to lower cost of debts.  Abbott et al. (2004) found 
that frequent meetings led to lower likelihood of restatement and an active 
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committee had an average four meetings per year.  Farber (2005) who compared the 
meeting frequency between fraud and non-fraud firms reported that fraud firms held 
significantly few meetings relative to the non-fraud firms.  Further, the study 
reported that the number of meetings in the fraud firms increased gradually 
throughout the analysis period.  The finding suggests that the audit committee 
members become more active in monitoring the financial reporting process upon 
detection of fraud.  Owens-Jackson et al. (2009) also reported a negative association 
between frequency of meetings and occurrence of fraud.   
 
However, there are studies that do not support the importance of audit committee 
meetings.  Bédard, Chtourou and Courteau (2004) reported that frequency of audit 
committee meeting is not important if the members of the committee were 
dominated by the financial expertise and independent directors.  Audit committee 
meeting is also reportedly not associated with the occurrence of the financial 
restatement (J. W. Lin et al., 2006) and conservative accounting (G. V. Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008).  Rahmat et al. (2009) who examined Malaysian financial 
distress firms found no significant difference in the frequency of meetings between 
financial distress firms and non-financial distress firms; frequency of meetings did 
not determine the financial distress status. 
.   
2.5.5. Ethnicity (Culture) 
 
The influence of culture in accounting practice has long been acknowledged.  
Schuler and Rogovsky (1998) found that culture influenced corporate financial and 
operating strategies.  Hope (2003) also showed that culture influenced accounting 
system attributes such as authority, enforcement, measurement and disclosure.  The 
cross cultural work of Hofstede (1983) identified four cultural value dimensions 
namely individualism, power distance, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity.  Gray 
(1988) proposed an association between Hofstede’s cultural values with four 
accounting values namely; (a) Professionalism versus Statutory control, (b) 
Uniformity versus Flexibility, (c) Conservatism versus Optimism and (d) Secrecy 
versus Transparency.  Table 2.1 summarizes Gray’s hypotheses on the association 
between Hofstede’s cultural values and accounting values.  In regards to 
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conservatism, Gray (1988) proposed that someone with low individualism and 
masculinity but with high uncertainty avoidance may adopt a more conservative 
approach to measurement.   
Table 2.1 
Summary of Gray’s hypotheses 
Hofstede’s cultural values Gray’s propositions on the accounting values 
Individualism High 
 
Professionalism: High 
Power Distance Low 
Uncertainty Avoidance Low 
Masculinity - 
Individualism Low 
 
Uniformity: High 
Power Distance High 
Uncertainty Avoidance High 
Masculinity - 
Individualism Low 
 
Conservatism: High 
Power Distance - 
Uncertainty Avoidance High 
Masculinity Low 
Individualism Low 
 
Secrecy: High 
Power Distance High 
Uncertainty Avoidance High 
Masculinity Low 
 
Accounting conservatism is a significant accounting value dimension as it involves 
the fundamental attitudes of an accountant in the measurement of assets and 
reporting profits (Gray, 1988).  Hofstede (2003) suggested that the more an activity 
requires judgement, the more it will be ruled by value and hence influenced by 
cultural differences.  This idea was acknowledged by Tsakumis et al. (2009) in that 
applying judgement to arrive at conservative reporting is most likely to be influenced 
by cultural values, due to the principle-base of financial reporting standards.  
Managers or accountants are allowed to use their discretion in the accounting 
estimates, hence the decision arrived from the judgement could be driven by their 
cultural values.  In other words, national culture directly influences conservatism 
which then affects the measurement of the financial information.   
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The interest in Gray’s accounting values motivated empirical studies to examine 
Gray’s propositions.  Schultz and Lopez (2001) found that German and French 
accountants, coming from countries with higher uncertainty avoidance, provided 
more conservative warranty estimates than their American counterparts with lower 
uncertainty avoidance.  Doupnik and Richter (2004) examined accountants from 
Germany, categorised as a high-conservative country; and accountants from US, 
categorised as low-conservative country;  the results showed that German 
accountants displayed higher conservatism relative to the US accountants.  Guan, 
Pourjalali, Sengupta and Teruya (2005) examined five Asia-Pacific countries i.e. 
Australia, Japan, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore to identify the effect of 
Hofstede’s culture value on earnings management.  The study found that higher 
individualism led to higher aggressive earnings management; which is the opposite 
of lower conservatism.  However, Tsakumis (2007) did not support Gray’s (1988) 
hypothesis.  He employed an experimental method to examine the conservatism level 
of the US and Greek accountants on the recognition of contingent assets and 
contingent liabilities.  His analysis identified that the Greek accountants displayed 
lower individualism and higher uncertainty avoidance than the US accountants,  
suggesting that the Greek accountants should be more conservative than the US 
accountants.  However, their results actually revealed that the US accountants were 
more conservative than the Greek accountants.  
 
In Malaysia, Iskandar and Pourjalali (2000) analysed the substantial changes in the 
Malaysian economy and its culture from 1987 to 1997; and explained how these 
factors may influence accounting practices.  Their analysis indicates that 
individualism had increased due to increases in the country’s wealth and higher 
survival rate in the competitive market, because of more opportunities in business 
and urban migration.  The uncertainty avoidance factor, however, had decreased due 
to a lower inflation rate, improvement in quality of life and the ambitious vision of 
2020.  Following Gray’s hypothesis, Iskandar and Pourjalali (2000) categorised 
Malaysia as a low conservative country, supported by Ball et al. (2003) who found 
that Malaysian auditors and managers were less transparent especially in the 
recognition of losses. 
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It is important to note that Iskandar and Pourjalali’s (2000) analysis was on the 
national culture.  Culture as defined by Perera (1989, p. 43) is “an expression of 
norms, values, beliefs, and customs which reflected typical behavioral 
characteristics” that are widely shared in a specific society at a particular point in 
time.  Since Malaysia is a multiracial country, national culture may not explain 
behaviour of the ethnic groups in the country.  Specter and Solomon (1990) claimed 
that, the behaviour of different groups within a nation might not represent the 
national culture.  To predict the conservatism practices of the Malays and Chinese 
ethnic groups in Malaysia, it is important to identify their level of individualism and 
uncertainty avoidance.  Literature on the Malay and Chinese individualism are 
mixed.  Firstly, some studies argued that Malays are less individualistic than 
Chinese.  A. Abdullah (1992) presented cultural values of the Malays, as among 
others, faith in god, compliance, obedience, non-aggression and reciprocal 
obligations, hence indicating that the Malays have high uncertainty avoidance.  The 
Chinese however are referred to as gamblers or risk takers; implying they have low 
uncertainty avoidance.  Islam is closed to collectivism and protect the rights of 
private ownership (Baydoun & Willett, 1995); and since Islam is the main religion of 
Malays, they are expected to have low individualism.  Borrowing from management 
research, Hamzah, Saufi and Wafa (2002) found the Chinese to be more 
individualistic but had lower uncertainty avoidance than Malays.  They assessed the 
Malaysian managers’ leadership style and found that the Chinese prefered the 
delegating style of leadership, greater autonomy and being more directive.  Malays, 
in contrast, preferred a participant leadership style, where they preferred to get 
involved with the decision making.  This is consistent with A. Abdullah’s (1992) 
findings that Malays were more masculine because they preferred relationship-based 
as compared to the Chinese who were task-oriented in achieving career-success.   
 
Secondly, previous evidence indicated that the culture values between Malays and 
Chinese are indifferent.  L. Y. Lim (1998) stated that conceptually both Malays and 
Malaysian Chinese have high collectivism (low individualism) which differs only in 
terms of content.  Although Malays derive pleasure from community spirit that help 
to develop their sense of responsibility in helping others, the Chinese also have the 
same spirit but they channel it through associations that they build amongst members 
of the same clan, dialect or educational group, through which they offer help and 
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security.  This is supported by Juri (1999) who identified that Malays and Chinese 
entrepreneurs in Peninsular Malaysia mostly shared the same cultural values of 
masculinity, individualism and power distance, except that the Malays had higher 
uncertainty avoidance than the Chinese.  Selvarajah and Meyer (2008) examined two 
leadership styles of Malaysians, (a) managerial behaviour type was assigned to the 
Chinese and (b) personal qualities type was assigned to the Malays.  The study 
argued that the Malays were assigned to the personal qualities type because they 
were considered as sensitive individuals living in harmony, having secured good 
relationships with the community members.  The Chinese were believed to have 
persuasive powers and a strong sense of trust on leadership, thus relevant to the 
Managerial Behaviour type.  The results however showed that, both ethnic groups 
fell under the Managerial Behaviour type.  They argued that changes in mindset 
might have narrowed the commercial gap between the Malays and Chinese as the 
nation strives towards vision 2020.  A. Abdullah (2001) found religiosity was the 
only factor that differentiated the Malays from Chinese and Indian.  This is further 
confirmed by Fontaine and Richardson (2005) who found that the three ethnic 
groups; Malays, Chinese and Indian were not culturally different as they shared most 
of the cultural values examined in their studies.   
 
Thirdly, some evidence suggested that Malays have high individualism levels.  
Tamam, Hassan and Said (1996) reported that Malays middle-executives portrayed 
the individualistic attribute.  Haniffa and Cooke (2002) examined the Malays ethnic 
influences on voluntary disclosure in the Malaysian firms’ annual reports.  They 
predicted that Malays would provide less disclosure, consistent with Gray’s (1988) 
hypothesis, that low individualism and high uncertainty avoidance lead to secrecy.  
However, they found opposite directions that implied increased individualism in the 
Malays.  Similarly, Zawawi (2008) found that Malay employees in Nestle Malaysia 
acted individualistically in certain situations if such acts would be of benefit to 
themselves.  The evidence on high individualism for Malays is consistent with the 
claim of Iskandar and Pourjalali (2000) that Malaysia is experiencing modernisation.  
Rahman and Ali (2006) added that Malays wealth had increased since the 
introduction of the National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991 which provided 
positive discrimination in favour of Bumiputera.  As a nation becomes wealthier, 
individual behaviour appears stronger (Hofstede, 1983).  Patel, Harrison and 
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McKinnon (2002) examined the accountants’ professional judgement on auditor-
client conflict resolution.  Their survey on Malaysian Chinese, Australian and Indian 
accountants revealed that Malaysian Chinese had lower individualism because their 
decision could still be influenced by the client in order to maintain harmonious 
interpersonal relationships and to avoid conflict.  The Australian accountants, 
however, were less likely to resolve conflict by acceding to client demands and 
assessed the auditors’ decision as being more unethical than the Indian and 
Malaysian Chinese. 
 
The effect of the ethnic groups on reported earnings can also be observed from the 
political perspective.  Watts and Zimmerman (1978) suggested that high profit is 
sometimes associated with monopoly, hence firms will lower the reported earnings 
to reduce the likelihood of adverse political action.  The New Economic Policy 
(NEP) implemented by Malaysian government created political incentives to 
minority ethnic Chinese to not report higher profits (Ball et al., 2003).  Bumiputera 
firms that normally have a close relationship with the government might delay 
reporting losses because the government does not want to take the blame or to avoid 
foreign financing.  Ball et al. (2003) inferred that the phenomena will encourage 
income smoothing.  Evidence from Yen, Chun, Abidin and Noordin (2007) 
confirmed the political incentive argument, as they found government linked 
companies (GLC) managed earnings upwards while the Chinese family linked 
companies (CFLC) managed earnings downwards.  They argued that the 
compensation plan of the GLC is normally related to earnings; hence providing an 
incentive to the GLC to report higher earnings.  Incentives for tax saving might 
encourage the CFLC to show lower profits; because Chinese who are task and profit 
oriented may want to improve their cash flows so that they can maximise output.  
The political incentive, compensation incentive and tax saving incentive suggest 
Malays would report higher earnings whilst Chinese would report lower earnings. 
 
2.5.6. Moderating Relationship 
 
A moderating effect indicates if a relationship of two variables is affected by the 
influence of another variable.  Moderating governance factors employed in previous 
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studies are numerous.  Schnake and Williams (2008) used board size and outside 
directors to moderate the adverse effect of multiple directorships on corporate 
misconduct.  The study found that small board size but not outside directors, was an 
effective moderating factor.  Akhtaruddin and Haron (2010) who examined 
Malaysian listed firms, showed that the negative effect of board ownerships on 
corporate voluntary disclosure was moderated by independent directors on the audit 
committee.  Setia-Atmaja (2010) examined family controlled companies in 
Australian listed firms and found that independent directors on the board influenced 
the family controlled firms to pay higher dividends, and hence reduce potential 
expropriation of the minority shareholders’ interest.   
 
Whilst the above studies employed a single mechanism as the moderating factor, 
others employed aggregate and multiple mechanisms.  Strong governance has been 
employed in a number of studies as an aggregate measure of governance mechanism.  
DeFond et al. (2005) observed positive stock returns upon the appointment of 
financial expertise on the audit committee but it occurred only for firms that have 
strong governance.  The study argued that strong governance assists the financial 
expertise to increase the shareholders’ wealth.  The moderating effect of the strong 
governance on financial expertise is shown as studies indicated that financial 
expertise in firms with strong governance led to more conservatism (G. V. Krishnan 
& Visvanathan, 2008), reduced audit fees (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2009) and 
was demanded when firms faced high litigation risk (J. Krishnan & Lee, 2009).   
 
Using multiple mechanisms individually, Baek, Johnson and Kim (2009) examined 
the moderating effect of five governance mechanisms on the relationship between 
managerial ownership and level of discretionary disclosure.  The mechanisms are 
equity-based executive compensation, outside directors, block ownership, 
institutional ownership and market for corporate control.  They found that ownership 
structure mechanisms influenced the managers to disclose ownership and investor 
related information whilst the level of outside directors influenced the managers to 
report board and management process disclosure.  The results indicate that those 
mechanisms reduce the incentive of managers not to disclose important and relevant 
information to the stakeholders.  Pissaris, Jeffus and Gleason (2010) examined pay 
disparity where CEO compensations are largely more than incentive paid to other 
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employees.  They found that CEO duality, high board equity ownership and high 
debt level improved the positive effect of executive pay disparity on firm 
performance.  They argued that, (a) Unitary command hypothesis: highly 
compensated CEO, who holds chairman position improves his authority, (b) 
Incentive alignment: board equity contributes to strong governance and (c) Credit 
monitoring:  levered firms are subject to credit monitoring. 
 
Researchers have raised concerns that the corporate governance model adopted from 
developed countries does not work well in emerging economies due to its different 
institutional environment notably concentrated ownership structure.  In particular, 
previous studies suggested that the board of directors or audit committee in emerging 
economies are ineffective due to the dominant role of the concentrated owners of 
whom the majority are insiders.  Moderating effects provide direct indication 
whether or not the board of directors or audit committee is effective in influencing 
the concentrated owners’ behaviour; or whether the concentrated owners reduce the 
functionality of other governance mechanisms.  Cho and Kim (2007) examined the 
effect of large shareholders ownership on the relationship between independent 
directors on the board and firm performance.  They reported that initially the 
proportion of independent directors is positively related to firm performance.  
However, the performance reduced when the independent directors were interacted 
with the large shareholders.  Garcia-Meca and Sanchez-Ballesta (2009) performed 
meta-analysis on the effectiveness of the independent directors on the board in 
controlling earnings management.  Their study examined corporate governance 
systems (Anglo-American versus emerging system) in moderating the relationship 
between board independence and earnings management; and concluded that board 
independence in the emerging system was ineffective relative to the Anglo-American 
system.  Hu, Tam and Tan (2010) reported that concentrated owners in Chinese 
listed firms reduced firm performance; and board of directors and supervisory board 
in the firms could not improve the firm performance since their monitoring duties 
were hindered by the concentrated owners.  V. Z. Chen et al. (2011) found similar 
findings, where board meeting, CEO duality, independent directors and supervisory 
board could not moderate the adverse effect of the concentrated owners on the firm 
performance.   
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Previous studies argued that ownership concentration limit firms’ governance 
mechanism from function effectively.  One aspect to test this argument is to test the 
moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’ 
governance and conservatism.  Entrenched controlling shareholders may adopt lower 
conservatism, and hence may influence the firms’ governance to adopt lower 
conservatism.   
 
2.5.7. Methodological concerns on the corporate governance 
measure to test moderating effect 
 
Previous studies employed various approaches to examine corporate governance.  
Most studies examined a small subset of corporate governance provisions (L. D. 
Brown & Caylor, 2009) such as the effect of the proportion of outside directors, 
board independence or board size on the firm performance, earnings, share return or 
disclosure in the financial reports.  However, there have been increasing studies that 
incorporated a summary of corporate governance provisions to consider broad 
governance mechanisms.  Some of these studies used corporate governance ratings 
provided by the rating agency.  For instance, Klapper and Love (2004) examined 14 
emerging markets using a corporate governance ranking index calculated by Credit 
Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA).  Bauer, Guenster and Otten (2004) measured the 
quality of the governance based on Deminor’s corporate governance rating.  The 
rating covered between 249 and 269 firms included in the FTSE Eurotop 300 over 
the period 2000 to 2001.  Ariff, Ibrahim and Othman (2007) who examined the 
determinants of corporate governance ratings in Malaysia, relied on the Corporate 
Governance Reporting Initiative, 2004.  Their study constructed two portfolios to 
distinguish firms’ rating either at the top 50% or bottom 50%.  The rating took place 
in year 2003 and was used as the sample period of the study.  L. D. Brown and 
Caylor (2009) incorporated 51 governance provisions based on Institutional 
Shareholders Services (ISS), coding each governance provision as dichotomous 
depending on whether or not ISS considers the firms’ governance to be minimally 
acceptable. 
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Gompers, Ishi and Metric (2003) however, developed their own external corporate 
governance provision focusing on takeover defence provisions of US firms.  Cremers 
and Nair (2005) adopted Gompers’s index as a proxy of external corporate 
governance; in addition to an internal governance proxy by percentage shareholding 
of the largest institutional block holders and 18 largest public pension funds.  
Further, survey studies developed questionnaires based on the best practices on 
corporate governance.  Questionnaires formed by Drobetz, Schillhofer and 
Zimmermann (2004) were based on the recommendations from the German 
Corporate Governance Code and German corporate governance scorecard whilst 
Black, Jang and Kim (2006) utilised the 2001 Korea Stock exchange of corporate 
governance practices to construct a corporate governance index for Korean 
companies.  Similarly, Haat et al. (2008) constructed questionnaires to measure a 
disclosure index based on the national and international best practice guidelines as 
well as research studies. 
 
Several studies focused on internal governance mechanisms, specifically the board 
of directors and audit committee, as they provide the main emphasis in measure of 
best practices in corporate governance.  Studies examining moderating relationships 
have employed single, multiple and aggregate measures of governance.  Cho and 
Kim (2007) interacted the proportion of outside directors with large shareholders 
ownership, managerial ownership and block holding ownership.  Baek et al. (2009) 
employed several mechanisms: namely executive compensation, outside directors, 
block ownership, institutional ownership and market for corporate control and 
interacted them individually with managerial ownership.  Pissaris et al. (2010) 
employed CEO duality, Gompers’s index, board equity ownership and leverage, and 
interacted them individually with a pay disparity variable.  V. Z. Chen et al. (2011) 
employed four moderating variables: namely board meeting, CEO duality, 
proportion of outside directors and supervisory board and interacted them 
individually with ownership concentration. 
 
Since the governance variables in the abovementioned studies were tested 
individually, their approach on testing the governance effect are different from the 
following studies.  Cohen et al. (2004) and Lara et al. (2007) noted that interaction 
among different governance players improve the effectiveness of the firms’ 
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governance, hence the aggregate measure impacts the effectiveness of the overall 
governance employed in the firms.  Accordingly, Lara et al. (2007) employed an 
aggregate measure of governance of six internal mechanisms inclusive of the 
characteristics of the board, audit committee and the presence of remuneration 
committee.  Khanchel (2007) used the characteristics of the board of directors, audit 
committee and auditors to create board index, committee index and audit index.  G. 
V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) who examined US firms, used an 
aggregate measure of governance based on the board and audit committee attributes 
including Gompers’s governance index.  The variables considered in those studies 
are similar with a few exceptions: G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) did 
not include compensation and nomination committee and numbers of meeting in 
their governance measure as in Lara et al. (2007) and Khanchel (2007).  Auditor was 
included in the Khanchel (2007) study but not in the other two studies.  G. V. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008, 2009) however, included the institutional 
ownership and Gompers’s governance index in their governance measure.  
 
Different methods and measurements employed by previous studies to examine 
corporate governance indicate that the quantitative indicators of governance are 
highly subjective (Khanchel, 2007; Méon & Weill, 2005).  Additionally, the 
corporate governance index based on ratings or surveys were subjective in 
construction and hence may be biased, and of limited use to a sample of countries 
(Méon & Weill, 2005, p. 82).  Ranking was assessed on certain governance 
standards of the past, thus on historic data (Khanchel, 2007); for instance those used 
by Bauer et al. (2004) and Ariff et al. (2007) are relevant for studies in the year the 
ranking was made, but not necessary applicable for future studies.   
 
This thesis is interested to identify whether ownership concentration limits firms’ 
internal governance from function effectively.  Hence, to account for total 
governance mechanisms adopted by firms, the aggregate measure of governance is 
used to measure firms’ governance and discussed in Chapter 4, section 4.5.6. 
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2.6. Summary 
 
In general, even though conservatism practices divert from neutrality, the benefits 
that they offer especially in limiting the moral hazard problem, improving corporate 
governance and ultimately increasing firm value should be appreciated.  Therefore, 
in order to gain more understanding on the cost-benefit tradeoffs of conservative 
accounting, there is a need to identify factors that drive this accounting practice 
(Zhang, 2008). 
 
The results of previous studies have shown that strong internal governance is 
associated with the presence of independent directors, smaller boards, board 
members with skill and separation of CEO and chairman roles.  An effective audit 
committee to monitor the accounting process is also linked to its attributes such as 
the independent directors on the committee, members with financial expertise and 
meeting frequency.  Evidence showed that strong board attributes are associated with 
better firms’ performance and quality financial information.  Given that conservative 
accounting is an effective mechanism; it could assist the board and audit committee 
to overcome the agency conflict.  Therefore, it is expected that strong attributes of 
board of directors and audit committee lead to more conservative reporting. 
 
There is limited evidence in Malaysia on the influence of ethnicity over financial 
reporting.  The only study in Malaysia that associated ethnicity and financial 
reporting was conducted by Rahman and Ali (2006) but they found that ethnicity did 
not influence earnings management.  Other studies examined ethnicity in relation to 
audit fees (Yatim et al., 2006) and auditor choice (Ahmad, Houghton, & Yusof, 
2006).  So far, no study has examined ethnicity effects on accounting conservatism.  
The evidence on the Hofstede-Gray hypothesis also leads to mixed arguments with 
regard to individualism of Malays and Malaysian Chinese.  Some studies found that 
Malays are less individualistic than the Chinese whilst the others showed that 
Malays and Chinese are indifferent in respect to individualism.  Political factors, 
compensation incentives and tax incentives also influence these ethnic groups, which 
might lead them to act differently. 
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Many studies found and argued that corporate governance in Asia generally, is 
ineffective due to the presence of controlling shareholders.  They were associated 
with expropriation of minority shareholders’ wealth; weak internal governance 
system and low quality financial reports. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter explains the theoretical framework of this thesis and presents 
hypotheses to be tested.  There are ten hypotheses to be tested in relation to the effect 
of ownership concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee 
characteristics and ethnicity on accounting conservatism.  Hypothesis 11 tests the 
moderating effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’ 
governance and conservatism. 
 
Section 3.2 presents and discusses the conceptual framework employed in this thesis.  
Section 3.3 presents the hypotheses according to independent variables presented in 
the conceptual framework.  Section 3.4 summarises this chapter. 
 
3.2. Conceptual Framework 
 
Positive accounting theory suggests that conservatism is an effective tool to reduce 
agency conflict.  Based on the agency theoretical framework, this thesis includes 
ownership concentration and characteristics of the board of directors and audit 
committee to examine if they affect the use of conservative financial reports.  
Additionally, the role of cultural values in influencing behaviour may also affect 
directors’ judgment on accounting conservatism.  This thesis uses ethnicity as a 
proxy for culture. 
 
Referring to the framework in Figure 3.1, this thesis examines ownership 
concentration as classified into inside substantial shareholders and outside 
substantial shareholders (see chapter 4 Section 4.5.1 for definition).  This 
classification is made because previous evidence showed that outside shareholders 
demand better governance relative to inside shareholders.  Hence, their effect on 
conservatism may vary.  The board characteristics examined are board composition, 
board size, board skill (proxied by board tenure, board financial expertise and 
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multiple directorships) and CEO duality.  The audit committee characteristics are 
audit committee composition, audit committee financial expertise and audit 
committee meeting.  This thesis focuses on two ethnic groups: Malay (Bumiputera) 
and Chinese directors, who sit on the board of directors and the audit committee.   
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Figure 3.1: Conceptual Model Underpinning this thesis 
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CONSERVATISM 
Firms’ aggregate  
measure of governance  
(GOV) 
As shown in Figure 3.2, this thesis also examined the moderating effect of 
concentrated ownership on the relationship between firms’ governance and 
conservatism.  It is expected that firms that employ good governance practices would 
employ more conservatism; but concentrated owners may limit the function of the 
firms’ governance, and hence may lead to less conservatism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Conceptual Model on Moderating effect of Concentrated Ownership 
 
3.3. Hypotheses Development 
 
3.3.1. Ownership Concentration 
 
Concentrated owners who have a large investment in firms have access to managers’ 
private information; hence reducing the traditional agency conflict between 
managers and shareholders.  As a result of this advantage, concentrated owners will 
put less emphasis on the quality of the financial reports.  Dargenidou et al. (2007) 
argued that the majority shareholders have lower demand for accounting 
conservatism because they rely less on the financial reports.  Two competing 
arguments, namely the entrenchment effect and the substitution effect suggest that 
majority shareholders would lead to less conservatism either because they do not 
need a governance tool to control their behaviour; or their presence to monitor the 
management substitutes for the governance mechanism.   
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Previous studies however showed that outside shareholders’ demand quality 
financial reports as they improved disclosure in financial reporting (Yeo et al., 2002) 
and reduced earnings management (Azofra et al., 2003).  Since the effect of inside 
and outside shareholders on conservatism may vary, this thesis segregates the 
ownership concentration into insiders and outsiders.  This thesis presents the 
following hypotheses, 
 
H1a: The proportion of substantial shareholding by insiders is inversely 
related to conservative accounting. 
H1b: The proportion of substantial shareholding by outsiders is positively 
related to conservative accounting. 
 
3.3.2. Board of Directors’ characteristics  
 
Previous studies suggested that the characteristics of a strong board of directors 
relate to representation by independent directors, limited number of members sitting 
on the board, members possessing good skill and separation of CEO and chairman 
roles.  Independent directors are credited for being more experienced and for giving 
independent judgment over the board’s decision.  Evidence showed that independent 
directors reduced fraud on financial statements (Beasley, 1996), lower earnings 
management (Peasnell et al., 2006) and led to more conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & 
Duellman, 2007; Beekes et al., 2004).  Board of directors that are designed to control 
agency conflict would demand more conservatism because it provides them with 
early notice of any future losses and assists them in controlling managers’ 
opportunistic behaviour.  This thesis presents the following hypothesis, 
 
H2: The proportion of independent directors on the board is positively 
related to conservative accounting. 
 
Empirical evidence on board size suggests that larger board size in most cases 
reduces board effectiveness in monitoring management.  Though several studies 
indicated that a larger board has a broader pool of knowledge and has better 
monitoring capacity, the risks of having too many members may outweigh the 
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benefits.  Lipton and Lorsch (1992) claimed that a large board creates a free rider 
problem, slows decision making and members are less likely to criticise the 
decisions of top managers.  Additionally, a large board is less involved with strategic 
decision making (Judge & Zeithaml, 1992) and leads to coordination problems 
(Forbes & Milliken, 1999).   
 
Empirical studies showed that a large board was associated with lower firm 
performance (Mak & Li, 2001), higher earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) 
and higher occurrence of a distressed status (Chang, 2009).  In contrast, small board 
size led to a higher returns-earnings relation (Vafeas, 2000) and effective monitoring 
of the quality of earnings (K. Ahmed et al., 2006).  The previous evidence suggests 
that large board size is associated with weak governance ability; hence it may not 
promote conservative financial reports.  This thesis presents the following 
hypothesis, 
 
H3: Board size is inversely related to conservative accounting. 
 
Previous studies examined three types of skills contributing to effective governance, 
namely firm-specific expertise, financial expertise and governance expertise.  Firm-
specific expertise refers to the cumulative knowledge of the firm through directors’ 
longer service on the firm’s board.  Financial expertise refers to accounting 
knowledge that allows the directors to understand the process of preparing the 
financial reports; and the ability to make decisions that will enhance the quality of 
the information.  Governance expertise refers to directors’ experience obtained from 
their participation on the boards of other firms, which deepen their knowledge in 
solving various problems.   
 
Empirical studies showed that longer tenure reduced earnings management (Bedard 
et al., 2004; Peasnell et al., 2005) and reduced the occurrence of a financial distress 
status (Chang, 2009).  Directors that are expert in financial aspects have better 
monitoring skill, thus were more effective in enhancing the quality of the financial 
reporting (Lanfranconi & Robertson, 2002; McMullen & Raghunandan, 1996; Rose 
& Rose, 2008).   
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In regards to multiple directorships, previous studies argued that although 
directorships on the boards of other firms enhance the directors’ knowledge, they 
may not be able to apply their knowledge effectively because they are too busy, and 
hence have limited time with the firm.  Consistent with this argument, evidence 
showed that multiple directorships were associated with lower firm performance 
(Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006), lower conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) 
and higher earnings management (Sarkar et al., 2008).  The evidence suggests that 
longer tenure and financial expertise are attributes of strong governance, hence will 
lead to more conservatism to assist in their oversight role of the financial reporting 
process.  Multiple directorships are however, an attribute of weak governance that 
will likely lead to less conservatism.  This thesis presents the following hypotheses, 
 
H4a: Directors’ tenure is positively related to conservative accounting. 
H4b: The proportion of financial expertise on the board is positively related 
to conservative accounting. 
H4c: The proportion of directors with multiple directorships is inversely 
related to conservative accounting. 
 
Using stewardship theory, previous studies have argued that duality roles reduce 
internal conflict as incomplete communications are diminished when the two roles 
are combined (Brickley et al., 1997) and improve board effectiveness because 
executive directors are more knowledgeable about the firms’ business than the 
independent directors (A. Klein, 1998).  Daily and Dalton (1997) pointed out that 
separating or combining the CEO and chairman roles are based on two perspectives, 
either for strong leadership structure or for effective monitoring.  They further 
acknowledged that practitioners and financial communities prefer the separate 
structure.  In view of the presence of concentrated owners, especially insiders in the 
majority of the Malaysian firms, separating the roles may limit full control of the 
controlling owners over the board’s decision.  Driven by previous evidence that CEO 
duality created more harm to board effectiveness (Dechow et al., 1995; A. Klein, 
2002; Rahman & Haniffa, 2005), this thesis posits that the joint structure will lead to 
less conservatism.  This thesis presents the following hypothesis, 
 
H5: CEO Duality is inversely related to conservative accounting. 
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3.3.3. Audit Committee characteristics  
 
This thesis examines three attributes of audit committee, namely independent 
directors on audit committee, directors with financial expertise and frequency of 
audit committee meetings. 
 
Previous studies argued that independent directors on the audit committee improve 
governance because they can resolve disagreement among internal managers (Fama 
& Jensen, 1983) and confront controversial issues with the internal auditors (Zain & 
Subramaniam, 2007).  Empirical evidence showed that independent directors were 
associated with fewer financial reporting problems (McMullen & Raghunandan, 
1996), reduced earnings management (Saleh et al., 2007) and positively moderated 
the CEO duality effects on audit fees (Muniandy, 2007).  Since evidence indicates 
that independent directors on the audit committee reduce agency conflicts and are 
effective in monitoring the financial reporting process, it is likely that they will 
demand more conservatism.  This thesis presents the following hypothesis, 
 
H6: The proportion of independent directors on the audit committee is 
positively related to conservative accounting. 
 
The study of McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), Rose and Rose (2008) and 
Dickins et al. (2009) highlighted it is important for audit committee members to have 
financial expertise.  Similar to the evidence on financial expertise on the board, 
previous studies established that financial expertise on the audit committee reduced 
earnings management (Bedard et al., 2004), led to less restatement of earnings 
(Abbott et al., 2004) and employed more conservative accounting (G. V. Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008).  Since, users of the financial statements rely on the competency 
of directors to oversee the process of the financial reporting; it is more likely that 
financial expertise employs more conservatism to assist in their governance roles.  
This thesis presents the following hypothesis, 
 
H7: The proportion of financial expertise on the audit committee is 
positively related to conservative accounting. 
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The frequency of audit committee meeting is an indication of the diligence of the 
audit committee members as they would normally resolve issues with the auditors in 
a formal meeting.  Raghunandan and Rama (2007) stated that frequent meetings 
reflect active committee members. 
 
Empirical studies showed that frequent audit committee meetings led to lower cost of 
debt (Anderson et al., 2004), reduced the possibility of restatement (Abbott et al., 
2004) and lowered fraud occurrence (Owens-Jackson et al., 2009).  Accordingly, it is 
perceived that audit committee members who hold meetings frequently are 
concerned with the quality of the financial reports; hence will likely demand more 
conservatism.  This thesis presents the following hypothesis, 
  
H8: The frequency of audit committee meeting is positively related to 
conservative accounting. 
 
3.3.4. Ethnicity 
 
The evidence in literature to predict the effect of Bumiputera (or Malays) and 
Chinese ethnic groups on conservatism is mixed.  Empirical studies on the 
individualism component of Gray (1988) alone, produced mixed findings and 
arguments.  Whilst some studies showed that both ethnic groups were indifferent in 
terms of individualism (Juri, 1999; Selvarajah & Meyer, 2008; Sendut, 1991), there 
are studies that suggest that Malays had lower individualism than the Chinese (A. 
Abdullah, 1992; Hamzah et al., 2002) or Malays’ individualism had increased 
(Iskandar & Pourjalali, 2000; Tamam et al., 1996; Zawawi, 2008).  It is difficult to 
predict the effect of ethnicity based on the individualism concept.   
 
The political incentive and compensation or tax incentives suggest that the 
Bumiputera ethnic group prefer to report higher earnings while the Chinese ethnic 
group prefer to report lower earnings (Ball et al., 2003; Yen et al., 2007).  Based on 
these incentives, it is likely that the Bumiputera ethnic group will employ less 
conservatism but the Chinese ethnic group will employ more conservatism.  Haniffa 
and Cooke (2002) found Malay directors to be less secretive.  According to Gray’s 
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(1988) hypothesis, individualism has the same impact on secrecy and conservatism.  
Therefore, following from Haniffa and Cooke’s (2002) findings, Malay directors 
who were less secretive may suggest that they are also less conservative.  Consistent 
with the political incentive and compensation or tax incentives and findings of 
Haniffa and Cooke (2002), this thesis presents the following hypotheses, 
 
H9a: The proportion of Bumiputera members on the board is inversely 
related to conservative accounting. 
H9b: The proportion of Bumiputera members on the audit committee is 
inversely related to conservative accounting. 
 
H10a: The proportion of Chinese members on the board is positively related 
to conservative accounting. 
H10b: The proportion of Chinese members on the audit committee is 
positively related to conservative accounting. 
 
3.3.5. Moderating effect of Ownership Concentration 
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance stated that Malaysian firms should 
adopt the best practice of corporate governance to ensure better monitoring ability.  
However, previous studies argued that corporate governance system in Asian 
countries is not working effectively due to the influence of the concentrated owners.  
This evidence was documented by Cho and Kim (2007), Hu, Tam and Tan (2010) 
and V. Z. Chen et al. (2011), that concentrated owners limit the effectiveness of the 
firms’ governance mechanisms. 
 
This thesis predicts that firms’ that practice good governance would employ more 
conservatism.  However as many studies had argued, the performance of the firms’ 
governance mechanism could be adversely affected by the influence of the 
concentrated owners.  This thesis presents the following hypotheses, 
 
H11a: There is a positive relationship between firm’s governance and 
conservatism. 
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H11b: The power of the concentrated owners, represented by the percentage 
of ownership, negatively moderates the positive effect of the firms’ 
governance on conservatism.   
 
3.4.  Summary 
 
The first part of this chapter presents the conceptual framework in this thesis.  Four 
main independent variables were identified, which are ownership concentration, 
board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee characteristics and ethnicity.  The 
predicted effect of these variables on conservatism practices was explained under the 
hypotheses development.  There are seventeen hypotheses altogether; the first fifteen 
hypotheses test the relationship between the independent variables and the 
conservatism and the final two hypothesis tests the moderating effect of ownership 
concentration on the relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH METHOD 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter provides explanation relating to the data used in this thesis.  Firstly, it 
explains the sampling method and sources of the data.  Next, it describes proxies and 
the measurement of the variables.  This thesis employs a panel data methodology; 
hence procedures to examine the panel data are also presented. 
 
4.2. Sampling 
 
The sample companies were extracted from the population of all companies listed on 
the main board and second board of Bursa Malaysia.  A list of companies printed 
from the Bursa Malaysia website was used as a reference to extract firms’ financial 
data from Datastream.  Finance related companies were excluded because they fell 
under the Banking and Financial Institutions Act of 1989, which possess unique 
characteristics and operated in different compliance and regulatory environment 
(Chu & Cheah, 2006; Yatim et al., 2006).  PN4 classified companies, which are 
distressed companies with given time and opportunity to regularise their financial 
position to the minimum required of a listed company, were also excluded to avoid 
the influence of their financial condition on the results of this thesis.  Following 
Strong and Walker (1993) and S. N. Abdullah (2006c), companies that changed their 
financial year end during the sample period were also excluded.  Also, excluded 
were companies that had undergone significant mergers or reconstruction, and those 
with unavailable online annual reports.  Table 4.1 provides a summary of the initial 
sample. 
 
This thesis employed two measures of conservatism; namely accrual-based 
conservatism and asymmetric timeliness.  For a sample of seven years period (2001-
2007), i.e. nine years complete accounting data, t= 2000-2008 is required to measure 
accrual-based whilst ten years complete accounting data, t= 1998-2007 is required to 
measure asymmetric timeliness.  Accrual-based conservatism used an average three-
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year accounting data which is centred in year t.  Therefore, a measure in 2001 
requires financial data for 2000-2002; and a measure in 2007 requires financial data 
for 2006-2008.  Asymmetric timeliness measure used a three-year backward 
accumulation of earnings and share returns.  Thus, the measure for 2001 requires 
financial data of 1999-2001.  In order to be included in the sample, firms with fiscal 
year end before December 1999, must have complete share prices in the relevant 
months of 1998 so that share returns for 1999 can be computed.   
 
Table 4.1 
Derivation of Sample 
Sample selection from 2001-2007 
Total number of companies extracted from the Datastream 807 
Less:  
Financial related companies (42) 
PN4 companies (12) 
Companies that change financial year end (12) 
Companies involved with mergers or reconstructions (28) 
Missing share price in any period between 1998-2007 (270) 
Incomplete online annual report in any period between 2001-2007 (143) 
Initial sample 300 
 
After deletion of outliers, the initial sample of 300 firms for 7 years (2100 firm-year 
observations) was reduced to 2031 firm-year observations for accrual-based 
conservatism (CONACCR) and 2012 firm-year observations for asymmetric 
timeliness (AT).  Table 4.2 presents the sector representation of the data distributions 
in the two models; CONACCR and AT. 
 
Table 4.2 
Sector Representation of the Sample  
 CONACCR AT 
Sectors Firm-year 
observations 
% Firm-year 
observations 
% 
Industrial product 775 38 778 39 
Trading and Services 399 20 401 20 
Consumer product 347 17 324 16 
Plantation 165 8 164 8 
Construction 164 8 165 8 
Property 63 3 63 3 
Technology 62 3 62 3 
Infrastructure 28 1 27 1 
Hotel 28 1 28 1 
Total 2031  2012  
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4.3. Sources of Data  
 
Data was collected from two separate sources: Datastream and annual reports. 
Monthly share prices obtained from Datastream were used to compute stock returns.  
Market values or market capitalisation, which is a product of share price and number 
of outstanding shares, were also retrieved from the database.  Any missing financial 
figures from Datastream were acquired from the annual reports. 
 
The annual reports were retrieved from the Bursa Malaysia website at 
www.bursamalaysia.com.my.  Data on ownership concentration, board of directors 
and audit committee were manually extracted from these annual reports.  Data on 
ownership concentration were obtained under the analysis of shareholding section.  
Information on board of directors and audit committee were extracted from the board 
of directors’ profile and audit committee report respectively.  All relevant data was 
collected from 2001 to 2007, except those used to compute conservatism measures 
that required additional figures from 1998 to 2000 and 2008.  The sample period of 
this thesis starts from 2001 because it was the year in which Malaysian listed firms 
were required to make mandatory disclosure of the extent of compliance (or non-
compliance) with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance adopted in 2000.  
The starting year was chosen to ensure availability of the governance data in the 
annual reports and to ensure uniformity of corporate governance practices of all 
Malaysian companies. 
 
4.4. Conservatism Measures 
 
This thesis used two measures of conservatism; (a) accrual-based conservatism 
proposed by Givoly and Hayn (2000) and asymmetric timeliness introduced by Basu 
(1997).  Basu’s conservatism measure has encouraged many studies on accounting 
conservatism1(Givoly, Hayn, & Natarajan, 2007), but several studies highlighted its 
limitations as a measure of accounting conservatism (e.g.  Beaver & Ryan, 2005; 
                                                 
1 As at July 2006, Basu’s measure has been quoted by 270 published and working papers (Ryan, 
2006). 
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Dietrich, Muller, & Riedl, 2007; Pae, Thornton, & Welker, 2005).  Ryan (2006) 
acknowledged the criticisms2, but concluded that Basu’s measure remained as the 
primary measure of accounting conservatism.  Nevertheless, Givoly et al. (2007) 
affirmed the importance of incorporating several measures of conservatism, as 
reliance on a single measure to assess the conservatism of the reporting entity may 
lead to an incorrect conclusion.  This thesis follows Lara et al. (2009) who used 
accrual-based and asymmetric timeliness to measure accounting conservatism. 
 
4.4.1. Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR) 
 
Reverse pattern of accruals occurs when periods in which net income exceeds (falls 
below) cash flow from operation, is expected to be followed by periods with 
negative (positive) accruals (Givoly & Hayn, 2000).  Firms with a steady state are 
expected to converge accruals in previous periods to cash flow from operation in the 
subsequent periods.  Therefore, a consistent predominance of negative accruals 
across firms over a period of time is an indication of conservatism.   
 
The accrual-based measure of conservatism was computed as income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations (INC) plus depreciation expenses 
(DEPRN) minus operating cash flows (OCF) and deflated by total assets (TA).  The 
accrual value is averaged over a three-year period centred at year t, and multiplied 
by -1 and referred to as CONACCR.  The simple form is shown as follows: 
 
Accruals3 years = [(INC + DEPRN – OCF)] / TA  
CONACCR = (Accruals / 3 years) X (-1) 
 
Averaging over a number of years will mitigate the effects of any temporary large 
accruals, since accruals are likely reversed within one to two years (Richardson, 
                                                 
2 Ryan (2006,footnote no.2) states that “In my view, two well-known empirical results together imply 
the biases identified by Dietrich et al.(2007) are likely to be fairly small and so biases in returns-
based measures of asymmetric timeliness are likely to be correspondingly small. First, the low values 
of R2 observed in contemporaneous returns–earnings regressions suggest that the extent to which 
earnings causes returns is tiny compared to the extent to which both variables are determined by 
other, more primitive information. Second, a large literature, only some of which employs the reverse 
regressions of earnings on returns used to estimate asymmetric timeliness, exists that shows returns 
typically reflect information on a timelier basis than earnings”. 
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Sloan, Soliman, & Tuna, 2005).  The CONACCR value above was derived after 
multiplying by -1, so that higher value of CONACCR indicates more conservatism.  
Zhang (2008) noted that the accrual conservatism measured here is a non-operating 
accruals that summarise the actual recording of bad news and capture the asymmetric 
verification requirements as reflected in earnings. 
 
4.4.2. Asymmetric Timeliness (AT) 
 
Basu (1997) introduced asymmetric timeliness to measure accounting conservatism 
where share returns are used as a proxy for news about firm performance.  
Timeliness in earnings is measured using reverse-regression between earnings and 
contemporaneous returns that capture the difference in the effects of negative returns 
and positive returns on earnings.  A dummy variable (D) interacts with the return 
variable (R) to proxy for bad news (RכD) whilst the main effect on return (R) is a 
proxy for good news.  Basu’s regression model is presented as follows: 
 
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + εit  
 
Where:  
 
For each firm (i) and each year (t), 
Eit /Pit – 1 = Net Income before extraordinary items divided by beginning of fiscal 
year market value of equity; 
R = fiscal year share return; 
D = dummy variable is equal to 1 if returns are negative; 0 if otherwise. 
R*D = Interaction between R and D 
 
The sensitivity of earnings to good news is measured by the β1 estimate while 
sensitivity of earnings to bad news is measured by β1 + β3.  Positive coefficients are 
predicted for intercept (β0) and return (β1).  The positive sign for the intercept 
reflects the realised gain (good news) from previous periods recognised in the 
current year (Basu, 1997).  The value of β3 reflecting the incremental sensitivity of 
earnings to bad news compared to good news, and thus measures the accounting 
conservatism.  The coefficient of β3 is commonly referred to as ‘asymmetric 
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timeliness’.  Under greater conservatism, earnings will have higher sensitivity to bad 
news as compared to good news.  Accordingly, β3 is expected to be larger than zero. 
 
4.5. Measurement of Independent Variables 
 
This section provides the operational definitions of each independent variable 
examined in this thesis.  The independent variables are categorised as ownership 
concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit committee characteristics, 
ethnicity and control variables.  Table 4.3 provides a summary of the measurements 
used in this thesis. 
 
Table 4.3 
Summary of the Measurements of the Variables 
Variables Acronym Measurements 
DEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
1) Accrual-based 
Conservatism 
CONACCR Accrual measure=  
[(Income before extraordinary item & 
discontinued operation + depreciation - 
operating cash flow)  total asset]  3 
years X (-1). 
2) Earnings Price ratio Eit/Pit – 1 Net Income before extraordinary items  
beginning of fiscal year market value of 
equity. 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
Ownership Concentration: 
1) Inside Substantial 
Shareholders 
OCIN Percentage of substantial shareholding held 
by executive and non-independent non-
executive directors. 
2) Outside Substantial 
Shareholders 
OCOUT Percentage of substantial shareholding held 
by outsiders who are independent from the 
management. 
Board of Directors characteristics 
3) Board Composition BID Proportion of independent directors to total 
directors on board. 
4) Board Size  BS Natural logarithm of board size. 
5) Board Tenure BT Average years the independent directors 
served on the firm’s board. 
6) Board Financial Expertise BF Proportion of board members with 
financial expertise to total directors on 
board. 
7) Multiple Directorships BSHIP Proportion of board members with more 
than two outside directorships to total 
directors on board. 
8) CEO Duality BCD Dummy = 1 if CEO-Chairman roles 
combine; 0 if separate. 
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Variables Acronym Measurements 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES: 
Audit Committee characteristics 
9) Audit Committee 
Composition 
ACID Proportion of independent directors to total 
directors on audit committee. 
10) Audit Committee 
Financial Expertise 
ACF Proportion of audit committee members 
with financial expertise to total directors 
on audit committee. 
11) Audit Committee 
Meeting 
ACM Numbers of audit committee meeting held 
per year. 
Ethnicity   
12) Bumiputera Directors on 
Board 
BBR Proportion of Bumiputera directors to total 
directors on board. 
13) Bumiputera Directors on 
Audit Committee 
ACBR Proportion of Bumiputera directors to total 
directors on audit committee. 
14) Chinese Directors on 
Board 
BCR Proportion of Chinese directors to total 
directors on board. 
15) Chinese Directors on 
Audit Committee 
ACCR Proportion of Chinese directors to total 
directors on audit committee. 
Control Variables 
16) Auditor AUD Dummy = 1 if audited by big 4 audit firm, 
0 otherwise. 
17) Firm Size TA Natural logarithm of total assets. 
18) Profitability PROF Cash flow from operation  Total assets. 
19) Leverage LEV Noncurrent liabilities  Total assets. 
20) Sales Growth SGROW Annual percentage change in sales. 
21) Market to Book MTB Market value of equity  Book value of 
equity. 
 
4.5.1. Ownership Concentration 
 
Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of the firm’s outstanding 
shares held by the substantial shareholders.  Section 69D of Companies Act 1965, 
defines substantial shareholder as a person who holds not less than five per centum 
of the aggregate of the nominal amounts of all the voting shares in the company.  
The substantial shareholding disclosures in the annual reports indicate the 
shareholders’ direct interest and indirect interest.  Direct interest refers to shares 
directly purchased from the firm under the shareholder’s own name whilst indirect 
interest refers to the interest of individual shareholders (or firms) through shares 
owned in another linked company and/or through shareholdings by the shareholder’s 
family members.   
 
Many studies have used the top ten largest, the top five largest or the largest 
shareholders as a proxy for ownership concentration.  This thesis however, uses 
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substantial shareholders as the proxy because many Malaysian firms are controlled 
by certain parties via nominee names to remain anonymous (Chu & Cheah, 2006; 
Singam, 2003).  Selecting the largest shareholders, top five or top ten largest 
shareholders as the proxy for ownership concentration may not be accurate because 
the list of the 30 largest shareholders in the annual reports does not aggregate 
different securities accounts belonging to the same person.  The substantial 
shareholding, however account for total ownerships with five percent and more 
including through nominees and indirect holding via other institution or connected 
person.  Therefore, shareholders who fall outside the top five or ten in the list of the 
30 largest shareholders are accounted for under the substantial shareholding.   
 
This thesis classified the substantial shareholders into insiders and outsiders.  This 
measure is undertaken following a survey result due to Bursa Malaysia and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2002, that directors involved in management were also 
substantial shareholders of the company (Satkunasingam & Shanmugam, 2006).  
The insiders (OCIN) are substantial shareholders who are executive and non-
independent non-executive directors (or their family members) of the company or 
firms in which the executive and non-executive directors (or their family members) 
have an indirect interest.  The outsiders (OCOUT) are those, other than categorised 
under insiders, who are individuals or firms that are independent from the 
management.  The measures for the two types of substantial shareholders are (a) 
OCIN is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding shares held by the inside 
substantial shareholders; and (b) OCOUT is the percentage of the firm’s outstanding 
shares held by the outside substantial shareholders. 
 
4.5.2. Board of Directors’ characteristics 
Board composition (BID) is the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Bursa Malaysia defines independent directors as those independent of the 
management, and free from any business or other relationship which could interfere 
with the exercise of independent judgment or the ability to act in the best interest of 
the stakeholders.  BID was computed as the total number of independent non-
executive directors on the board divided by the total number of board members (S. 
N. Abdullah, 2006a; A. Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al., 2006). 
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Board size (BS) is the natural logarithm of total number of board members.  A 
similar measure was employed by previous studies, among others A. S. Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007), G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Lam and Lee (2008). 
 
Board skill is proxied by board tenure, board financial expertise and multiple 
directorships.  These three proxies represent different skills possessed by directors on 
the board that may influence accounting conservatism.  Board tenure reflects firm-
specific expertise; board financial expertise reflects directors’ expertise in 
accounting or finance, and multiple directorships reflect governance expertise.   
Board tenure (BT) is the average years the independent directors served on the 
firm’s board.  BT was computed as the total number of years of service of all 
independent directors on the board divided by the total number of independent 
directors on board (Peasnell et al., 2005; Rahman & Ali, 2006). 
 
Board financial expertise (BF) is the proportion of board members with 
qualifications or experience in accounting or finance, including those who are 
members of accounting professional bodies.  The definition includes directors 
who are current or former chief financial officers, accountants and former 
auditors.  BF was computed as the total number of board members with financial 
expertise divided by the total number of board members (Bedard et al., 2004; 
Saleh et al., 2007). 
 
Multiple directorships (BSHIP) are the proportion of directors on the board 
with more than two outside directorships.  A similar measure was employed by 
Ferris et al. (2003), Saleh et al. (2005) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006).  Many 
previous studies (e.g.: A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) used average number of 
additional directorships as a measure of BSHIP.  Fich and Shivdasani (2006) 
noted that an average number of directorships is a noisy measure as the number 
of directorships are widely dispersed.  This thesis found that average number 
could not be used because most companies did not provide a clear number of the 
directors’ additional directorships.  Rather, this thesis observed that the word 
‘several’ was used in place of the actual number of directorships.  This thesis 
assumed ‘several’ as more than two directorships.  BSHIP was computed as the 
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total number of board members with more than two outside directorships 
divided by the total number of board members. 
CEO Duality (BCD) occurs when the CEO is also the chairman of the board.  
Dummy was assigned as 1 if the roles of the CEO and chairman were combined and 
0 otherwise. 
4.5.3. Audit Committee characteristics 
 
Audit committee composition (ACID) is the proportion of independent directors on 
the audit committee.  ACID was computed as the total number of independent 
directors on the audit committee divided by the total number of audit committee 
members (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Salleh et al., 2006). 
 
Audit committee financial expertise (ACF) is the proportion of audit committee 
members with qualifications or experience in accounting or finance, including those 
who are members of accounting professional bodies.  The definition includes 
directors who are current or former chief financial officers, accountants and former 
auditors.  ACF was computed as the total number of audit committee members with 
financial expertise divided by the total number of audit committee members (G. V. 
Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008).   
 
Audit committee meeting (ACM) was measured as the number of meetings held by 
the audit committee per year.  The same measure had been used by previous studies 
to proxy for the diligence of the audit committee (e.g.: G. V. Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, 2008; Raghunandan & Rama, 2007)  
 
4.5.4. Ethnicity 
 
This thesis examines Bumiputera ethnic and Chinese ethnic directors on the board 
and audit committee.  
 
Bumiputera directors on board (BBR) were computed as the total number of 
Bumiputera directors on the board divided by the total number of board members.  
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Bumiputera directors on audit committee (ACBR) were computed as the total 
number of Bumiputera directors on the audit committee divided by the total number 
of audit committee members.  
 
Chinese directors on board (BCR) were computed as the total number of Chinese 
directors on the board divided by the total number of board members.  
 
Chinese directors on audit committee (ACCR) were computed as the total number 
of Chinese directors on the audit committee to the total number of audit committee 
members.  
 
4.5.5. Control Variables 
 
As in previous studies, this thesis included auditor, firm size, growth, profitability 
and leverage as control variables in the regression models, given the evidence of the 
association between these variables and accounting conservatism.  Sales growth and 
market to book ratio are the two proxies for growth; where sales growth is a control 
factor in accrual-based conservatism whilst the market to book ratio is a control 
factor in asymmetric timeliness. 
 
Auditor (AUD) was measured using binary variables; a dummy is assigned the value 
of 1 if firms were audited by big four audit firms and 0 otherwise.  Empirical 
evidence showed that the auditor influences financial reporting process; for instance 
appointment of a big six auditor led to lower earnings management (Becker, 
DeFond, Jiambalvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; Francis & Krishnan, 1999).  
Additionally, big-firm auditors were more widely associated with conservatism than 
were non big-firm auditors.  For instance, DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) found 
that big six auditors adopted more conservatism than the non-big six auditors.  
Chung et al. (2003) reported that large audit firms demanded more accounting 
conservatism.  Relative to small and medium size audit firms, large audit firms are 
more exposed to loss of reputation or legal action in case of audit failure.  Small 
audit firms are less likely to be sued because their ability to settle lawsuits may be 
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insufficient to cover the costs incurred by the shareholders or creditors.  A positive 
association is expected between auditor and conservatism. 
Firm size (TA) was measured by the natural logarithm of total assets.  This 
measurement was employed by Rahman and Ali (2006) and G. V. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008).  According to Watts and Zimmerman (1978), large firms that 
are exposed to more political costs will adopt more accounting conservatism.  
However, these political costs could be subject to the information asymmetry effects 
and the aggregation effects.  LaFond and Watts (2008) viewed larger firms to suffer 
less information asymmetry because they produce more public information.  This is 
supported by the findings of Givoly et al. (2007) where asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings of the large firms was significantly smaller than for small firms.  Thus, 
large firms with lesser information asymmetry may be exposed to lower political 
costs, hence adopt lower conservatism.  A negative association is expected between 
firm size and conservatism. 
Profitability (PROF) was computed as cash flow from operations divided by total 
assets, following A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and G. V. Krishnan and 
Visvanathan (2008).  Relative to profitable firms, A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) noted 
that unprofitable firms will be less likely to employ conservative accounting as it 
will decrease its profits further.  A positive association is predicted between 
profitability and conservatism. 
Leverage (LEV) was computed as total noncurrent liabilities divided by total assets 
following A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008).  As the demand for conservatism is partly from debt contracting, it is argued 
that highly leveraged firms may employ more conservative accounting in order to 
reduce the conflict between shareholders and debt holders.  A. S. Ahmed et al. 
(2002) reported that firms employed accounting conservatism and dividend policy to 
mitigate the debtholders-shareholders conflict, which in turn reduced the cost of 
debt.  Also, LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) documented that highly leveraged 
firms employed more conservatism.  Beatty, Weber and Yu (2008) reported that debt 
holders demanded conservative financial reports even though they had the ability to 
specify the financial numbers in the debt contract.  A positive association is expected 
between leverage and conservatism. 
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Sales growth (SGROW) is the percentage of annual growth in total sales [SGROW= 
(Salest - Salest-1)/Salest-1].  SGROW is included in the CONACCR regression model 
because A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) argued that growth in sales is likely to affect the 
CONACCR measure due to several reasons.  First, SGROW affects accruals items 
such as inventory and receivables; and in turn affects CONACCR.  Second, for firms 
with declining sales, CONACCR is a poor measure of accounting conservatism.  A 
negative association is expected between sales growth and accrual-based 
conservatism because higher sales growth will likely increase current accruals, 
which in turn reduces CONACCR. 
 
Market to book (MTB) was measured as the ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity.  MTB is a proxy for growth opportunity and needs to be controlled 
for in the asymmetric timeliness model because changes in growth opportunities can 
create variation in the asymmetric timeliness that are unrelated to accounting 
conservatism (Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007).  LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
stated that MTB is used to control for the effect of beginning composition of equity 
value on future asymmetric timeliness.  A negative association is expected between 
market to book and asymmetric timeliness. 
 
4.5.6. Moderating Relationship: Aggregate measure of firms’ governance 
(GOV)  
 
This thesis, which focused on internal governance mechanisms, is interested in 
identifying whether ownership concentration constrains firms’ governance from 
applying high conservatism practices.  The concentrated owners were identified as 
inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) and outside substantial shareholders 
(OCOUT).  Aggregate measure was used to measure firms’ governance (GOV) 
following the approach undertaken by Lara et al. (2007), Khanchel (2007) and G. V. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008); and because aggregate measure accounts the 
effectiveness of the overall governance employed in the firms (Cohen et al., 2004; 
Lara et al., 2007).  If Malaysian firms’ governance mechanisms are effective, the 
controlling shareholders might not be able to influence the firms’ governance to 
adopt lower conservatism.   
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To compute the aggregate measure of firms’ governance (GOV), this thesis 
incorporated eight governance mechanisms that are consistent with the 
recommendation in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and the empirical 
evidence.  The mechanisms are board composition, board size, CEO duality, 
financial expertise on the board and audit committee, audit committee composition, 
audit committee meeting and auditor to represent the firms’ governance.  As 
presented below, the empirical evidence has shown that these mechanisms have 
significant roles in determining the effectiveness of the firms’ governance. 
 
Board Composition  
 
Agency theory and resource dependence theory highlight the importance of having 
independent directors on the board so that the board could monitor the management 
effectively (Fama & Jensen, 1983).  Additionally, independent directors could 
protect firms’ resources and reduce uncertainty as a result from improving the flow 
of information between the firms and outside environment (Pfeffer & Salancik, 
2003).  Since independent directors are associated with strong governance, 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance dictates that Malaysian listed firms to 
comply with minimum one third ratios of outside directors on the board.  Empirical 
evidence showed that independent directors contributed to strong governance as it 
improved the quality of the financial reports (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; 
Beekes et al., 2004; Benkraiem, 2009; Dahya et al., 2008; Dahya, Dimitrov, et al., 
2009; Koh et al., 2007; Peasnell et al., 2006; Salleh et al., 2006).  Concentrated 
owners themselves acknowledged that the presence of independent directors on the 
board are a threat to them as evidence showed that, firms with concentrated owners 
had few independent directors (Dahya et al., 2008; Setia-Atmaja, 2009).  The 
evidence suggests that higher proportions of independent directors on the board 
contribute to stronger governance. 
 
Board Size  
 
The best practices in corporate governance suggest that firms should revise its board 
size that makes it function effectively.  Previous studies have shown that members in 
a large board were inactive in strategic decision making and had problem in 
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coordination (Forbes & Milliken, 1999; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992).  Most empirical 
evidence supported the Jensen (1993) and Lipton and Lorsch (1992) arguments that 
large board is ineffective for monitoring the management as it was associated with 
low firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009; Mak & Li, 2001), high earnings 
management (Rahman & Ali, 2006), lower earnings informativeness (K. Ahmed et 
al., 2006) and higher occurrence of financial distress status (Chang, 2009).  Hence, 
large board is considered an attribute of weak governance. 
 
CEO Duality  
 
The best practices in corporate governance suggest firms to separate the CEO and 
chairman roles; and require firms to disclose reasons if they choose to combine them.  
The requirement is a clear indication that the combined roles may impair the board 
independence.  Conflicting views of whether or not the CEO should hold the 
chairman position are explained by the agency theory and the stewardship theory.  
To promote good leadership, the stewardship theory suggests that the CEO and 
chairman roles should be held by one person.  However, from the governance 
perspective proposed by the agency theory, separating the two roles ensures board 
independence from the management.  Much evidence suggests that joint leadership 
structure weakened firms’ governance, as it led to earnings manipulation (Dechow et 
al., 1995; A. Klein, 2002) and higher audit fees (Muniandy, 2007).  The separate 
structure however, contributes to stronger governance as it was associated with more 
accounting conservatism (G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008) and increased firm 
performance (Rahman & Haniffa, 2005).  Lam and Lee (2008) showed that when 
insiders dominate the board, CEO and chairman roles should be separated.  The 
empirical evidence suggests that CEO duality is an attribute of weak governance. 
 
Financial Expertise on the Board and Audit Committee 
 
The quality of the financial statements remains the responsibility of the board of 
directors although audit committee has been formed to deal with issues relevant to 
financial reports.  This is consistent with Volpe and Woodlock (2008) argument that 
board members are responsible to review major issues on accounting principle and 
financial statements presentation.  Evidence has shown that financial failure was 
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caused by lack of accounting knowledge among the board members (Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005; Guner et al., 2008; Lanfranconi & Robertson, 2002).  In addition, 
audit committee members need to have expertise in accounting or finance to qualify 
them as monitor of financial reporting process.  Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance requires the members of the audit committee to be financially literate 
and at least one is a registered member of the accounting body.  The market 
perceives financial expertise as an attribute of strong governance as reflected by the 
increased in the stock returns following the appointment of financial expertise to the 
firms (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005).  Also, financial expertise 
enhanced the quality of the financial reports (Abbott et al., 2004; Agrawal & 
Chadha, 2005; Bedard et al., 2004) and enhanced governance through the demand of 
quality audit (Yatim et al., 2006).  Further, financial analysts preferred financial 
expertise over the non-accounting financial expertise (Dickins et al., 2009).  
Therefore, higher proportions of financial expertise on the board and audit 
committee contribute to stronger governance. 
 
Audit Committee Composition 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) and McMullen and Raghunandan (1996) highlighted the 
significant role of independent directors on the audit committee in reducing agency 
conflict.  Most empirical evidence showed the benefit of having independent 
directors on the audit committee as firms were less likely experiencing financial 
problem, the independent directors were associated with lower earnings management 
and they reduced the negative effect of CEO duality on audit fees (McMullen & 
Raghunandan, 1996; Muniandy, 2007; Saleh et al., 2007).  Since audit committee 
independence would contribute to better monitoring of the management, the 
Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance suggests that majority of the audit 
committee members must be represented by independent directors.  Based on 
empirical evidence, higher proportions of independent directors on the audit 
committee contribute to stronger governance. 
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Audit Committee Meeting  
 
Audit committee meeting is a place where the members of the audit committee meet 
and discuss with the auditor on accounting issues including those that arise from the 
internal audit.  Frequency of meetings therefore, reflects how active the audit 
committee members communicate with the auditors.  The best practices of corporate 
governance suggest a minimum of two meetings with the auditor without the 
presence of the management, but active members are expected to hold frequent 
meetings.  Number of meetings reflect the diligence of the committee members 
(Raghunandan & Rama, 2007) and most evidence suggests that frequent meetings 
improve governance as it was associated with less fraud (Farber, 2005; Owens-
Jackson et al., 2009), improved quality of the financial reports (Abbott et al., 2004) 
and led to less cost of debt (Anderson et al., 2004).  The evidence suggests that 
frequent audit committee meetings contribute to stronger governance. 
 
Auditor  
 
Auditor plays an important role in corporate governance as the auditor provides an 
independent assessment on the financial reports.  According to the best practice 
guidelines, audit committee members are required to have a close collaboration with 
the auditor to resolve any problems and conditions arising from the audit works.  
Since the auditor is regarded as an active participant in the governance process 
(Cohen et al., 2004), the audit committee members may not able to monitor the 
management effectively without the auditor’s support.  The big-brand auditors (the 
big 4/5 audit firms) are perceived to be a strong governance mechanism; as evidence 
showed that they provided quality audit service through higher qualified opinion in 
the case of detection of earnings management (Johl, Jubb, & Houghton, 2007), 
reduced earnings forecast errors (Ahmad-Zaluki & Wan-Hussin, 2010; Lee, Taylor, 
& Taylor, 2006) and influenced firms to disclose internal audit reports mandatorily 
and led to frequent audit committee meetings (Haron, Ibrahim, Jeyaraman, & Chye, 
2010).  
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Computation of GOV 
 
Following Khanchel (2007), percentile ranking was used to obtain GOV.  Higher 
score in the ranking indicates direction of stronger monitoring.  Procedures to 
compute the percentile ranking are explained as follows: 
 
(a) The eight mechanisms were ranked from bottom to top; small value was 
ranked bottom and high value was ranked top.  Firms that were ranked with 
highest score represent those firms having stronger mechanism.  With 
exceptions, larger board size reflecting weak governance and was ranked in 
reverse order where larger board was scored lower.  Similarly, firms that 
combined the CEO and chairman roles were scored lower than those who 
separated the roles.  The computations were run by the STATA statistical 
software, using syntax: egen rank_ (variable name) = rank (variable name).  
The egen syntax ensures that any tied values on the variables are ranked as 
an average score.   
 
(b) The ranked score of the eight mechanisms in part (a) were added and 
divided by eight and were assigned as the average ranked score of GOV.  
The average score was used to compute percentile rank, simply i divided by 
n (i/n) where i is the rank and n is the number of observations.   
 
Multiple regressions analysis was carried out to test the moderating effect of 
concentrated ownership on the relationship between GOV and conservatism.  
Moderated relationship tests the interaction effect between the focal independent 
variable and moderated variable; and interaction effect exist if the effect of the 
independent variables on the dependent variables changes depending on the value of 
the moderating variable (Jaccard & Turrisi, 2003).  Since this thesis wanted to test 
the effect of concentrated owners on the relationship between firms’ governance 
(GOV) and conservatism, hence GOV is the focal independent variable and 
concentrated owners i.e. insiders (OCIN) and outsiders (OCOUT) are the moderating 
variables.  The model summarises this moderating relationship as presented in 
Chapter 3, figure 3.2. 
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The interaction effect between GOV with OCIN and OCOUT was operationalised as 
follows.  OCIN and OCOUT were separately multiplied with GOV to represent the 
effect of insiders and outsiders on firms’ governance.  The two interaction variables, 
OCIN*GOV and OCOUT*GOV were included in the original regression models 
used in the hypothesis testing earlier, but excluded the eight variables that have been 
accounted for in the GOV.  An interaction effect exists if the coefficients on 
OCIN*GOV or OCOUT*GOV are significant.  For the asymmetric timeliness 
model, 3-way interactions were made to test the moderating effect of OCIN and 
OCOUT on the effect of GOV on R and RD.  The interacted variables are shown as 
follows: OCIN*GOV*R, OCIN*GOV*RD, OCOUT*GOV*R and 
OCOUT*GOV*RD. 
 
4.6. Regression Models 
 
4.6.1. Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR) 
 
The following regression model tests the influence of ownership concentration, 
attributes of the board of directors, attributes of the audit committee and ethnicity of 
the directors on accrual-based conservatism. 
 
CONACCRit = β0 + β1OCINit + β2OCOUTit + β3BIDit + β4BSit + β5BTit + β6BFit + 
β7BSHIPit + β8BCDit + β9ACIDit + β10ACFit + β11ACMit + β12BBRit + β13ACBRit + 
β14BCRit + β15ACCRit + β16AUDit + β17TAit + β18PROFit + β19LEVit + β20SGROWit + 
εit (1) 
 
Where: 
 
For each firm (i) and each year (t), 
 
CONACCRit  = Accrual-based measure of conservatism proposed by Givoly and 
Hayn (2000). 
OCINit = Percentage of substantial shareholding held by executive and 
non-executive directors. 
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OCOUTit = Percentage of substantial shareholding held by outsiders 
independent from the management. 
BIDit = Proportion of independent directors to total directors on board. 
BSit = Natural logarithm of board size. 
BTit = Average years the independent directors served on the firm’s 
board. 
BFit = Proportion of board members with financial expertise. 
BSHIPit = Proportion of directors with more than two outside 
directorships. 
BCDit = Dummy = 1 if CEO-Chairman roles combine; 0 if separate. 
ACIDit = Proportion of independent directors to total directors on audit 
committee. 
ACFit = Proportion of audit committee members with financial expertise. 
ACMit = Number of audit committee meetings per year. 
BBRit = Proportion of Bumiputera directors to total directors on board. 
ACBRit = Proportion of Bumiputera directors to total directors on audit 
committee. 
BCRit = Proportion of Chinese directors to total directors on board. 
ACCRit = Proportion of Chinese directors to total directors on audit 
committee. 
AUDit = Dummy = 1 if audited by big 4 audit firm; 0 otherwise. 
TAit = Natural logarithm of total assets. 
PROFit = Cash flow from operation  Total assets. 
LEVit = Noncurrent liabilities  Total assets. 
SGROWit = Annual percentage change in sales. 
 
4.6.2. Asymmetric Timeliness (AT) 
 
As presented in section 4.4.2, the following is Basu’s original model of asymmetric 
timeliness. 
 
Eit / Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + εit (2)  
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Where:  
 
For each firm (i) and each year (t), 
 
Eit / Pit – 1 =  Net Income before extraordinary items  beginning of fiscal year 
market value of equity. 
R =  Fiscal year share return. 
D =  Dummy variable is equal to 1 if returns are negative; 0 otherwise. 
R*D =  Interaction between R and D. 
 
Interaction of independent variables with equation 2: 
 
This thesis extends Basu’s original model to examine the relationship between 
conservatism and ownership concentration, board of directors’ characteristics, audit 
committee characteristics and ethnicity.  These independent variables and the control 
variables interact with each variable in Basu’s original model as shown in equation 
2.  The following model illustrates the interaction of OCIN with each component in 
equation 2.  Similar interactions are made with the remaining independent variables; 
OCOUT to MTB, but are not shown for clarity purposes. 
 
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4OCINit + β5Rit*OCINit + β6DitכOCINit + 
β7Rit*Dit*OCINit +  ............+ εit 
 
The coefficient of the interaction term R*D with the independent variable, represents 
the effect of the respective variable on asymmetric timeliness.  For instance, the 
effect of insiders on asymmetric timeliness, is observed on β7, which is the 
coefficient of the interaction term of R*D with insiders (R*D*OCIN).  If insiders 
employ more conservatism, β7 is expected to be positive. 
 
Basu’s original specification of asymmetric timeliness used a one year measure of 
earnings (Eit) and returns (Rit).  A one year horizon is, however affected by firms’ 
failure to record asset write-downs, since due to conservatism, previous increases in 
assets were unrecorded.  This is referred to as the “buffer” problem (LaFond & 
Watts, 2008).  Pae et al. (2005) stated that Basu’s annual coefficient understates the 
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degree of conservatism.  Also, Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) noted that the single 
period asymmetry is not a measure of aggregate conservatism but is an implication 
of asymmetric verification standards.  They stated that asymmetric timeliness 
measures estimated over several years would progressively eliminate time lags 
between returns and earnings.  Following this suggestion, A. S. Ahmed and 
Duellman (2007), LaFond and Watts (2008) and LaFond and Roychowdhury (2008) 
are amongst others who accumulated the returns and earnings over the past three 
years.  A similar approach was employed in this thesis. 
 
4.7. Research Design 
 
This thesis employed panel data methodology to examine the effect of the 
independent variables on accounting conservatism.  Panel data methodology has 
been adopted by previous accounting studies including Banker, Devaraj, Schroeder 
and Sinha (2002); Bhattacharya et al. (2003); Schiehll (2006); Sanchez-Ballesta and 
Garcia-Meca (2007); Ming and Gee (2008); Leng (2008) to name a few.  Data in this 
thesis was analysed using STATA statistical software version 11 as it is suitable for 
panel data regression. 
 
Panel data, also known as longitudinal data or cross sectional time series data, refers 
to data on the same subjects observed over several years.  Greene (2008) noted that 
some issues could not be studied purely by cross sectional or time series data; firms’ 
conservative accounting can be better captured if firms are examined for a longer 
period (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Roychowdhury & Watts, 2007).  This 
thesis examined 300 firms over 7 years. 
 
Panel data suggests that the subjects (countries, states, firms or individuals) under 
study are heterogeneous.  It means that although some variables vary across subject 
and time, there are many of other variables that may be subject-invariant or time-
invariant.  Subject invariant refers to factors that influence all subjects but varies 
across time.  Time-invariant refers to factors that are time constants as they are 
unique to the subjects.  It is important to include these type of variables (subject-
invariant or/and time-invariant) in the model equation; otherwise it leads to bias in 
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the resulting estimates.  The panel data methodology provides a solution to control 
these invariant factors that are not controlled for either in cross sectional or time 
series studies.  Additionally, a further motivation for using panel data is to solve the 
omitted variables problem (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 247).  
 
4.7.1. Advantages of Panel Data 
 
Over pure cross sectional and pure time series analysis, panel data has benefits,  
discussed in Hsio (2003) and Baltagi (2008) and presented as follows: 
a. Panel data provides a richer source of information as it accounts for multiple 
observations on cross sectional units.  Thus, it offers more variability and is 
more efficient in the estimation of parameters.  The informative data also 
provides more reliable estimates and tests a more sophisticated behavioural 
model with less restrictive assumptions. 
 
b. For pure time series data, serious multicollinearity problem appears among the 
independent variables (X); where current period independent variables (Xt) are 
highly correlated with those in previous period (Xt-1).  Hence, for panel data, 
differences in the X across cross sectional units can be used to reduce the 
collinearity.  This is due to the fact that the pooling of cross sectional and time 
series data increases variability that can be decomposed into variation between 
subjects and variation within subjects. 
 
c. Individual heterogeneity is controlled in panel data.  The panel data model 
resolves or reduces the problem of omitted variables, due to mismeasurement 
or no observed items that correlate with the included independent variables in 
the model.   
 
d. Panel data allows the researcher to study the complex issues of dynamic 
behaviour because it can identify and estimate effects that are simply not 
detectable in either pure cross section or time series data. 
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e. Panel data enables the researcher to identify an otherwise unidentified model 
which under usual circumstances may be undetectable due to measurement 
errors. 
 
4.7.2. Panel Data Analysis 
 
The simple OLS regression assumes that the sample companies were homogenous, 
thus do not account for heterogeneity unlike in the panel regression technique.  Jager 
(2008) investigated whether panel data that is analysed using a simple OLS 
regression technique produced a different result than if it is analysed using panel data 
techniques.  The results generated from the two techniques are substantially 
different; implying that adopting OLS technique on panel data leads to incorrect 
inference.   
 
Panel data observations cannot be assumed as independently distributed across time 
due to individual unique factors that remain constant over time (Baddeley & 
Barrowclought, 2009; Wooldridge, 2003).  Therefore, a single regression (also 
known as pooled OLS) applied in pure cross-sectional or time series analysis, which 
assume homogeneity, if estimated on panel data may lead to misleading inference 
(Baddeley & Barrowclought, 2009).  In simple pooling on panel data no adjustment 
is made for firm specific factors, resulting in autocorrelation, because for each year 
under study the firm unique factor was left in the residual.  Additionally, it also 
results in heterogeneity bias in terms of omitted variables bias because the firm 
unique factor is not included in the deterministic part of the model (Baddeley & 
Barrowclought, 2009).   
 
Panel regression models control for the heterogeneity effect in panel data using 
either a fixed effects model or random effects model.  The main difference between 
the two methods is whether the unobserved effects (the error term) are correlated 
with included independent variables (Wooldridge, 2003). 
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4.7.2.1. Fixed Effects Model 
 
Each entity has its own individual attributes, which are constant across time, that 
may or may not affect the dependent variables.  Fixed effects, which investigate the 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables within an entity, 
control for these unobserved unique attributes (the time-invariant factor) within the 
entity that may affect or bias the dependent variables.  Following the assumption 
underlying the use of a fixed effects method that the error term is correlated with the 
independent variables; this method removes the effect of unobserved time-invariant 
characteristics from the independent variables, so that the net effect of independent 
variables is assessable.  Therefore, the fixed effects method is unbiased as it controls 
for unobserved time-invariant factors but it may be inefficient if the correlation that 
it assumes is really zero (Allison, 2009).  
 
The fixed effects method can be implemented either by dummy variables or through 
the mean deviation method.  A dummy variables method is implemented by creating 
a set of dummy variables for each entity in the data set.  The coefficient of the 
entity’s dummy variables produced upon analysis represents an estimate of the 
unobserved time-invariant factors.  However, Wooldridge (2003) suggested that this 
method is not practical for data sets with many cross sectional observations.  Allison 
(2009) pointed out that this method imposes difficulty as it may be beyond the 
capacity of the accounting software.  The mean deviation method is an alternative to 
estimate fixed effects regression which is simple to perform using accounting 
software.  The mean deviation method implies that mean values for all time-varying 
variables is identified for each entity.  Subsequently, these entity’s specific means 
are subtracted from the observed value for each variable.  In this method, estimate 
coefficients for the time-invariant independent variables are not given, since their 
values are constant for each entity; subtracting the entity-specific mean of time-
invariant variables from the individual values yield a value of zero for all entities.  
Accordingly, the time-invariant independent variables are dropped out of the 
equation, nevertheless their effect has been controlled (Allison, 2009).   
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4.7.2.2. Random Effects Model 
 
The advantage of a random effects model over the fixed effects model is that time-
constant independent variables are allowed and can be examined in a regression 
model.  This result from the assumption that the unobserved effect is not correlated 
with the independent variables, whether or not they are fixed over time. 
 
Accordingly, a random effects model allows time-constant independent variables and 
does not drop them out of the regression model.  However, if it violates the 
assumption that fixed effects are not correlated with the disturbances reflected in the 
between effects, it may produce biased results. 
 
4.7.3. Hausman Specification Test 
 
According to Greene (2008), the assumption in random effects model that individual 
effects are uncorrelated with the other regressors has little justification.  Thus, it may 
suffer inconsistency should this correlation exist.  As noted earlier, the main factor 
that distinguishes fixed effects from the random effects is whether the error term is 
correlated with the included independent variables.  Hence, in order to choose 
between the fixed effects method and random effects method of panel data 
regression, the Hausman specification test is used to determine the existence of the 
correlation. 
 
Recall that the fixed effects model assumes that the independent variables are 
correlated with the error term whilst the random effects model does not.  Thus, the 
following hypotheses are to be tested: 
 
H0: Unobserved effect is uncorrelated with explanatory variables 
H1: Unobserved effect is correlated with explanatory variables 
 
The null hypothesis (H0) predicts the use of random effects and the alternative (H1) 
as fixed effects.  To test whether there is any correlation between the error term and 
the explanatory variables, the Hausman specification test is performed upon running 
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the fixed effects and random effects regression models (Baltagi, 2008).  If the 
Hausman test produces a significant p-value, the null hypothesis is rejected; hence 
the fixed effects model should be used.   
  
Two Hausman tests were performed, one each for the accrual-based conservatism 
(CONACCR) and asymmetric timeliness (AT).  In both conservatism models, the 
Hausman tests were significant at the 1% level, thus rejecting the null hypothesis.  
Accordingly, the fixed effects model clustered at firm level was used to estimate the 
effect of the independent variables on accounting conservatism.  Pirie and Smith 
(2008) who examined accounting information of Malaysian firms suggested that firm 
fixed effects model is a preferred specification in the Malaysian market because it 
provides more informative results as it incorporates fixed effects for individual firms. 
 
4.7.4. Diagnostic Tests 
 
This section explains the diagnostic tests performed on the data employed in this 
thesis.  First, the diagnostic tests on the data distributions in terms of normality, 
extreme outliers and multicollinearity are discussed.  Second, diagnostic tests 
specifically for the panel data are presented, namely contemporaneous correlation 
(also known as cross sectional dependence), heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
 
4.7.4.1. Normality 
 
Normality refers to the shape of data distributions for an individual quantitative data 
variable and its correspondence to the normal distribution.  Normality is a 
fundamental assumption in multivariate analysis, such that a sufficiently large 
deviation from normality will lead to invalid statistical results (Hair, Black, Babin, 
Anderson, & Tatham, 2006).  In multivariate analysis, the residual, which is the 
difference between the observed and predicted values, is assumed to be independent 
and normally distributed.  Accordingly, the residual is assessed for normality testing.  
Should the examination of residuals meet the assumption, it is unnecessary to check 
the normality of individual variables (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007)  
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Skewness and kurtosis are among the common statistical tests for normality.  
Skewness reflects the balance of the distribution, with the skewness of non normal 
distribution shifted to one side (left or right).  Kurtosis refers to “peakedness” or 
“flatness” of the distribution compared to normal distribution.  Tabachnick and 
Fidell (2007) claimed that the use of skewness and kurtosis statistical tests are 
sensitive in a large data set.  A variable with significant skewness or kurtosis often 
does not deviate enough from normality to make a significant difference to the 
analysis.  They suggest looking at the shape of the distribution on a graph.  The 
distributions of the residual based on standardized normal probability plots (pnorm), 
which are sensitive to non-normality in the middle range of data, was observed.  
Further, as recommended by Miller (1997), the residual was observed against the 
quartiles of a normal distribution (qnorm), which is sensitive to non-normality near 
the tails.  Hair et al. (2006) stated that the normal probability plot is a reliable 
approach as actual data values are compared with the cumulative distribution of 
normal distribution.  A line representing the actual data that closely follows the 
diagonal line (normal distribution) indicates normality.  Examination of the 
normality plot of CONACCR and AT models employed in this thesis indicated 
minor deviation from normality.  Since this thesis examined data from a large 
sample, this condition may not distort the results as significant departure from non 
normality may be negligible for a sample size of 200 or more (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
4.7.4.2. Outliers 
 
Transformation is one of the options to solve a normality problem cause by the 
outliers.  However, some authors have argued against it.  Grissom (2000) argued that 
the means of transformed data can occasionally reverse the difference of means of 
the original data.  Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) highlighted that data transformations 
are not usually recommended, although they are feasible as a remedy for outliers and 
for failures of normality.  
 
This thesis detected multivariate outliers using the method developed by Hadi (1992, 
1994).  The procedure was conducted using the hadimvo syntax, which method is 
more robust than the classical Mahalanobis Distance (Hadi, 1992).  Extreme points 
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identified were further investigated to ensure that they were not due to data entry 
error.  Upon deletion of the outliers, the initial sample of 300 companies observed 
from year 2001 to 2007 (2100 firm-year observations) were reduced to 2031 firm-
year observations for CONACCR model and 2012 firm-year observations for AT 
model. 
 
4.7.4.3. Multicollinearity 
 
According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007) and Hair et al. (2006), a multicollinearity 
problem exists if the correlation between independent variables exceeds 0.9.  The 
Pearson and Spearman correlations shown in Table 5.4 indicated that the highest 
correlation was between Bumiputera directors on board (BBR) and Bumiputera 
directors on audit committee (ACBR) at 0.71.  Also, correlation between Chinese 
directors on board (BCR) and Chinese directors on audit committee (ACCR) was 
0.73. 
 
In addition to the correlation values, the test on the variance inflation factor (VIF) is 
performed since multicollinearity cannot necessarily be detected or ruled out by 
examining the matrix of the correlations between variables (Hamilton, 2009).  VIF is 
an indicator of the effect that the other independent variables have on the standard 
error of a regression coefficient.  VIF that exceeds 10 suggests collinearity problems.  
The VIF test ran on the independent variables used in this thesis showed that the 
highest VIF was 7.91 for ACCR.  The above correlation and VIF values suggest that 
there is no multicollinearity problem between the independent variables; hence these 
variables can be fitted into one regression model. 
 
4.7.4.4. Contemporaneous Correlation 
 
Contemporaneous correlation, also known as cross sectional dependence refers to the 
correlation of unobserved factors across units.  This cross-sectional dependence is 
more likely to occur for a sample with cross-section units (Wooldridge, 2003).  
Hoyos and Sarafidis (2006) suggested that strong interdependencies between cross-
sectional units can plausibly follow from the economic and financial factors that are 
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integrated in country and financial entities.  Thus, a similar response could have been 
experienced by individuals as explained by genuinely interdependent preferences, 
neighbourhood effects, herd behaviours and social norms.  Ignoring its presence will 
cause bias in the standard error estimation.  The test on cross-sectional dependence 
in STATA was performed using xtcds, pesaran syntax which is valid for panel data 
that has large N and small T (Hoyos & Sarafidis, 2006).  This procedure implements 
a parametric testing procedure proposed by Pesaran (2004). 
 
The test on cross-sectional dependence was carried out on the two regression models 
employed in this thesis, which are accrual-based conservatism (CONACCR) and 
asymmetric timeliness (AT), but only the test on the AT model showed a significant 
p-value indicating the presence of cross sectional dependence.  Accordingly, 
standard errors with the presence of cross sectional dependence need to be corrected. 
 
4.7.4.5. Heteroskedasticity 
 
Homoskedasticity is where the error process is independently and identically 
distributed.  Although the error process may be homoskedastic within cross-
sectional units, its variance may differ across units: a condition known as groupwise 
heteroskedasticity (Baum, 2001).  According to Baltagi (2008), assuming 
homoskedasticity in regression disturbances of panel data model is a restrictive 
assumption because every unit has its own individual characteristics or heterogeneity 
which remains constant overtime. 
 
Baltagi (2008) further stated that ignoring the presence of heteroskedasticity 
produced a consistent but inefficient estimate of the regression coefficients, and the 
standard errors of these estimates would be biased.  Heteroskedasticity of the error 
term is tested based on a modified Wald statistic (Baltagi, 2008).  This test was 
performed using xttest3 syntax in STATA.  The test carried out on CONACCR and 
AT models confirmed the presence of heteroskedasticity in the residual.  
Accordingly, standard errors with the presence of heteroskedasticity need to be 
corrected. 
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4.7.4.6. Autocorrelation 
 
Autocorrelation, also known as serial correlation, refers to the correlation of error 
components across time periods.  This condition violates the classical assumption of 
regression analysis but it is a reasonable characteristic of error term in time series 
analysis (Wooldridge, 2003).  Autocorrelation is likely to have more substantial 
influence on the estimated covariance matrix of the least square estimator than is 
heteroskedasticity (Greene, 2008, p. 211). 
 
The tests to detect the presence of autocorrelation was carried out using xtserial 
syntax in STATA, which implements a test for serial correlation in the idiosyncratic 
errors of a linear panel-data model, as discussed by Wooldridge (2002).  The tests on 
CONACCR and AT models confirmed the presence of autocorrelation. 
 
4.8. Robust Standard Error 
 
The diagnostic tests on the panel data detected the presence of cross sectional 
dependence, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residual of the AT model.  
According to Sarafidis, Yamagata and Robertson (2009), time dummies are a 
popular approach undertaken by researchers to overcome the cross sectional 
dependence problem.  However, Sarafidis et al. (2009) claimed that the time 
dummies are not effective if all pairs of cross section units do not have identical 
cross section dependence, which is commonly the case.  Researchers generally make 
this assumption such that time dummies in models purge the cross section 
dependence (Hoechle, 2007).  Petersen (2009) explained that time dummies will 
remove the cross sectional dependence completely, only if the time effect is fixed.  If 
the time effect is not fixed, cross sectional dependence will remain and a robust 
standard error clustered by firm can be biased.  Accordingly, this thesis corrected for 
the cross sectional dependence in the AT model by employing the fixed effects panel 
regression estimates based on Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors.  Driscoll 
and Kraay’s (1998) standard errors is a nonparametric covariance matrix estimator 
that is robust to cross sectional dependence, heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
(Hoechle, 2007).  This procedure was performed using xtscc syntax in STATA. 
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As for the CONACCR model, the diagnostic tests detected the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation in the residual.  Hence, the standard errors in 
the CONACCR model were estimated based on Rogers (1993) clustered at firm 
level.  Clustering at firm level, also called firm fixed effects, produces an estimator 
that is robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and within-panel correlation.  This 
technique ensures that valid statistical inference on the coefficient is made.   
 
4.9. Goodness of Fit 
 
Panel data regression reports three R2 values; (a) R2 within, (b) R2 between and (c) R2 
overall.  As explained in section 4.7.3, this thesis ran fixed effects regressions, hence 
R2 within is used as a measure of goodness of fit of the models (StataCorp, 2009). 
 
4.10. Summary 
 
This chapter discusses the research method employed in this thesis.  In order to meet 
the objectives of this thesis, accounting data and corporate governance data were 
retrieved from Datastream and firms’ annual reports.  A sample of 300 companies 
over a seven-year period was selected but reduced after deletion of outliers. 
 
This thesis adopted two measures of conservatism, namely accrual-based 
conservatism and asymmetric timeliness.  In respect of independent variables, inside 
and outside substantial shareholders were investigated under the ownership 
concentration.  The attributes of board of directors examined in this thesis were 
extensive covering board composition, board size, board tenure, board financial 
expertise, multiple directorships and CEO duality.  Three attributes of audit 
committee explored in this thesis were audit committee composition, financial 
expertise and audit committee meeting.  Bumiputera and Chinese ethnic groups on 
the board of directors and audit committee were identified to investigate their effect 
on conservatism. 
 
Based on the Hausman specification test, this thesis employed a firm fixed effects 
model.  Diagnostic tests on the data in respect to normality, outliers and 
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multicollinearity were run.  Additionally, diagnostic tests specifically on panel data 
were carried out to determine an appropriate panel regression model that will 
produces robust standard errors.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS 
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
This chapter reports the findings of this thesis.  The sections are organised as 
follows.  Section 5.2 presents the descriptive statistics of all variables employed in 
the regression model.  Section 5.3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlation 
analysis.  Section 5.4 reports the results of the multiple regression models.  Section 
5.5 presents the results of several additional analyses to identify the robustness of the 
earlier tests.  Section 5.6 presents the results on the moderating effect of ownership 
concentration.  Section 5.7 summarises the overall findings of this thesis.  
 
5.2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the full sample of 2,031 firm-year 
observations which were used to run the accrual-based conservatism (CONACCR) 
model.  E/P, R and MTB used in the asymmetric timeliness (AT) model were based 
on 2012 firm-year observations.  The mean value of the CONACCR is -0.006 lower 
than the mean value of accrual-based conservatism for US firms at 0.010 reported by 
both A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008).  Different institutional factors, such as ownership structure, might have 
driven this discrepancy, as Malaysian firms’ ownership structure is highly 
concentrated to large shareholders in contrast to widely held ownership structure in 
US.   
 
The descriptive statistics showed that the mean ownership by insiders (OCIN) was 
31.03% and mean ownership by outsiders (OCOUT) was 22.48%.  Mean value of 
OCIN found in this thesis (and previously documented by other Malaysian studies) 
is far higher than those reported by studies in other countries.  For instance, LaFond 
and Roychowdhury (2008) who examined US firms, reported a mean ownership of 
4.5% for top five managers and Baek et al. (2009) examined firms listed in Standard 
& Poor index reported that top five managers in the firms hold an average of 1.88% 
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of equity shares and the mean ownership of the blockholding is 7.61%.  High 
shareholdings by the insiders obtained in this thesis impose concerns whether they 
used their controlling power for personal benefit as argued by Yeo et al. (2002).   
 
Table 5.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
CONACCR -0.006 -0.008 0.053 -0.254 0.281 
E/P  0.144 0.174 0.449 -2.416 2.542 
R  0.162 0.110 0.624 -1.780 3.280 
OCIN (%) 31.029 32.580 20.917 0.000 81.230 
OCOUT (%) 22.477 14.490 23.727 0.000 92.500 
BID 0.401 0.375 0.112 0.000 1.000 
BS 7.683 7.000 1.889 3.000 17.000 
BT 6.763 6.000 4.328 0.000 31.000 
BF 0.267 0.250 0.157 0.000 1.000 
BSHIP 0.480 0.500 0.290 0.000 1.000 
ACID 0.696 0.670 0.125 0.000 1.000 
ACF 0.369 0.330 0.190 0.000 1.000 
ACM 4.693 5.000 0.962 2.000 10.000 
BBR 0.371 0.333 0.237 0.000 1.000 
ACBR 0.409 0.330 0.285 0.000 1.000 
BCR 0.531 0.571 0.264 0.000 1.000 
ACCR 0.525 0.500 0.297 0.000 1.000 
TA (RM’000) 1,160,000 247,000 3,500,000 21,200 44,000,000 
PROF 0.052 0.045 0.084 -0.341 0.537 
LEV 0.087 0.036 0.117 0.000 0.693 
SGROW (%) 9.096 6.910 29.100 -91.720 172.630 
MTB 1.055 0.836 0.785 -1.776 5.683 
Dummy Variables: 
BCD=1  (Combined CEO-chairman roles) :  4.8% 
AUD=1 (Big 4 audit firms)                         :  65.5% 
CONACCR= Accrual-based conservatism, E/P= Earning price ratio, R= Annual share return, 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, 
BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, ACID= Audit committee composition, ACF= Audit committee 
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= 
Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on 
audit committee, TA= total assets value, PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, SGROW= Sales 
growth, MTB= Market to book ratio, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-Chairman combine; 0 otherwise, 
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise. 
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The mean value of board composition (BID) indicated that firms had complied with 
the recommendation of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) to 
have at least one third of the board comprising independent non-executive directors.  
This mean value of 0.40 however, indicated that 60% of the board composition in 
Malaysian firms was dominated by the insiders.  Also, about 70% of the audit 
committee members were independent directors following the Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance (MCCG) recommendation that independent directors must 
dominate the audit committee.  However, the minimum zero values of both BID and 
ACID indicated the non-presence of independent directors on the board of directors 
and audit committee in some firms.  Examination on a yearly basis revealed that the 
minimum values occurred in 2001 and 2002, which were the transition periods 
before firms fully complied with the MCCG implemented in 2001.  In fact, the 
compliance deadlines set then by KLSE (now known as Bursa Malaysia) were 
extended three times during 31 March 2002 to 31 March 2003 (Haron et al., 2005).   
 
The average board size reported in this thesis was eight directors, similar to Haniffa 
and Hudaib (2006) and Rahman and Ali (2006).  The board size is appropriate as 
exceeding eight is deemed ineffective (Jensen, 1993).  The average tenure of 
independent directors on the board (BT) was seven years, the longest being thirty-
one years.  An insight into the data showed that the average tenure increased 
gradually from 2001 to 2007, suggesting that the same independent directors 
continued to serve the same companies throughout the period.  The statistic showed 
that on average 48% of the board members had more than two outside directorships; 
implying that half of the board were busy or probably had more experience from 
their service on other boards.  The duality role in Malaysian firms is considered 
small with only 4.8% of the sample combining the CEO and chairman roles.  G. V. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) who examined US firms reported that 79% of their 
sample combined the two roles.  There has been an improvement to the leadership 
structure of Malaysian firms compared to that reported previously.  For instance, a 
statistic of 25.7% was reported for the study period 1996 to 2000 (Haniffa & Hudaib, 
2006) and 12% for 2001 (Muniandy, 2007).  Despite this fact however, board 
independence in Malaysian firms is not a guarantee because a majority of substantial 
shareholders in Malaysian firms sit on the board, and hence may influence decisions 
of the board.   
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In respect of financial expertise, on average 37% of the audit committee members 
had financial expertise (ACF) relative to 27% on the board (BF).  The zero minimum 
value for the BF and ACF indicated that there were firms which did not have 
financial expertise on their board or audit committee.  An analysis of the sample 
firms showed that 107 firm-year observations (5.27%) did not have financial 
expertise.  A further examination of the data showed that the absence of financial 
expertise in the audit committee not only occurred in 2001, but continued until 2007.  
In 2001, 51 firms (17.59%) did not have financial expertise on their audit committee, 
but this reduced to 11 firms (3.90%) in 2007.  This outcome suggests that although it 
is mandatory for firms to have at least one member of the audit committee with 
financial expertise, some firms breached the rules.  Firms are not required to appoint 
financial expertise on the board; but since audit committees are required to do so, 
and the audit committee members are appointed from the board of directors, the rules 
have indirectly strengthened the board structure.  This thesis found that the 
proportion of financial expertise in the board of directors had increased from an 
average of 22.38% in 2001 to 29.19% in 2007. 
 
The average number of audit committee meetings (ACM) held per year was about 
five meetings, and the most frequent was ten meetings per year.  Based on the firm-
year observations, 43.72% of the observations met four times a year, followed by 
38.95% of the observations met five times a year.  Less than four meetings a year 
was represented by 3.34% and more than five meetings a year was represented by 
13.98% of the observations.  The statistics showed that a majority of the Malaysian 
firms have active members in the audit committee. 
 
The mean proportion of Chinese directors on the board (BCR) and audit committees 
(ACCR) were both 0.53.  The mean proportions of Bumiputera directors on board 
(BBR) and audit committee (ACBR) were 0.37 and 0.41 respectively.  The values 
indicated that both board and audit committee were represented by more Chinese 
than Bumiputera directors.  The mean ratio of Bumiputera on the board is consistent 
with Salleh et al. (2006) of 38% but lower than Rahman and Ali (2006) of 48%.  
About 66% of the sample was audited by big four audit firms (AUD).  This is close 
to the number reported by Yatim et al. (2006) of 68.8%.   
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Table 5.2 
Percentage of firms based on Ownership Concentration 
  
Dispersed 
ownership 
Concentrated 
Ownership 
Insiders 
dominant 
Outsiders 
dominant 
Insiders and 
Outsiders 
dominant Combination 
Full 
sample 
(N=2031) 3.25 96.75 52.63 24.42 17.33 2.36 
2001 
(n=290) 2.41 97.58 50.34 24.14 21.38 1.72 
2002 
(n=291) 2.41 97.60 52.58 22.34 19.24 3.44 
2003 
(n=292) 2.74 97.26 52.40 21.92 20.89 2.05 
2004 
(n=289) 3.81 96.20 54.33 23.88 15.57 2.42 
2005 
(n=293) 4.44 95.57 52.22 25.60 16.04 1.71 
2006 
(n=294) 3.74 96.26 53.06 26.19 14.29 2.72 
2007 
(n=282) 3.19 96.81 53.55 26.95 13.83 2.48 
 
Table 5.2 presents statistics on the percentage of firms with dispersed and 
concentrated ownership.  Following Claessens, Djankov, Fan and Lang (1999), Chu 
and Cheah (2006) and H. J. A. Ahmed (2009), shareholding below 20 percent was 
labelled as a dispersed structure.  Based on the full sample, only 3.25% of the 
distributions had dispersed ownership whilst the remaining 96.75% had concentrated 
ownership.  Of the firms with concentrated ownership, 52.63% were dominated by 
insiders, 24.42% were dominated by outsiders and 17.33% were dominated by both 
insiders and outsiders.  The yearly distributions showed that firms with dispersed 
ownership remained below 5% and those with concentrated ownership remained 
above 90% throughout.  The information also indicated that insiders were the 
dominant owners of the firms.  This condition warrants investigation to determine 
whether inside or outside substantial shareholders have a different effect on the 
conservatism. 
 
To identify if there is any significant difference in conservatism practices between 
the dispersed and concentrated ownership, t-tests were performed and results were 
presented in Table 5.3 (Panel A).  The test was carried out only for accrual-based 
conservatism (CONACCR) but not asymmetric timeliness (AT) because AT is not a 
firm specific measure. 
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Table 5.3 (Panel A) 
Mean Difference on Accrual-based Conservatism:  
Dispersed vs. Concentrated Ownership 
 Mean t-statistic 
 Dispersed vs. Concentrated 
a) Shareholding below 20% 0.001 
 Shareholding equal and above 20% -0.006 0.928 
 
b) Shareholding below 50% -0.001 
 Shareholding equal and above 50% -0.009 3.236*** 
Table 5.3 (Panel B) 
Mean Difference on Accrual-based Conservatism: 
Inside vs. Outside Substantial Shareholders 
 Mean t-statistic 
 Outsiders vs. Insiders 
a) Majority outsiders -0.002 
 Majority insiders -0.008 2.324** 
   
b) Outside dominant owner (=>20%) -0.001 
 Inside dominant owner (=>20%) -0.010 3.134*** 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05 
 
Different categories for ownership concentration were used.  First, firms were 
classified into two: dispersed ownership (shareholding below 20%) and concentrated 
ownership (shareholding equal and above 20%).  Based on this measure, the mean 
CONACCR of the dispersed ownership was positive (0.001) in contrast to the 
negative value for the concentrated ownership (-0.006).  The mean value suggests 
that firms that were not closely controlled by the substantial shareholders were more 
conservative than their counterparts, but the difference was not significant.  Second, 
the measure to split the groups was then changed based on shareholding below 50% 
versus 50% and above.  The cut-off 50% shareholding adopted here follows Chu and 
Cheah (2006), who specified a shareholding ranging from 20 to 50% as dominant 
minority while above 50% as a dominant majority.  The result showed that the mean 
difference of the CONACCR between the two groups was significant at the 1% level 
but both groups displayed negative CONACCR.  In order to investigate further this 
issue, mean CONACCR was observed for firms classified into the 3 groups which 
were shareholding less than 20%, 20% and above but less than 50% and 50% and 
above (not tabulated).  The analysis showed that increases in shareholding 
percentage were followed by decreases in the CONACCR mean.  This outcome 
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implied that as the shareholding increased, the demand for accrual-based 
conservatism was reduced. 
 
This thesis also compared the CONACCR between inside owners and outside 
owners using two categories, and the results were presented in Table 5.3 (Panel B).  
The first category was based on a majority shareholding and the second category was 
based on a sub-sample of firms dominated by only insiders or outsiders using 20% 
cut-off point of dominant shareholding.  In both methods of classification, the mean 
CONACCR for insiders and outsiders were negative and the mean differences were 
significant.  The test results indicated that while both insiders and outsiders were less 
conservative, the inside owners were far less conservative than the outside owners. 
 
5.3. Correlation Analysis 
 
Table 5.4 presents correlations between the CONACCR and independent variables.  
Pearson correlations are shown below the diagonal and Spearman correlations are 
shown above the diagonal.  As compared to the Pearson correlation coefficient, the 
Spearman correlation reduced sensitivity to extreme values.  The positive coefficient 
for outside substantial shareholders (OCOUT) is consistent with the expectation that 
outside owners who demand better governance employed higher conservatism.  The 
negative coefficient for inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) is consistent with the 
expectation that inside owners employed lower conservatism.  Board attributes that 
had significant associations with the CONACCR measure were board composition 
(BID) and board size (BS).  Audit committee attributes significantly correlated with 
the CONACCR measure were audit committee composition (ACID), financial 
expertise (ACF) and audit committee meeting (ACM).  All control variables: auditor 
(AUD), firm size (TA), sales growth (SGROW), profitability (PROF) and leverage 
(LEV) were significantly correlated with CONACCR.  The inverse relationships 
between BS and CONACCR are consistent with the argument that large board size 
reflects weak board, thus employ less conservatism.  The positive sign on BID is   
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Table 5.4 
Pearson (Spearman) Correlations below (above) the diagonal* 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
1 CONACCR 1 -0.12 0.06 0.01 0.01 -0.03 0.02 -0.09 0.01 -0.06 -0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.04 0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.03 -0.15 0.16 0.08 
2 OCIN -0.11 1 -0.63 -0.12 0.02 -0.12 0.03 -0.05 0.08 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.33 0.35 -0.27 0.28 -0.03 -0.20 0.02 0.00 -0.05 
3 OCOUT 0.04 -0.73 1 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.05 0.17 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 0.29 -0.36 0.21 -0.27 0.13 0.23 0.03 0.15 0.00 
4 BID 0.07 -0.13 0.01 1 0.05 0.03 0.02 -0.26 0.07 0.31 -0.11 0.10 0.19 -0.15 0.09 -0.10 0.02 0.03 0.00 -0.04 0.03 
5 BT -0.01 0.03 0.06 0.01 1 -0.15 0.18 0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.15 -0.02 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 -0.05 0.05 0.28 0.09 0.15 0.11 
6 BF -0.01 -0.14 0.06 0.08 -0.19 1 -0.07 -0.17 0.06 0.06 0.55 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 0.05 -0.06 0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 
7 BSHIP 0.00 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.16 -0.07 1 0.04 0.12 0.03 -0.08 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.08 0.21 0.00 0.09 0.08 
8 BS -0.13 -0.05 0.17 -0.31 0.09 -0.19 0.05 1 -0.10 0.05 -0.12 0.00 0.07 -0.11 0.06 -0.08 0.08 0.27 0.08 0.12 0.00 
9 BCD 0.01 0.07 -0.06 0.07 0.00 0.06 0.12 -0.11 1 -0.07 0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.10 -0.09 0.11 0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.03 0.04 
10 ACID -0.04 -0.04 -0.01 0.36 -0.03 0.07 0.01 0.00 -0.05 1 -0.01 0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 0.07 0.05 -0.05 0.09 
11 ACF -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 -0.07 -0.19 0.54 -0.05 -0.08 0.06 0.04 1 -0.06 -0.09 0.10 -0.06 0.09 -0.01 -0.20 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 
12 ACM 0.04 -0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 0.03 0.03 0.06 -0.05 1 0.09 -0.04 0.07 -0.02 -0.14 0.12 0.02 -0.04 0.06 
13 BBR 0.03 -0.36 0.36 0.21 -0.06 0.10 0.05 0.05 -0.06 0.13 -0.05 0.13 1 -0.79 0.71 -0.65 0.04 0.22 -0.02 -0.06 0.15 
14 BCR -0.02 0.38 -0.45 -0.16 -0.01 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 0.08 -0.06 0.07 -0.06 -0.80 1 -0.58 0.73 -0.14 -0.24 0.02 -0.04 -0.02 
15 ACBR 0.04 -0.29 0.26 0.13 0.06 0.10 0.02 0.05 -0.08 0.11 -0.07 0.08 0.75 -0.60 1 -0.88 -0.08 0.21 -0.03 -0.06 0.11 
16 ACCR -0.03 0.31 -0.32 -0.12 -0.05 -0.09 -0.02 -0.06 0.11 -0.06 0.08 -0.03 -0.67 0.75 -0.88 1 -0.01 -0.23 0.01 0.01 -0.06 
17 AUD -0.06 -0.05 0.14 0.04 0.07 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.03 -0.01 0.00 -0.12 0.05 -0.15 -0.07 -0.01 1 0.09 0.08 0.09 -0.06 
18 TA -0.05 -0.22 0.31 -0.01 0.30 -0.02 0.25 0.30 0.04 0.04 -0.17 0.14 0.21 -0.22 0.20 -0.22 0.09 1 0.16 0.12 0.33 
19 SGROW -0.15 0.02 0.03 -0.04 0.04 -0.03 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.04 0.02 -0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.00 0.07 0.12 1 0.08 0.06 
20 PROF 0.16 -0.05 0.19 -0.03 0.15 -0.06 0.07 0.11 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.10 0.14 0.05 1 -0.12 
21 LEV 0.07 -0.04 0.00 0.03 0.11 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.00 0.10 -0.05 0.07 0.14 -0.06 0.09 -0.06 -0.06 0.40 0.04 -0.06 1 
*Bold text indicates significance at the 5% level or better
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consistent with the expectation that a board represented by more independent 
directors employed higher conservatism.  Additionally, frequent audit committee 
meetings were positively related to conservatism.  Surprisingly, negative signs on 
ACID, ACF and AUD suggest that they led to lower conservatism.  Coefficient signs 
on ethnic groups on both board and audit committee (ACBR and ACCR) were 
contrary to those predicted.  However, since simple correlation does not consider the 
joint effect of other variables, it should be interpreted with caution as it is subject to 
omitted variables bias.  
 
Inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) were found to be inversely correlated with 
the proportion of independent directors on the board (BID), board financial expertise 
(BF) and board size (BS) but positively related to CEO duality (BCD).  This 
evidence suggests that the higher the proportion of substantial shares held by the 
insiders, the lower the number of independent directors on the board, the lesser the 
number of directors with financial expertise, the smaller is the board size and the 
more likely for the firm to combine the roles of the CEO and chairman of the board.  
The inverse association between OCIN and total assets suggests that insiders were 
dominant in smaller firms.  In terms of ethnicity, both on board and audit committee, 
inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) were inversely related to Bumiputera 
directors but positively related to Chinese directors.  It suggests that greater numbers 
of inside substantial shareholders were Chinese. 
 
The outside substantial shareholders (OCOUT) were positively related to board 
tenure (BT), board financial expertise (BF) and board size (BS) but inversely related 
to CEO duality (BCD).  This evidence suggests that the higher the proportion of 
substantial shares held by outsiders, independent directors stayed on the firms’ board 
for a longer term, board size was larger and the more likely for the firm to separate 
the CEO and Chairman roles.  In contrast to the insiders, a higher proportion of 
outside substantial shareholders was positively associated with Bumiputera ratios but 
negatively related to Chinese ratios.  The relationship indicates that firms dominated 
by outsiders had more Bumiputera directors on the board. 
 
CEO duality (BCD) had an inverse relationship with the Bumiputera ratios (BBR and 
ACBR) but was positively related to the Chinese ratios (ACBR and ACCR).  It 
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suggests that a board or audit committee dominated by the Bumiputera directors 
preferred a separate leadership structure whereas the dominant Chinese directors 
adopted the combined structure.  Correlation between total assets (TA) and board 
size (BS) suggests that firms that grew in size had more directors on the board.  Also, 
as the size of the board increased, the more active the audit committee became. 
 
The positive correlation between the proportion of independent directors on the 
board and audit committee (BID and ACID) with Bumiputera ratio (BBR and 
ACBR) implied the domination of Bumiputera directors in the composition of the 
independent directors.  The negative relationship between BID and ACID with 
Chinese ratio suggests otherwise. 
 
5.4. Multivariate Analysis 
 
Two sets of regression models representing two measures of conservatism were 
employed to test the hypotheses in this thesis.  First, the regression model of 
CONACCR is explained and followed by the regression model of AT.  Results on 
the hypothesis testing for both measures are presented after Section 5.4.2, according 
to the hypothesis and independent variables.  The final section of this chapter 
summarises the results. 
 
5.4.1. Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR) 
 
The following empirical model was employed to test the effect of ownership 
concentration (H1), board attributes (H2-H5), audit committee attributes (H6-H8) 
and ethnicity of directors (H9-H10) on CONACCR.  Also included were control 
variables which might have an influence on conservatism practices namely auditor, 
total assets, profitability, leverage and sales growth. 
  
CONACCRit = β0 + β1OCINit + β2OCOUTit + β3BIDit + β4BSit + β5BTit + β6BFit + 
β7BSHIPit + β8BCDit + β9ACIDit + β10ACFit + β11ACMit + β12BBRit + β13ACBRit + 
β14BCRit + β15ACCRit + β16AUDit + β17TAit + β18PROFit + β19LEVit + β20SGROWit + 
εit 
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Table 5.5 presents the results of the firm fixed effect regression for CONACCR.  The 
reported t-statistics for the CONACCR model were estimated based on Rogers’s 
(1993) method and were robust for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation.  The F-
value of the model was statistically significant at the 1% level and the R2 within was 
11.03%.   
 
Table 5.5 
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic 
constant  0.197 1.12 
OCIN - -0.001 -2.71*** 
OCOUT + -0.001 -2.17** 
BID + 0.026 0.9 
BS - -0.005 -0.42 
BT + 0.001 0.95 
BF + 0.014 0.58 
BSHIP - -0.014 -0.99 
BCD - -0.004 -0.14 
ACID + -0.011 -0.71 
ACF + 0.005 0.38 
ACM + 0.002 1.37 
BBR - 0.094 2.08** 
ACBR - -0.027 -0.77 
BCR + 0.066 1.55 
ACCR + -0.023 -0.69 
AUD + 0.004 0.57 
TA - -0.012 -1.29 
PROF + 0.178 7.15*** 
LEV + 0.037 1.27 
SGROW - 0.000 -2.17** 
F-value   4.41*** 
R2 within   .1103 
N   2031 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= 
Board composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board 
financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-
chairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit 
committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on 
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, 
ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= 
Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth. 
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5.4.2. Asymmetric Timeliness (AT) 
 
The following regression model was employed to test the effect of ownership 
concentration (H1), board attributes (H2-H5), audit committee attributes (H6-H8) 
and directors’ ethnicity (H9-H10) on asymmetric timeliness (AT).  Independent 
variables included in the AT model were similar to those in CONACCR, except 
MTB was used in place of SGROW. 
 
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4OCINit + β5OCINit*Rit + β6OCINit*Dit  
+ β7OCINit*Rit*Dit + β8OCOUTit + β9OCOUTit*Rit + β10OCOUTit*Dit + 
β11OCOUTit*Rit*Dit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variablesit + εit 
 
As explained in section 4.6.2, this thesis estimated Eit/Pit – 1 and Rit on a three-year 
backward accumulation as suggested by Roychowdhury and Watts (2007).  
Regression was also run using one-year estimate of asymmetric timeliness from 
Basu’s (1997) original model and shown in Appendix A, column (a).  The results 
were similar except that more significant findings were found in the three-year 
estimates reported in Table 5.6.  The regression model was estimated based on a firm 
fixed effect regression; and standard errors were corrected based on Driscoll and 
Kraay’s (1998) method so that they are robust to cross-sectional dependence, 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation (Hoechle, 2007).  The F-value of the model 
was statistically significant at the 1% level and the R2 within was 23.74%.   
 
The results in Table 5.6 depict the interaction of independent variables with each 
item in Basu’s (1997) original model.  Due to the lengthy list of interactions, only 
main variables are shown in the table.  The full list of the regression results is shown 
in the Appendix A, column (b).  Explanatory variables that interact with R (e.g.: 
BID*R) represents their timeliness in recognising good news into earnings.  
Variables that interact with RD (e.g.: BID*RD) represent the incremental effect of 
recognizing bad news relative to good news into earnings; called asymmetric 
timeliness.  If the variable leads to more conservatism, the coefficient on its 
interaction with R (e.g. BID*R) is expected to be negative.  Coefficient on its 
interaction with RD (e.g. BID*RD) is expected to be positive.   
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Table 5.6 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness 
Variables Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.76* 
OCIN*RD - -0.001 -0.7 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.34 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.4 
BID*R - -0.421 -4.96*** 
BID*RD + 1.351 3.23*** 
BS*R + -0.089 -2.83*** 
BS*RD - -0.169 -0.83 
BT*R - 0.006 1.92* 
BT*RD + -0.002 -0.31 
BF*R - -1.017 -8.31*** 
BF*RD + 0.571 2.07** 
BSHIP*R + -0.058 -1.29 
BSHIP*RD - -0.075 -1.1 
BCD*R + -0.101 -4.87*** 
BCD*RD - 0.038 0.51 
ACID*R - 0.130 1.73* 
ACID*RD + -0.355 -4.12*** 
ACF*R - 0.412 4.25*** 
ACF*RD + 0.199 0.88 
ACM*R - 0.043 2.87*** 
ACM*RD + -0.042 -0.82 
BBR*R + -0.283 -1.35 
BBR*RD - 0.848 5.88*** 
ACBR*R + 0.211 1.35 
ACBR*RD - -0.803 -2.14** 
BCR*R - -0.224 -1.33 
BCR*RD + 0.461 2.71*** 
ACCR*R - 0.100 0.81 
ACCR*RD + -0.664 -2.18** 
AUD*R - -0.172 -2.69*** 
AUD*RD + 0.218 2.85*** 
TA*R + 0.028 1.46 
TA*RD - 0.056 1.15 
PROF*R - 0.474 1.91* 
PROF*RD + -0.392 -0.53 
LEV*R - -0.265 -1.34 
LEV*RD + -0.639 -3.89*** 
MTB*R + 0.082 6.35*** 
MTB*RD - -0.202 -11.13*** 
F- value   27.02*** 
R2 within   .2374 
N   2012 
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***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy equal 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple 
directorships, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman 
combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee 
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, 
ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= 
Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= 
Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
 
5.4.3. Ownership Concentration and Conservatism (H1) 
 
Results in Table 5.5 showed that inside substantial shareholders (OCIN) were 
negatively related to CONACCR and significant at the 1% level.  This finding 
implies that inside owners led to lower conservatism and they did not use 
conservatism as a governance tool.  This result is consistent with the argument that 
inside dominant shareholders create agency conflict; and thus support the outcome of 
the adverse effect of insiders ownership in Malaysian firms; for instance, high 
ownership by insiders led to financial distress status (S. N. Abdullah, 2006b), 
produced lower levels of corporate social responsibility (Ghazali, 2007) and reduced 
financial performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006; Ming & Gee, 2008). 
 
The coefficient on outside substantial shareholders (OCOUT) was significant at the 
5% level but the sign was the opposite of that expected.  Lower conservatism 
practices by OCOUT suggest that they did not employ higher conservatism to 
promote better governance.  This finding suggests that outside substantial 
shareholders in Malaysia did not exercise their governance role through higher 
demand of accounting conservatism.  These results confirmed that substantial 
shareholders in Malaysia, regardless of whether they are insiders or outsiders, 
adopted less conservative accounting.   
 
Table 5.6 showed findings as in CONACC, where OCIN and OCOUT led to lower 
AT reflected by the negative coefficients on OCIN*RD and OCOUT*RD.  Their 
effect however, was not significant suggesting that inside and outside substantial 
shareholders had no direct influence on asymmetric timeliness.  OCIN led to slower 
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recognition of good news into earnings as reflected by the negative coefficient of 
OCIN*R, but the effect was marginal. 
 
The results from the CONACCR measure supported Hypothesis 1a that inside 
substantial shareholders were less conservative.  Also, based on the CONACCR 
measure, Hypothesis 1b was rejected because the significant negative association 
obtained on outside substantial shareholders was contrary to expectations.  Based on 
the AT measure, both hypotheses were rejected because neither relationship was 
significant. 
 
5.4.4. Board of Directors’ characteristics and Conservatism (H2-
H5) 
 
CONACCR is expected to be positively associated to board composition (BID), 
board tenure (BT) and board financial expertise (BF) because these characteristics 
reflect strong governance mechanisms.  Also, board size (BS), multiple directorships 
(BSHIP) and CEO duality (BCD) are predicted to have inverse relationships with 
CONACCR as these characteristics reflect weak governance mechanisms.  The 
results showed that the coefficient signs on all of the board attributes were as 
expected, but none of them were significant.  
  
In contrast, BID was positively associated with AT (BID*RD) and significant at the 
1% level.  The effect of BT on good news (BT*R) was significant at the 10% level.  
The positive sign on the coefficient suggests that longer tenure led to faster 
recognition of good news into earnings, contrary to conservatism practices.  
Nevertheless, BT had no significant effect on AT (BT*RD).  BF was positively 
related to AT (BF*RD), significant at the 5% level.  This indicates that the higher the 
proportion of board members with financial expertise, the higher conservatism 
practices were adopted.  The effect of BS and BSHIP on AT (BS*RD and 
BSHIP*RD) were consistent with the expectation, but the relationships were not 
significant.  Nevertheless, a negative significant coefficient for BS*R suggested that 
a larger board led to slower recognition of good news into earnings.  As reflected by 
the negative coefficient, CEO duality was found to be more conservative in the 
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recognition of good news (BCD*R) but not significantly associated with AT 
(BCD*RD). 
 
Hypotheses 2 to 5 were not supported if based on the CONACCR measure.  
However, Hypothesis 2 with regards to board composition and Hypothesis 4b with 
regards to board financial expertise were supported based on the AT measure.   
 
5.4.5. Audit Committee characteristics and Conservatism (H6-H8) 
 
CONACCR is expected to be positively related to the proportion of independent 
directors on the audit committee (ACID), audit committee financial expertise (ACF) 
and audit committee meeting (ACM).  With the exception of ACID, the coefficients 
sign on ACF and ACM were as predicted but all were not significant. 
 
The negative effect of ACID on AT (ACID*RD) was significant at the 1% level, 
contradicting the expectation that higher proportions of independent directors on 
audit committee contribute to higher conservatism practices.  Previously it was 
argued that, independent directors on the audit committee are expected to employ 
higher conservatism because they represent strong governance.  However, the result 
showed that more independent directors on the audit committee led to lower 
conservatism.   
 
ACF was positively related but not significantly with AT (ACF*RD).  This implies 
that the merit of financial expertise to oversee the financial reporting process was not 
strong enough to influence conservatism practices.  No significant association was 
found between ACM and AT (ACM*RD).  The findings also showed that all the 
audit committee attributes led to faster recognition of good news into earnings, as 
reflected by the positive coefficients for ACID*R, ACF*R and ACM*R. 
 
Hypotheses 6 was rejected in the CONACCR model because it was not significant, 
whilst it was rejected in the AT model because the direction of relationship was the 
opposite of that expected.  Hypotheses 7 and 8 were rejected in both the CONACCR 
and AT models. 
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5.4.6. Ethnicity and Conservatism (H9-H10) 
 
Turning to the effect of ethnicity, the positive coefficient on ethnic groups on board 
suggest that higher proportions of Bumiputera (BBR) and Chinese (BCR) directors 
on boards led to higher conservatism.  Interestingly, the same ethnic groups on audit 
committee however, behaved differently because higher proportions of Bumiputera 
(ACBR) and Chinese (ACCR) directors on the audit committees led to lower 
conservatism.  The direction of relationships between the ethnic groups and 
conservatism was similar in CONACCR and AT, except that only BBR was found 
significant in CONACCR whilst all the ethnic variables were significant in AT.  
Significant relationship between BBR and CONACCR suggest that Bumiputera 
directors on the board play an important role in the governance of the firms, as they 
significantly led to more CONACCR.  The mixed results supported Hypotheses 9b 
and 10a but cause the rejection of Hypotheses 9a and 10b. 
 
5.4.7. Control Variables and Conservatism 
 
Out of five control variables, profitability (PROF) and sales growth (SGROW) were 
significantly associated with CONACCR while auditor (AUD), leverage (LEV) and 
market to book ratio (MTB) were significantly related to AT.  PROF was not 
significantly associated with AT but the significant positive coefficient for PROF*R 
suggested that profitable firms led to faster recognition of good news into earnings.  
Except LEV, the other coefficient signs are consistent with the previous studies 
notably A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008).  A 
positive coefficient on PROF is consistent with the argument that profitable firms are 
willing to be more conservative, while loss making firms are reluctant because 
conservatism will further reduce their earnings.  A positive coefficient on AUD is 
consistent with previous evidence that big audit firms were more conservative in 
order to protect their reputation and to minimise legal action should earnings be 
overstated.  A negative association between LEV and AT was surprising because it 
contradicted previous evidence and the prediction that creditors demand higher 
conservatism to protect their interest.  The significant negative coefficient on MTB 
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support the findings of Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) and LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) that firms with growth opportunities were less conservative. 
 
5.5. Additional analyses  
 
Several additional tests were carried out to identify the credibility of the initial 
results.  Using dummy variable as an alternative measure, this additional analysis re-
examined board size (BS), audit committee independence (ACID), audit committee 
financial expertise (ACF), audit committee meeting (ACM) and leverage (LEV). 
 
5.5.1. Board Size measured using binary variables 
 
This thesis reported in the initial analysis that board size (BS) was not significantly 
related to both CONACRR and AT.  An insight into the data revealed that 51% of 
the observations had less than eight board members and 33% had more than eight 
members.  The remaining 16% observations had the ideal eight members on board 
suggested by Jensen (1993).  This variation could possibly explain the insignificant 
effect of BS on accounting conservatism when BS was measured using continuous 
variable. 
 
This thesis repeated the regression analysis where BS was measured as a dummy 
variable, labelled as DUMMY_BS.  Dummy variable coded 1 is for large BS (>8 
members) and 0 for small BS (<=8 members).  Eight members was used as the cut-
off point following Jensen’s (1993) suggestion that exceeding eight is ineffective.  
The coefficient on DUMMY_BS using that measure (not tabulated) was positive and 
insignificant.  The dummy variable was then changed to include eight as large BS.  
Specifically, dummy variable coded 1, if BS is equal and above eight (>=8), and 0 if 
otherwise (<8).  As reported in Table 5.7 and Table 5.8, the coefficients were 
negative but still not significant.  These results, therefore confirm the initial evidence 
that BS is not a significant factor influencing accounting conservatism.  Results on 
the other variables are similar to the initial analysis.  The full list of the AT results 
are shown in the Appendix B. 
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Table 5.7 
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism: Board Size using Binary Variables 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic 
Constant  0.189 1.07 
OCIN - -0.001 -2.73*** 
OCOUT + -0.001 -2.19** 
BID + 0.028 0.95 
DUMMY_BS - -0.001 -0.2 
BT + 0.001 0.97 
BF + 0.015 0.61 
BSHIP - -0.014 -0.96 
BCD - -0.003 -0.11 
ACID + -0.012 -0.77 
ACF + 0.004 0.33 
ACM + 0.002 1.36 
BBR - 0.095 2.06** 
ACBR - -0.027 -0.76 
BCR + 0.068 1.57 
ACCR + -0.023 -0.7 
AUD + 0.004 0.57 
TA - -0.012 -1.3 
PROF + 0.178 7.14*** 
LEV + 0.037 1.26 
SGROW - 0.000 -2.18** 
F-value   4.54*** 
R2 within   .1102 
N   2031 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= 
Board composition, DUMMY_BS= dummy equal 1 if board size equal and above 8; 0 
otherwise, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple 
directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit 
committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit 
committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit 
committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, 
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total 
assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth. 
 
Table 5.8 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Board Size using Binary Variables 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.99** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -0.75 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.34 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.44 
BID*R - -0.365 -6.25*** 
BID*RD + 1.436 3.3*** 
DUMMY_BS*R + 0.024 0.75 
DUMMY_BS*RD - -0.048 -0.75 
BT*R - 0.006 1.85* 
BT*RD + -0.001 -0.17 
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Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients t-statistic 
BF*R - -0.988 -9.1*** 
BF*RD + 0.645 2.2** 
BSHIP*R + -0.036 -0.77 
BSHIP*RD - -0.100 -1.4 
BCD*R + -0.089 -4.36*** 
BCD*RD - 0.061 0.68 
ACID*R - 0.107 1.35 
ACID*RD + -0.414 -3.59*** 
ACF*R - 0.404 4.38*** 
ACF*RD + 0.190 0.83 
ACM*R - 0.041 2.71*** 
ACM*RD + -0.043 -0.81 
BBR*R + -0.336 -1.54 
BBR*RD - 0.962 7.01*** 
ACBR*R + 0.221 1.35 
ACBR*RD - -0.841 -2.28** 
BCR*R - -0.231 -1.27 
BCR*RD + 0.538 3.06*** 
ACCR*R - 0.088 0.68 
ACCR*RD + -0.679 -2.2** 
AUD*R - -0.187 -2.69*** 
AUD*RD + 0.233 2.87*** 
TA*R + 0.021 1.14 
TA*RD - 0.056 1.17 
PROF*R - 0.527 1.93* 
PROF*RD + -0.529 -0.66 
LEV*R - -0.256 -1.33 
LEV*RD + -0.661 -4.24*** 
MTB*R + 0.079 5.56*** 
MTB*RD - -0.197 -8.5*** 
F- value   25.50*** 
R2 within   .2358 
N   2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside substantial 
shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board independence, DUMMY_BS= 
Dummy equals 1 if board size equal and above 8; 0 if otherwise, BT= Board tenure, BCD= Dummy 
equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= 
Audit committee members with financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio 
Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, 
ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equals 1 if big four audit firm; 0 
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, 
MTB= Market to book value. 
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5.5.2. Audit Committee Independence using binary variables 
 
The measurement for audit committee composition (ACID) reported in the initial 
analysis was treated as a linear variable.  The initial result suggested that a higher 
proportion of independent directors on the audit committee led to lower 
conservatism.  This finding contradicted the prediction that outside directors who 
provide strong governance would employ more conservatism to monitor the 
management.   
 
In order to confirm the credibility of the results, this thesis repeated the regression 
model with alternative measures of independence; using 100% threshold and 
majority threshold.  Similar measures were employed by A. Klein (2002) and Bedard 
et al. (2004) and they found that one of the measures was significantly related to 
effectiveness.  The use of 100% threshold is consistent with the Deli and Gillan’s 
(2000) argument that non existence of independent directors on audit committee 
makes the whole process non-independent.  Saleh et al. (2007) employed the 100% 
threshold by using a dummy variable; 1 for all members are independent and 0 
otherwise.   
 
Results shown in Table 5.9 maintain the initial finding that ACID had no influence 
on the CONACCR.  Results shown in Table 5.10 maintain the initial result that 
ACID reduced AT.  Specifically, firms with 100% independent directors in its audit 
committee produced less conservative reporting as reflected by positive coefficient 
on good news (DUMMY_ACID*R) and negative coefficient on asymmetric 
timeliness (DUMMY_ACID*RD), and both effects were significant at the 1% level. 
 
The second measure for the dummy variable is from using a majority threshold 
consistent with the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance that requires 
independent directors to be the majority members of the audit committee.  A dummy 
variable was assigned as 1 for majority independence (equal and more than 51%) and 
0 otherwise.  Results in Table 5.10 revealed that no significance.  The full list of the 
AT results are shown in the Appendix C. 
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Table 5.9  
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism:  
Audit Committee Composition using Binary Variables 
  (a) Dummy = 1 All independent 
(b) Dummy = 1 
Majority independent 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
constant  0.205 1.16 0.201 1.15 
OCIN - -0.001 -2.68*** -0.001 -2.68*** 
OCOUT + -0.001 -2.13** -0.001 -2.14** 
BID + 0.019 0.74 0.022 0.87 
BS - -0.007 -0.54 -0.006 -0.49 
BT + 0.001 0.93 0.001 0.94 
BF + 0.014 0.59 0.014 0.56 
BSHIP - -0.014 -0.99 -0.014 -1 
BCD - -0.003 -0.11 -0.003 -0.13 
DUMMY_ACID + 0.002 0.25 -0.003 -0.68 
ACF + 0.004 0.28 0.005 0.38 
ACM + 0.002 1.34 0.002 1.36 
BBR - 0.092 2.05** 0.093 2.04** 
ACBR - -0.028 -0.8 -0.027 -0.77 
BCR + 0.065 1.51 0.066 1.53 
ACCR + -0.023 -0.68 -0.022 -0.68 
AUD + 0.003 0.5 0.003 0.53 
TA - -0.012 -1.34 -0.012 -1.33 
PROF + 0.177 7.1*** 0.177 7.15*** 
LEV + 0.037 1.25 0.037 1.27 
SGROW - 0.000 -2.18** 0.000 -2.18** 
F-value   4.39***  4.40*** 
R2 within   .1099  .1101 
N   2031  2031 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= 
Board composition, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board 
multiple directorships, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-
chairman combine; 0 otherwise, DUMMY_ACID (a)= Dummy equals 1 if all audit 
committee members are independent; 0 otherwise, DUMMY_ACID (b)= Dummy equals 1 if 
majority audit committee members are independent; 0 otherwise, ACF= Audit committee 
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, 
ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= 
Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= 
Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth. 
 
Table 5.10 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:  
Audit Committee Composition using Binary Variables 
 (a) Dummy = 1 
All independent 
(b) Dummy = 1 
Majority independent 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.58 -0.002 -1.64 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -0.71 -0.002 -0.65 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.23 -0.001 -1.21 
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 (a) Dummy = 1 
All independent 
(b) Dummy = 1 
Majority independent 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.39 -0.001 -0.34 
BID*R - -0.394 -4.74*** -0.400 -5.01*** 
BID*RD + 1.226 2.94*** 1.167 2.58** 
BS*R + -0.099 -3.11*** -0.088 -3.45*** 
BS*RD - -0.188 -0.87 -0.216 -1.09 
BT*R - 0.005 1.7* 0.006 1.77* 
BT*RD + -0.001 -0.1 0.001 0.08 
BF*R - -1.025 -8.86*** -1.011 -8.65*** 
BF*RD + 0.576 2.04** 0.595 2.08** 
BSHIP*R + -0.053 -1.24 -0.052 -1.18 
BSHIP*RD - -0.100 -1.48 -0.117 -1.52 
BCD*R + -0.118 -5.12*** -0.088 -4.2*** 
BCD*RD - 0.055 0.73 0.000 0 
DUMMY_ACID*R - 1.160 8.02*** 0.050 1.47 
DUMMY_ACID*RD + -1.176 -4.16*** 0.054 0.88 
ACF*R - 0.391 4.25*** 0.404 4.15*** 
ACF*RD + 0.236 0.97 0.265 1.15 
ACM*R - 0.046 3.02*** 0.042 2.94*** 
ACM*RD + -0.041 -0.78 -0.040 -0.75 
BBR*R + -0.288 -1.38 -0.262 -1.18 
BBR*RD - 0.853 5.6*** 0.771 3.97*** 
ACBR*R + 0.240 1.49 0.194 1.17 
ACBR*RD - -0.874 -2.37** -0.818 -2.25** 
BCR*R - -0.229 -1.38 -0.202 -1.15 
BCR*RD + 0.487 3.1*** 0.424 2.23** 
ACCR*R - 0.121 0.98 0.084 0.66 
ACCR*RD + -0.717 -2.42** -0.656 -2.23** 
AUD*R - -0.172 -2.76*** -0.177 -2.87*** 
AUD*RD + 0.214 2.74*** 0.227 2.87*** 
TA*R + 0.028 1.49 0.031 1.73* 
TA*RD - 0.058 1.22 0.061 1.28 
PROF*R - 0.474 1.99** 0.466 1.96* 
PROF*RD + -0.402 -0.54 -0.447 -0.59 
LEV*R - -0.282 -1.38 -0.278 -1.42 
LEV*RD + -0.604 -3.9*** -0.656 -3.79*** 
MTB*R + 0.079 5.42*** 0.081 5.98*** 
MTB*RD - -0.188 -11.11*** -0.188 -11.31*** 
F-value  9.53***  1.53*** 
R2 within  .2384  .2411 
N  2012  2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
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composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial 
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, 
DUMMY_ACID (a)= Dummy equals 1 if all audit committee members are independent, 0 
otherwise, DUMMY_ACID (b)= Dummy equals 1 if majority audit committee members are 
independent; 0 otherwise, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit 
committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit 
committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, 
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total 
assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
 
5.5.3. Financial Expertise on Audit Committee 
 
The initial analysis reported that financial expertise on the audit committee (ACF) 
was not significantly related to conservatism.  This result is inconsistent with the 
governance role of financial expertise.  Also, it does not support the findings of 
Bedard et al. (2004) and Rahmat et al.(2009) that ACF is an important governance 
mechanism. 
 
While this thesis examined both board financial expertise (BF) and ACF in one 
model, it is important to note that Bedard et al. (2004) and Rahmat et al. (2009) 
explored only ACF in their study.  Insignificant findings in this thesis may possibly 
be due to the fact that BF is stronger in explaining conservatism practices, hence 
reducing the impact of ACF on conservatism.  Analysis was repeated after excluding 
BF from the regression model to confirm if ACF is an important mechanism. 
 
As shown in Table 5.11, the significant positive effect of ACF on AT (ACF*RD) 
affirmed that financial expertise is an important attribute to enhance the quality of the 
financial reports.  The results, therefore support the findings of Davidson et al. 
(2004) that investors appreciate firms that appoint financial expertise in the audit 
committees.  A similar test was carried out on CONACCR, but ACF was not 
significant, similar to the earlier finding.  The full list of the AT results are shown in 
the Appendix D. 
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Table 5.11 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Excluding Board Financial Expertise  
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.001 -1.02 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -0.94 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -0.98 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.57 
BID*R - -0.430 -5.65*** 
BID*RD + 1.431 3.39*** 
BS*R + 0.031 1.47 
BS*RD - -0.191 -0.89 
BT*R - 0.008 2.1** 
BT*RD + -0.002 -0.31 
BSHIP*R + -0.056 -0.86 
BSHIP*RD - -0.051 -0.56 
BCD*R + -0.076 -5.32*** 
BCD*RD - 0.006 0.09 
ACID*R - 0.125 0.88 
ACID*RD + -0.397 -5.72*** 
ACF*R - -0.049 -0.54 
ACF*RD + 0.435 2.17** 
ACM*R - 0.005 0.38 
ACM*RD + -0.012 -0.2 
BBR*R + -0.225 -1.05 
BBR*RD - 0.899 6.31*** 
ACBR*R + 0.200 1.31 
ACBR*RD - -0.791 -2.18** 
BCR*R - -0.148 -0.97 
BCR*RD + 0.488 2.13** 
ACCR*R - 0.026 0.22 
ACCR*RD + -0.571 -1.84* 
AUD*R - -0.179 -2.82*** 
AUD*RD + 0.214 3.41*** 
TA*R + 0.013 0.65 
TA*RD - 0.073 1.45 
PROF*R - 0.453 2.02** 
PROF*RD + -0.429 -0.57 
LEV*R - -0.286 -1.38 
LEV*RD + -0.677 -3.09*** 
MTB*R + 0.090 7.02*** 
MTB*RD - -0.196 -9.24*** 
F- value   2.33*** 
R2 within   .2156 
N   2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
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composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board 
multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 otherwise, 
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= 
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on 
audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, 
AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total 
assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
 
5.5.4. Audit Committee Meeting using binary variables 
 
The initial analysis showed that audit committee meeting (ACM) had no significant 
influence on the conservatism practices.  The regression analysis was repeated using 
a dummy variable to measure frequency of audit committee meeting held by firms.  
This approach follows Bedard et al.’s (2004) suggestion that there may be a 
threshold in the number of meeting for the audit committee to be efficient. 
 
Following J. W. Lin et al. (2006), dummy 1 was assigned for four or more meetings 
(>=4 meetings) and 0 otherwise; labelled as DUMMY_ACM.  Table 5.12 presents 
results for CONACCR but DUMMY_ACM remained insignificant.  Results 
presented in Table 5.13 for asymmetric timeliness, indicate that a threshold of 4 
meetings is indeed reflective of an effective number of meetings as the coefficient 
now became significant at the 5% level.  The results on other variables were similar 
to the initial analysis.  The full list of the AT results are shown in the Appendix E. 
 
Table 5.12 
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism:  
Audit Committee Meeting using Binary Variables 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic 
constant  0.207 1.16 
OCIN - -0.001 -2.74*** 
OCOUT + -0.001 -2.21** 
BID + 0.026 0.91 
BS - -0.005 -0.42 
BT + 0.001 0.92 
BF + 0.015 0.6 
BSHIP - -0.014 -1 
BCD - -0.004 -0.15 
ACID + -0.011 -0.68 
ACF + 0.005 0.37 
DUMMY_ACM + 0.005 0.67 
BBR - 0.095 2.09** 
ACBR - -0.027 -0.77 
BCR + 0.066 1.54 
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Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic 
ACCR + -0.022 -0.66 
AUD + 0.004 0.56 
TA - -0.012 -1.31 
PROF + 0.177 7.1*** 
LEV + 0.038 1.28 
SGROW - 0.000 -2.16** 
F-value   4.37*** 
R2 within   .1096 
N   2031 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, 
BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman combine; 0 
otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, 
DUMMY_ACM= Dummy equals 1 if number of audit committee meetings held is four and more; 0 
otherwise, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= 
Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big 
four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, 
LEV= Leverage, SGROW= Sales growth. 
 
Table 5.13 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:  
Audit Committee Meeting using Binary Variables 
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.68*
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -1.13
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.06
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.55
BID*R - -0.396 -4.46***
BID*RD + 1.309 3.42***
BS*R + -0.075 -2.27**
BS*RD - -0.199 -1.02
BT*R - 0.006 1.77*
BT*RD + -0.003 -0.43
BF*R - -0.942 -9.45***
BF*RD + 0.492 1.46
BSHIP*R + -0.067 -1.38
BSHIP*RD - -0.055 -0.77
BCD*R + -0.100 -4.5***
BCD*RD - 0.025 0.35
ACID*R - 0.165 1.9*
ACID*RD + -0.414 -4.09***
ACF*R - 0.399 4.1***
ACF*RD + 0.180 0.86
DUMMY_ACM*R - -0.036 -0.63
DUMMY_ACM*RD + 0.260 2.33**
BBR*R + -0.254 -1.15
BBR*RD - 0.823 7.52***
ACBR*R + 0.219 1.33
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Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
ACBR*RD - -0.794 -2.25** 
BCR*R - -0.225 -1.36 
BCR*RD + 0.485 3.29*** 
ACCR*R - 0.116 0.9 
ACCR*RD + -0.690 -2.27** 
AUD*R - -0.189 -2.85*** 
AUD*RD + 0.231 2.7*** 
TA*R + 0.032 1.58 
TA*RD - 0.047 0.89 
PROF*R - 0.490 1.95* 
PROF*RD + -0.421 -0.55 
LEV*R - -0.276 -1.12 
LEV*RD + -0.598 -2.87*** 
MTB*R + 0.086 6.87*** 
MTB*RD - -0.201 -9.66*** 
F- value  16.23*** 
R2 within  .2363 
N  2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial 
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman 
combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee 
financial expertise, DUMMY_ACM= Dummy equals 1 if number of audit committee meetings 
held is four and more; 0 otherwise, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio 
Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on 
audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 otherwise, TA= Natural 
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to 
book value. 
 
5.5.5. Leverage using binary variables  
 
Initial results showed that leverage (LEV) significantly reduced AT.  This effect is 
contrary to previous evidence and inconsistent with the argument that a creditor, who 
needs to secure the promised payment, will demand higher conservatism to control 
unnecessary or excessive distribution of firm’s earnings to managers or shareholders.  
Therefore, this thesis employed an alternative measure of leverage using a dummy 
variable to distinguish levered firms and non-levered firms.  A dummy was assigned 
as 1 for levered firms and 0 for unlevered firms; labelled as DUMMY_LEV.  The 
results for CONACCR in Table 5.14 showed that the coefficient on LEV was 
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positive but not significant.  Thus, using a dummy variable did not change the initial 
result on the effect of LEV on CONACCR. 
 
The results presented in Table 5.15 showed that the debt holders demanded more 
asymmetric timeliness as reflected by the positive coefficient between LEV and AT 
(DUMMY_LEV*RD).  This finding confirmed that debt holders demand higher 
conservatism to reduce conflict between them and the shareholders.  The full list of 
the AT results are shown in the Appendix F. 
 
Table 5.14 
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism: Leverage using Binary Variables 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic 
constant  0.162 0.94 
OCIN - -0.001 -2.72*** 
OCOUT + -0.001 -2.18** 
BID + 0.024 0.85 
BS - -0.006 -0.47 
BT + 0.001 0.84 
BF + 0.015 0.62 
BSHIP - -0.015 -1.06 
BCD - -0.004 -0.17 
ACID + -0.010 -0.65 
ACF + 0.005 0.36 
ACM + 0.002 1.4 
BBR - 0.093 2.09** 
ACBR - -0.027 -0.76 
BCR + 0.065 1.54 
ACCR + -0.023 -0.71 
AUD + 0.003 0.53 
TA - -0.010 -1.11 
PROF + 0.175 7.2*** 
DUMMY_LEV + 0.006 1.51 
SGROW - 0.000 -2.25** 
F-value   4.44*** 
R2 within   .1087 
N   2031 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= 
Board composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board 
financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-
chairman combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit 
committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on 
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, 
ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, 
DUMMY_LEV= Dummy equals 1 for levered firms; 0 otherwise, SGROW= Sales growth. 
138 
 
Table 5.15 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Leverage using Binary Variables 
Variables Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.87* 
OCIN*RD - 0.000 -0.11 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.41 
OCOUT*RD + -0.001 -0.25 
BID*R - -0.533 -6.1*** 
BID*RD + 1.399 2.92*** 
BS*R + -0.135 -3.94*** 
BS*RD - -0.133 -0.72 
BT*R - 0.005 1.75* 
BT*RD + -0.005 -0.99 
BF*R - -1.091 -8.55*** 
BF*RD + 0.715 2.44** 
BSHIP*R + -0.081 -1.87* 
BSHIP*RD - -0.051 -0.75 
BCD*R + -0.053 -2.04** 
BCD*RD - -0.005 -0.06 
ACID*R - 0.228 2.22** 
ACID*RD + -0.473 -5.69*** 
ACF*R - 0.392 4.16*** 
ACF*RD + 0.082 0.42 
ACM*R - 0.036 2.69*** 
ACM*RD + -0.031 -0.62 
BBR*R + -0.236 -1.2 
BBR*RD - 0.708 4.43*** 
ACBR*R + 0.224 1.41 
ACBR*RD - -0.753 -2.06** 
BCR*R - -0.276 -1.84* 
BCR*RD + 0.485 2.56** 
ACCR*R - 0.198 1.6 
ACCR*RD + -0.732 -2.35** 
AUD*R - -0.193 -3.16*** 
AUD*RD + 0.245 3.36*** 
TA*R + 0.045 2.82*** 
TA*RD - -0.002 -0.05 
PROF*R - 0.458 1.9* 
PROF*RD + -0.350 -0.45 
DUMMY_LEV*R - -0.175 -2.86*** 
DUMMY_LEV*RD + 0.191 4.59*** 
MTB*R + 0.075 5.17*** 
MTB*RD - -0.203 -13.35*** 
F- value   28.73*** 
R2 within   .2321 
N   2012 
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***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial 
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Dummy equal 1 if CEO-chairman 
combine; 0 otherwise, ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee 
financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, 
ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= 
Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm; 0 
otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, 
DUMMY_LEV= Dummy equals 1 for levered firms; 0 otherwise, MTB= Market to book 
value. 
 
5.6. Moderating effect of Ownership Concentration (H11) 
 
The following empirical model was employed to test the moderating effect of 
concentrated ownership (OCIN and OCOUT) on the relationship between firms’ 
governance (GOV) and conservatism (CONACCR or AT). 
 
Accrual-based Conservatism (CONACCR) 
 
CONACCRit = β0 + β1OCINit + β2OCOUTit + β3GOVit + β4 OCINit*GOVit + β5 
OCOUTit*GOVit + β6BTit + β7BSHIPit + β8BBRit + β9ACBRit + 
β10BCRit + β11ACCRit + β12TAit + β13PROFit + β14LEVit + 
β15SGROWit + εit 
 
Asymmetric Timeliness (AT) 
 
Eit/Pit – 1 = β0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3Rit*Dit + β4OCINit + β5OCIN it*Rit + β6OCINit*Dit  
+ β7OCINit*Rit*Dit + β8OCOUTit + β9OCOUT it*Rit + β10OCOUT it*Dit + 
β11OCOUTit*Rit*Dit + β12GOVit + β13GOVit*Rit + β14GOVit*Dit + 
β15GOVit*Rit*Dit + β16GOVit*OCINit + β17GOVit*OCOUTit + 
β18GOVit*OCINit*Rit + β19GOVit*OCINit*Dit + β20GOVit*OCINit*Rit*Dit + 
β21GOVit*OCOUTit*Rit + β22GOVit*OCOUTit*Dit + 
β23GOVit*OCOUTit*Rit*Dit + BT + BSHIP + Ethnicity & Control 
Variablesit + εit 
 
Table 5.16 presents the results for CONACCR model.  Column (a) shows the results 
on the main effect of GOV on CONACCR and column (b) shows the results on the 
moderating relationship.  In column (a), the main effect of GOV on CONACCR was 
insignificant whilst OCIN and OCOUT significantly led to lower CONACCR.  The 
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insignificant coefficient on GOV could be due to the dominant power of the 
concentrated owners.   
 
Column (b) shows the influence of concentrated owners on firms’ governance; the 
main focus is GOV, OCIN*GOV and OCOUT*GOV.  The results suggest that when 
GOV was not influenced by the concentrated owners, GOV had a positive but weak 
effect on CONACCR.  However, when GOV was interacted with OCOUT 
(GOV*OCOUT), the coefficient turned into negative.  The finding implies that in 
firms with outside concentrated owners, the firms’ governance led to lower 
CONACCR.  No significant finding was obtained on the effect of OCIN on GOV. 
 
Table 5.16 
Results of Accrual-based Conservatism: 
Main Effect and Moderating Effect  
  (a) Main effect (b) Moderating effect 
Variables Predicted sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
Constant  0.198 1.1 0.119 0.620 
OCIN - -0.001 -2.87*** 0.000 0.180 
OCOUT + -0.001 -2.2** 0.001 1.470 
GOV + 0.023 1.12 0.148 1.930* 
OCIN*GOV -   -0.002 -1.220 
OCOUT*GOV -   -0.003 -2.330** 
BT + 0.001 1 0.001 1.030 
BSHIP - -0.012 -0.83 -0.013 -0.950 
BBR - 0.099 2.19** 0.085 1.840* 
ACBR - -0.028 -0.79 -0.028 -0.780 
BCR + 0.069 1.61 0.058 1.320 
ACCR + -0.023 -0.71 -0.024 -0.740 
TA - -0.012 -1.33 -0.011 -1.160 
PROF + 0.177 7.12*** 0.178 7.120*** 
LEV + 0.037 1.27 0.034 1.170 
SGROW - 0.000 -2.16** 0.000 -2.220** 
F-value   6.04***  6.00*** 
R2 within   .1066  .1123 
N   2031  2031 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
OCIN=Inside substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, GOV= 
Firms’ aggregate governance measure, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board multiple 
directorships, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit 
committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, TA= 
Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, 
SGROW= Sales growth. 
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Table 5.17 presents the results for AT model.  In column (a), GOV had a strong 
positive association with AT whilst OCIN and OCOUT were not significant.  The 
findings suggest that firms’ governance had significant power to encourage early 
recognition of bad news in relative to good news into earnings.   
 
Further, interaction effect between GOV and both OCIN and OCOUT were made to 
observe if the effect of GOV on AT changes with the influence of the concentrated 
owners.  The main focus is OCIN*GOV*RD and OCOUT*GOV*RD for 
asymmetric timeliness on the recognition of bad news into earnings, relative to good 
news; and OCIN*GOV*R and OCOUT*GOV*R on the recognition of good news 
into earnings.  Results in column (b) showed that without the influence of the 
concentrated owners, GOV led to more conservatism.  Specifically, GOV 
significantly led to slower recognition of good news into earnings (GOV*R) and 
faster recognition of bad news relative to good news into earnings (GOV*RD).  The 
magnitude of the coefficients on GOV was bigger than those in the main effect in 
column (a).  When GOV was interacted with OCIN and OCOUT, the firms’ 
conservatism became lower, as shown by the negative coefficient on 
OCIN*GOV*RD and OCOUT*GOV*RD.  The finding suggests that the 
concentrated owners influenced the firms’ governance to employ lower 
conservatism. 
 
Overall, Hypothesis 11a was not supported in the CONACCR model but was 
supported in the AT model.  Hypothesis 11b was supported in the CONACCR and 
AT models. 
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Table 5.17 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: 
 Main Effect and Moderating Effect  
(a) Main effect (b) Moderating effect 
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
OCIN*R + -0.001 -0.9 -0.033 -5.31*** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -1.19 0.047 4.34*** 
OCOUT*R - 0.000 0.27 -0.023 -2.42** 
OCOUT*RD + -0.003 -0.77 0.027 1.63 
GOV*R - -0.839 -6.18*** -3.717 -5.43*** 
GOV*RD + 1.666 3.93*** 5.524 4.92*** 
OCIN*GOV*R +   0.065 5.31*** 
OCIN *GOV*RD -   -0.097 -4.77*** 
OCOUT*GOV*R +   0.047 2.54** 
OCOUT*GOV*RD -   -0.058 -2.09** 
BT*R - 0.001 0.34 -0.003 -0.71 
BT*RD + 0.005 0.65 0.010 1.26 
BSHIP*R + -0.021 -0.24 0.046 0.47 
BSHIP*RD - -0.085 -0.58 -0.153 -1.16 
BBR*R + -0.310 -1.43 -0.336 -2.23** 
BBR*RD - 1.158 8.23*** 1.103 6.03*** 
ACBR*R + -0.059 -0.29 0.001 0 
ACBR*RD - 0.550 3.4*** 0.435 2.23** 
BCR*R - 0.312 1.52 0.367 1.79* 
BCR*RD + -1.007 -2.55** -1.054 -2.4** 
ACCR*R - 0.062 0.39 0.037 0.22 
ACCR*RD + -0.676 -2.29** -0.636 -1.88* 
TA*R + 0.011 0.51 -0.007 -0.33 
TA*RD - 0.061 1.33 0.071 1.68* 
PROF*R - 0.445 2.03** 0.458 2.3** 
PROF*RD + -0.386 -0.53 -0.360 -0.55 
LEV*R - -0.264 -0.99 -0.086 -0.39 
LEV*RD + -0.681 -3.18*** -0.969 -4.04*** 
MTB*R + 0.072 4.28*** 0.067 5.21*** 
MTB*RD - -0.163 -4.81*** -0.148 -8.2*** 
F- value   16.11***  176.60*** 
R2 within   .2039  .2240 
N   2012  2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative; 0 otherwise, RD = R*D, OCIN=Inside substantial 
shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, GOV= Firms’ aggregate governance 
measure, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on 
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACCR= Ratio 
Chinese on audit committee, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, 
LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
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5.7. Summary 
 
The earlier section of this chapter presented the descriptive statistics on the data used 
in this thesis.  The descriptive analysis showed that Malaysian listed firms had 
successfully complied with the best practices of corporate governance recommended 
in the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance.  Figure 5.1 shows the lines 
connecting variables that have significant effect on accounting conservatism.  
Overall, results in this thesis showed that concentrated owners had a strong influence 
on the accrual-based conservatism (CONACCR) relative to the asymmetric 
timeliness (AT).  None of the board and audit committee attributes had a significant 
effect on CONACCR.  However, BID, BF and ACID were significantly related to 
AT.  These results suggest that internal governance mechanisms influenced 
conservative accounting depending on whether conservatism is measured using an 
accounting based or a market based approach.   
 
Additional analysis was performed on BS, ACID, ACF, ACM and LEV to confirm 
the initial results.  Whilst BS remained insignificant in the additional analysis, the 
strong negative coefficient on wholly independent directors on the audit committee 
confirmed the earlier finding that independent directors on the audit committee led to 
lower asymmetric timeliness.  This thesis found that firms that held at least four 
meetings a year were positively related to asymmetric timeliness, suggesting that use 
of a dichotomous measure is better able to detect the importance of frequent meeting 
in producing quality financial reports.  Additional analysis on the proportion of 
financial expertise on the audit committee suggests that it is not necessary to appoint 
financial experts on audit committee if there was already financial expertise on the 
board.  The effect of LEV on conservatism is proven when LEV was measured as 
dichotomous variable to classify levered and unlevered firms.  The result is 
consistent with the previous evidence that debt holders would demand higher 
conservatism to protect their interest.  Mixed evidence on the relationship between 
ethnic groups and conservatism seems to suggest that ethnicity is not the real 
influence on conservatism.   
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Figure 5.1: Results Summary of Hypothesis 1 to Hypothesis 10  
 
Results from testing Hypothesis 11 shown in Figure 5.2, indicated that firms’ 
governance had a weak positive effect on CONACCR; when it was not influenced by 
the concentrated owners.  However, the firms’ governance led to lower conservatism 
when it was interacted with the outside substantial shareholders.  The firms’ 
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Firm’s aggregate  
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 (GOV) 
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Firm’s aggregate  
measure of governance 
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governance had a strong positive association on asymmetric timeliness but when it 
was interacted with the inside substantial shareholders and outside substantial 
shareholders, both led the firms’ governance to employ less asymmetric timeliness.  
The results confirmed the argument that concentrated ownership constrains an 
effective function of firms’ governance mechanisms. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(* NS = Not significant) 
 
Figure 5.2: Results Summary of Hypothesis 11(a) and 11(b)  
 
Overall, most of the hypotheses are supported in the asymmetric timeliness as 
compared to the accrual-based conservatism, supporting the Givoly et al.’s (2007) 
claim that relying on only one measure of conservatism may lead to incorrect 
conclusions.   
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CHAPTER SIX 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
6.1. Introduction 
 
The previous chapter presented the results of the hypotheses testing and the summary 
of the results is presented in Table 6.1.  This chapter provides a more detailed 
discussion of the findings and provides further insight into the effect of ownership 
concentration, attributes of board of directors and audit committee; and ethnicity on 
the conservatism practices.  It is followed by discussion on the moderating effect of 
ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’ governance and 
conservatism. 
 
The chapter is organised as follows.  Section 6.2 discusses the results on ownership 
concentration, section 6.3 discusses the results on board of director’s characteristics 
and section 6.4 discusses the findings on audit committee characteristics.  Section 6.5 
discusses findings on ethnicity.  Section 6.6 discusses results on the moderating 
effect of ownership concentration on the relationship between firms’ governance and 
conservatism.  Section 6.7 presents the conclusions of the findings and section 6.8 
discusses the implications of this thesis.  Section 6.9 presents the limitations of this 
thesis.  This chapter ends with section 6.10 on areas for future research. 
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Table 6.1  
Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
  Predicted 
Sign 
Findings Additional 
analysis 
 Hypotheses  CONACCR AT CONACCR AT 
 
 
 
H1a 
 
Inside Substantial  
Shareholders (OCIN) 
Proportion of 
substantial 
shareholding by 
insiders is inversely 
related to conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
  
 
 
 
 
H1b 
 
Outside Substantial 
Shareholders 
(OCOUT) 
Proportion of 
substantial 
shareholding by 
outsiders is positively 
related to conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
  
 
 
 
H2 
 
Board Composition 
(BID) 
Proportion of 
independent directors 
on the board is 
positively related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
  
 
 
H3 
 
Board Size (BS) 
Board size is inversely 
related to conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
- 
(NS)
 
 
H4a 
 
Board Tenure (BT) 
Directors’ tenure is 
positively related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
  
 
 
 
H4b 
 
Board Financial 
Expertise (BF) 
Proportion of financial 
expertise on the board 
is positively related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
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  Predicted 
Sign 
Findings Additional 
analysis 
 Hypotheses  CONACCR AT CONACCR AT 
 
 
H4c 
 
Multiple Directorships 
(BSHIP) 
Proportion of directors 
with multiple 
directorships is 
inversely related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
 
- 
(NS)
  
 
 
H5 
 
CEO Duality (BCD) 
CEO Duality is 
inversely related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
- 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
+ 
(NS)
  
 
 
 
H6 
 
Audit Committee 
Composition (ACID) 
Proportion of 
independent directors 
on the audit committee 
is positively related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
 
 
 
 
H7 
 
Audit Committee 
Financial Expertise 
(ACF) 
Proportion of financial 
expertise on the audit 
committee is positively 
related to conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS)
 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
 
 
 
H8 
 
Audit Committee 
Meeting (ACM) 
Frequency of audit 
committee meeting is 
positively related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
- 
(NS)
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
 
 
 
H9a 
 
Bumiputera on Board 
(BBR) 
Proportion of 
Bumiputera members 
on the board is 
inversely related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
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  Predicted 
Sign 
Findings Additional 
analysis 
 Hypotheses  CONACCR AT CONACCR AT 
 
 
 
H9b 
 
Bumiputera on Audit 
Committee (ACBR) 
Proportion of 
Bumiputera members 
on the audit committee 
is inversely related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H10a 
 
Chinese on Board 
(BCR) 
Proportion of Chinese 
members on the board 
is positively related to 
conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
  
 
 
 
H10b 
 
Chinese on Audit 
Committee (ACCR) 
Proportion of Chinese 
members on the audit 
committee is positively 
related to conservative 
accounting. 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
- 
(NS) 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
  
 
 
H11a 
 
Main effect of GOV 
There is a positive 
relationship between 
firm’s governance and 
conservatism. 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
(NS) 
 
 
+ 
(S) 
  
 
 
 
 
H11b 
 
Moderating effect of 
ownership 
concentration 
The power of the 
concentrated owners, 
represented by the 
percentage of 
ownership, negatively 
moderates the positive 
effect of the firms’ 
governance on 
conservatism.   
 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
 
 
 
 
- 
(S) 
  
S= Significant; NS= Not significant 
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6.2. Ownership Concentration (H1) 
 
Following agency theory, managerial ownership is regarded as an effective tool to 
reduce agency conflict between managers and shareholders.  Although it is a 
beneficial tool in firms with diffused ownership, the same is not true if the firms’ 
ownership structure is concentrated to the large shareholders.  In fact, evidence has 
shown that managerial ownership exceeding a certain point would be detrimental to 
the firms (Korczak & Korczak, 2009).   
 
Literature documented the merit of accounting conservatism to reduce agency 
conflict as its application can constrain opportunistic behaviour and increase firm 
value that ultimately protects the interest of the minority shareholders (Watts, 2003).  
As predicted, this thesis finds that an increase in the percentage of shareholding by 
insiders leads to a decrease in accrual-based conservatism.  LaFond and 
Roychowdhury (2008) who found similar relationship argued it as consistent with the 
substitution effect.  As managers become owners, their interest is aligned with the 
shareholders, thus the demand for conservatism as a monitoring tool is reduced.  
They made this contention on the grounds that US firms, having a dispersed 
ownership structure, used managerial ownership to reduce high agency conflict 
between the managers and shareholders.  Arguably, the substitution effect may not 
apply in firms with highly concentrated ownership because manager-shareholder 
conflict is no longer apparent, and the more pronounced conflict is between the 
majority and minority shareholders.  The findings of Leuz et al. (2003) that Malaysia 
is one of the three Southeast Asian countries in the common law group having the 
worst earnings management ratings, is plausibly an indication of entrenchment 
activities in Malaysian firms.  Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) suggested that high 
managerial ownership is unsuitable in the Malaysian business environment due to the 
risk of misallocation of firms’ resources at the expense of the minority shareholders.  
Hence, an entrenchment effect is a possible explanation for the result obtained in this 
thesis because insiders do not need a mechanism that constrains their behaviour, so 
they can conceal their expropriation activities (Korczak & Korczak, 2009; Kothari et 
al., 2009).  Where controlling shareholders adopt less conservatism, this means that 
they can conceal their behaviour, thus confirming the argument made by Bidin 
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(2009) on the risk that controlling shareholders extract firms’ wealth for their own 
interest.  Consistent findings were presented by Hu, Tam and Tan (2010) for Chinese 
companies as the concentrated owners significantly reduced firm performance.  The 
findings in this thesis strongly support Haniffa and Hudaib’s (2006) suggestion that 
necessary actions need to be taken to ensure that insiders do not misappropriate firm 
resources, thus damaging firm value. 
 
The inverse relationship between outside substantial shareholders and accrual-based 
conservatism found in this thesis is contrary to expectation.  Outside substantial 
shareholders are seen as an effective governance mechanism because they would 
demand transparent and quality financial information to secure their huge investment 
in the firm.  Previous studies also showed the governance role of outside 
shareholders to improve earnings informativeness (Yeo et al., 2002) and employ 
higher conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007).  Further, Malaysian studies 
showed that outside shareholders reduce managers’ remuneration (S. N. Abdullah, 
2006c) and reduce occurrence of financial distress status (S. N. Abdullah, 2006b).  
The results in this thesis however, suggest that they fail to promote better governance 
through higher conservatism practices.  Similar arguments were made by Ming and 
Gee (2008) that outside majority shareholders are not effective in their monitoring 
role.   
 
Despite the contradictions apparent from the above empirical findings, the reverse 
effect obtained in this thesis may be influenced by the use of different means of 
measurement.  This thesis uses substantial shareholding held by outsiders as the 
proxy for outside concentrated ownership while the abovementioned studies 
identified the outsiders from large shareholders and from directors’ ownerships.  As 
defined in section 4.5.1, substantial shareholders are those who hold more than 5% 
equity including their indirect interest via nominees.  Since this thesis focuses on 
concentrated ownership, the use of large shareholders or directors’ shareholding may 
understate the measure of concentration intended.  Specifically, large shareholding is 
ranked based on high to low percentage of shareholding, regardless of securities 
accounts belonging to the same person.  S. N. Abdullah (2006b) employed the same 
measure used in this thesis but with a sample period from 1999 to 2001.  Recovery 
from financial crisis during that period may encourage the outside shareholders to 
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play a more prominent role to avoid huge investment loss if firms are subject to 
distress. 
 
Despite the findings on the accrual-based measure, ownership concentration has no 
effect on asymmetric timeliness.  Similar findings were obtained by Haniffa and 
Hudaib (2006) that ownership concentration increases accounting return but not the 
market return.  This result is also consistent with Dalton and Dalton’s (2005) 
argument that managers sometimes have less direct control on the market measure of 
accounting.   
 
6.3. Board of Directors’ characteristics (H2 – H5) 
 
6.3.1. Board Composition (H2) 
 
Supporting the agency theory, this thesis found a significant positive association 
between board composition and asymmetric timeliness.  As a higher proportion of 
independent directors leads to higher conservatism, this finding supports the claim 
that outside directors significantly enhanced board effectiveness and reduced 
uncertainty (Fama & Jensen, 1983; Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).  The results are 
consistent with Beekes et al.’s (2004) and A. S. Ahmed and Duellman’s (2007) 
evidence on UK and US firms respectively.  It is also consistent with the results of 
other accounting research, outside directors reduced financial statement fraud 
(Beasley, 1996), reduced earnings management (Benkraiem, 2009; Peasnell et al., 
2006), improved audit quality (Salleh et al., 2006) and reduced abnormal accruals 
(Koh et al., 2007).   
 
Board composition had no influence on accrual-based conservatism.  This finding 
suggests that effectiveness depends on the measure of conservatism; market based or 
income statement based.  In other words, independent directors were effective to 
monitor market based accounting but lack the power to impact on the income 
statement base of accounting.  Significant influence of independent directors on 
market based measure was also reported by Ameer et al. (2010) for Malaysian 
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sample as they showed that independent directors significantly increased Tobin’s Q, 
which is a market based measure of firm value.   
 
Although this thesis did not find an association between board composition and 
accrual-based conservatism, thus conflicting with A. S. Ahmed and Duellman (2007) 
and G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), it is however, consistent with existing 
evidence for Malaysian firms.  Malaysian studies reported that independent directors 
were not related to firm performance (S. N. Abdullah, 2004), financial distress status 
(S. N. Abdullah, 2006b), earnings management (Rahman & Ali, 2006) and financial 
restatements (S. N. Abdullah et al., 2010).  Therefore, board independence may not 
imply the board as expertise or diligence in monitoring management as argued in 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) rather is perceived as a provider of service 
and ‘window to the world’ for the firm as argued in resource dependence theory 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 2003).   
 
The effectiveness of independent directors in countries with a concentrated 
ownership structure has been a focal discussion in Asian corporate governance 
literature (see: Barton et al., 2004; P. Klein et al., 2005).  Some evidence showed that 
controlling owners simply chose a weak governance structure when they appointed 
less independent directors to the board (Hu et al., 2010; Setia-Atmaja, 2009).  In 
Malaysian firms, the presence of independent directors on the board, although 
reflecting good governance practice, may in fact reflect controlling shareholders 
choosing directors that favour their interest.  S. N. Abdullah et al. (2010) showed 
that, for sample firms that restated the accounts, their nomination committee was less 
independent with high managerial ownership.  If members in the nomination 
committee are dominated by the insiders, more likely they will nominate and appoint 
directors that can go along with them.  This thesis found that the majority of 
Malaysian firms’ boards were dominated by inside shareholders who might use their 
power as controlling owners to overrule board decisions.  Since managers have more 
control over accounting-based measures than the market-based measures (Dalton & 
Dalton, 2005), plausibly shareholders controlling power on accrual-based 
conservatism reported earlier in this thesis dominated power of the independent 
directors.  As a result, independent directors become ineffective because their 
monitoring role is jeopardised by the interference of the management (S. N. 
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Abdullah, 2004; Rahman & Ali, 2006).  This may explain why independent directors 
were not effective in influencing accrual-based conservatism relative to asymmetric 
timeliness. 
 
6.3.2. Board Size (H3) 
 
The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance and Bursa Malaysia Listing 
requirements are silent on the number of directors that should sit on the board.  
However, they encourage firms to evaluate the board size to allow active and 
effective participation from the board members.  The result in this thesis showed that 
board size did not determine conservatism practices in Malaysian firms.  This finding 
is not consistent with previous evidence that board size was related to earnings 
management (Rahman & Ali, 2006), firm performance (Cheng, 2008; Guest, 2009), 
voluntary disclosure (Akhtaruddin et al., 2009) or financial distress status (Chang, 
2009).   
 
Results in this thesis however, are consistent with Bonn et al. (2004) who found 
insignificant association between board size and firm performance.  Bonn et al. 
(2004) recognised that board size is only a factual number of directors, and do not 
reflect the directors’ skill and knowledge that are more valuable for a board to 
function effectively.  This thesis observed that financial expertise on the board is the 
factor that had a strong positive impact on asymmetric timeliness.  Hence, size of the 
board is not an issue if the board members possessed the relevant skill to monitor the 
financial reporting process. 
 
6.3.3. Board Skill (H4a – H4c) 
 
This thesis examined board tenure, board financial expertise and multiple 
directorships to proxy for board skill.  This thesis found that financial expertise was 
the only skill that enhanced the accounting conservatism. 
 
This thesis found that directors with longer tenure were faster in recognising good 
news which will be turned into earnings.  Longer tenure did not significantly affect 
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asymmetric timeliness, but the negative coefficient provided a hint that it reduced 
conservatism.  This finding implies that independent directors who stayed on the 
firm’s board for too long did not enhance their ability to monitor.  Previous research 
had questioned the independence of the outside directors in Malaysia; since their 
appointment was made by the owners, which in Malaysia’s case means the 
controlling shareholders; or their appointment dependent on the availability of 
talented individuals. (S. N. Abdullah, 2004).  Firms may decide to hold the 
independent directors for a longer term because talented persons are not easily 
available or the management has established a good relationship with the directors so 
does not want to let them go.  This phenomena is consistent with the expertise 
hypothesis, that longer tenure enhanced directors’ experience and competency, but 
the management-friendliness hypothesis suggests that the risk may outweigh the 
benefit when the independence of the senior directors is impaired, as they become 
too close to the executive directors (Vafeas, 2003).  Independent directors who have 
been serving on the board for a longer period may be influenced by the management, 
especially when a Malaysian firms’ board is dominated by the inside controlling 
shareholders.  Possibly, the directors’ long service itself helps the controlling 
shareholders to pursue their own agenda and does not relate firm-specific knowledge 
to the provision of quality financial reports. 
 
A significant relationship between financial expertise and asymmetric timeliness 
signifies the importance of accounting knowledge for directors to control 
manipulation or produce transparent financial information.  This result supports 
previous studies that highlighted the importance of financial experts (e.g.: Rahmat et 
al., 2009; Rose & Rose, 2008).  This finding also indicated that to achieve quality 
financial reports, financial expertise is the relevant skill, relative to longer tenure and 
multiple directorships.  Directors that are equipped with financial knowledge can 
understand and detect any irregular issues in overseeing the preparation of the 
financial statements.  A finding consistent with Lanfranconi and Robertson (2002) 
who noted that lack of accounting knowledge would lead to financial failure of the 
firm.  The results in this thesis suggest that longer tenure and multiple directorships 
are obscure in providing better monitoring, especially in observing matters relating to 
the financial reports.  
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This thesis found that multiple directorships had no significant influence on 
conservatism, but the direction of the relationship suggests that multiple directorships 
adversely affected the quality of the financial reports.  Arguments on the benefit of 
multiple directorships is essentially mixed, one suggests that participating in many 
boards makes directors busy and less effective in monitoring the management (Ferris 
et al., 2003) whilst others argue that it broadens the directors’ knowledge (Schnake et 
al., 2005).  However, Schnake and Williams (2008) later argued that when directors 
were busy serving on many boards, they could not deliver their knowledge 
effectively.  Empirical evidence mostly supports the latter argument, with multiple 
directorships found to be associated with lower conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & 
Duellman, 2007) and higher earnings management (Sarkar et al., 2008).  Similarly, 
evidence in Malaysia showed that multiple directorships are not a healthy practice as 
they reduced market performance (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  Saleh et al. (2005) 
reported that multiple directorships detected earnings management but only in firms 
with negative earnings.  The direction of the relationship found in this thesis is 
consistent with the above evidence but it was not a vital factor that could affect the 
incidence of accounting conservatism in Malaysian firms. 
 
6.3.4. CEO Duality (H5) 
 
This thesis identified that the board leadership structure of Malaysian listed firms 
follows agency theory rather than stewardship theory.  As reflected by almost 95% of 
the sample, the separate roles adopted for CEO and chairman indicated that 
Malaysian firms emphasized effective monitoring rather than effective leadership as 
discussed by Daily and Dalton (1997).  The separate structure is also favourable to 
the practitioner and financial communities (Daily & Dalton, 1997).  Separating the 
CEO-chairman roles is not mandated by the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance, but if the roles are combined there should be a strong independent 
element on the board and the decision to combine should be publicly explained.  The 
concern that CEO may dominate the board as argued by Jensen (1993) was not 
prominent in Malaysian listed firms, as compared to firms in other countries like US, 
where almost 80% of firms combined the roles of CEO and chairman.    
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As predicted, the result shows that the coefficient on CEO duality was negative and 
consistent in accrual-based conservatism and asymmetric timeliness models, but 
none of them were statistically significant.  The results suggest that conservatism 
practices in Malaysian firms were not determined by the CEO or/and chairman 
leadership structure.  This result is not surprising because empirical evidence on the 
CEO duality effect is indeed mixed.  Some studies supported the agency theory 
(Dechow et al., 1995; A. Klein, 2002; G. V. Krishnan & Visvanathan, 2008; Rahman 
& Haniffa, 2005), while others supported the stewardship theory (Brickley et al., 
1997; Farooque et al., 2007).  There are also studies that failed to support either 
theory; for instance, CEO duality was insignificant with accounting conservatism (A. 
S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007) and earnings management (Cornett et al., 2008).  This 
suggests that no one theory is superior in all circumstances. 
 
The results from this thesis supported the findings of Dahya, Garcia et al. (2009) and 
affirmed that though separating the two roles had been a major practice in Malaysian 
firms, it did not have a demonstrably favourable effect on the financial reports.  S. N. 
Abdullah (2004, 2006a) and S. N. Abdullah et al. (2010) who examined Malaysian 
firms also obtained similar outcome.  Some studies argued that CEO duality does not 
produce the expected result because it was affected by other factors.  For instance, 
the structure was influenced by the complexity of firms’ operation and governance 
characteristics of the individual firm (Faleye, 2007), firms decision to separate or 
combine the roles was determined by family controlled factors (Lam & Lee, 2008) 
and the effect of CEO duality on performance dependent on the firms’ performance 
level (Ramdani & Witteloostuijn, 2010).  In the Malaysian context, a separate 
leadership structure does not promise board independence because the board is still 
influenced by the inside controlling shareholders who are sitting on the board.  
Coombes and Wong (2004) suggested that the chairman must be able to challenge 
the CEO without fear of giving offence but this is unlikely to happen in Malaysian 
firms as inside controlling shareholders are dominant on the board of Malaysian 
firms.  As discussed in Horner (2010), the board has a certain amount of ownership 
power when the members of the board hold equity shares of the firm.  In Malaysian 
firms’ board, the power of the inside directors must be excessive because they hold 
substantial ownership in the firms.  Hence, their controlling power may have 
superseded the merit of separating the board leadership structure.  Although the 
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insiders chose to apply separate board leadership structure in the firms, they still 
have the power to appoint the board’s chairman and may choose a person who is 
within their circle of trust.  As a result, separate leadership structure has no influence 
on conservatism. 
 
6.4. Audit Committee characteristics (H6 – H8) 
 
6.4.1. Audit Committee Composition (H6) 
 
This thesis found that the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee 
and wholly independent audit committees were inversely related to asymmetric 
timeliness.  An audit committee represented by a majority of independent directors 
showed a positive sign but the effect was not significant.  Hence, the 
recommendation of the best practice guideline to have a majority of independent 
directors on the audit committee did not improve accounting conservatism.  Also, 
results in this thesis indicated that increasing the number of independent directors on 
the audit committee led to lower conservatism. 
 
Although outside directors are associated with strong governance, the findings in this 
thesis suggest that independent directors on the audit committee were ineffective.  
This result is consistent with S. N. Abdullah et al.’s (2010) findings that an increase 
in the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee led to a higher 
probability of financial misstatement.  Contradicting results between board 
composition and audit committee composition suggest that these two mechanisms 
reacted differently towards conservatism practices.  This result is puzzling because 
independent directors on the audit committee were also independent directors on the 
board.  The result could be driven by the nature of the job undertaken by the 
independent directors in respect to the committee they served.  Based on 
responsibility, directors on the board have wider roles within the operation of the 
business, in addition to just monitoring the financial reporting process.  The roles of 
directors on the audit committee are limited to the financial statement matters 
including reviewing the outcome from the audits.  In this context, independent 
directors on the board possessed more knowledge about the firm which then led to 
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higher conservatism.  According to Zain and Subramaniam (2007), independent 
directors who have limited knowledge about the firms’ business are not effective 
unless the resource person who is the head of the internal audit function is strong and 
well-resourced.  Based on this point, it raises concerns whether independent directors 
appointed to the audit committee were those having a good understanding about the 
business or were merely selected randomly; or maybe directors that had not been a 
good fit for other committees.  If this is true, directors who were appointed to the 
audit committee might not have the competency to monitor the financial statements.  
This is an alarm to the relevant authorities that the status of being independent from 
the management is not a guarantee of better monitoring.  Consistent with DeZoort 
and Steven (2001), this thesis believes that the competency of the independent 
directors should be assessed based on the committee they serve, as roles of the 
committees vary.  Since the audit committee is responsible for monitoring the 
process of the financial reports, having outside directors with financial expertise 
would enhance their governance role, as evident from Mustafa and Youssef (2010).  
The independent audit committee members lead to lower conservatism could also be 
driven by the influence of the inside concentrated owners, as reported by Zain and 
Subramaniam (2007) that independent audit committee members were not free from 
management influence.  Other possible explanation is taken from the finding of 
Pomeroy and Thornton (2008) that independent directors of the audit committee 
were effective only in improving audit quality, but not financial statement quality; 
and thus explain the lower conservatism practices of the independent directors on 
audit committees reported in this thesis. 
 
6.4.2. Audit Committee Financial Expertise (H7) 
 
Financial expertise measures in this thesis followed G. V. Krishnan and Visvanathan 
(2008) who defined financial experts as directors who have qualification or 
experience in accounting or finance.  Initially, financial expertise on the audit 
committee was not significantly associated with asymmetric timeliness.  However, 
after excluding board financial expertise from the regression model, the coefficient 
on audit committee financial expertise became significant.  This change in result is 
not likely to be due to a multicollinearity problem as the correlation between 
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financial expertise on the board and those on the audit committee as shown in Table 
5.4 was less than 0.9.  The result suggests that board financial expertise was stronger 
in determining the conservatism practices, than the financial expertise on the audit 
committee.  However, when board financial expertise was excluded from the model, 
financial expertise on the audit committee effectively performed a governance role 
leading to more conservatism practices.  Excluding board financial expertise from 
the model was intended to facilitate the observation of the effect of audit committee 
financial expertise on conservatism.  The results imply that financial expertise on the 
board and audit committee are two important mechanisms for effective monitoring of 
the financial reporting.  However, when firms appointed financial expertise to both 
board and audit committee, those that represent the board show an outstanding role.  
It is presumed that being financial experts is an added bonus to the board members as 
they already have wider knowledge about the firm’s business.  This finding also 
implied that board financial expertise is enough to promote quality financial reports, 
even when there is no financial expertise on the audit committee.   
 
The results in this thesis are consistent with McMullen and Raghunandan (1996), 
Rose and Rose (2008), Dickins et al. (2009) and Rahmat et al.(2009) that knowledge 
or experience in accounting among the audit committee members enhances the 
quality of the financial statements.   
 
6.4.3. Audit Committee Meeting (H8) 
 
Initially, this thesis did not find any association between frequency of audit 
committee meetings and conservatism practices when it is treated as a linear variable.  
However, when audit committee meeting was assigned the status of dummy variable, 
using a threshold of 4 meetings, it was significantly related to asymmetric timeliness.  
This finding is consistent with evidence reported by Anderson et al. (2004), Abbott et 
al. (2004) and Owens-Jackson et al. (2009), and hence showing that frequent 
meetings improved the quality of the financial statements.  On the flip side, G. V. 
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) and Rahmat et al. (2009) failed to find significance 
in the frequency of meetings, perhaps because they did not identify the threshold of 
meeting frequency to detect efficiency. 
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Findings in this thesis showed that the minimum number of 4 meetings per year is a 
useful recommendation to improve accounting conservatism.  This thesis also 
highlighted the importance of correct measurement in the analysis to ensure that the 
contribution of a particular factor is appreciated.  Although mixed evidence obtained 
by previous studies were based on a similar measures i.e. total number of meetings 
held per year, this thesis considers variation in the data distributions of respective 
studies might be sensitive to one selected measure, so that changing it to a stronger 
proxy would improve its predictive ability. 
 
6.5. Ethnicity (H9 – H10) 
 
Gray (1988) proposed that the individualism concept relates to conservatism 
practices.  A review on Malaysian studies showed no uniform evidence to suggest 
the individualism level of the Bumiputera and Chinese ethnic groups.  Hence, on the 
basis of individualism, it is difficult to predict the effect of the ethnic groups on 
conservatism.  However, the political hypothesis argued by Ball et al. (2003) and the 
compensation incentive hypothesis evidence by Yen et al. (2007) led to the 
prediction that Bumiputera directors adopt lower conservative accounting whilst the 
Chinese directors adopt higher conservative accounting. 
 
Results from this thesis, however indicated that the effects of Bumiputera directors 
and Chinese directors on conservatism were similar.  However, the two ethnic 
groups’ attitudes towards conservatism differed depending on whether they served 
on the board or audit committee.  Specifically, this thesis showed that higher 
proportion of Bumiputera directors or Chinese directors on the board led to higher 
asymmetric timeliness.  In contrast, a higher proportion of Bumiputera directors or 
Chinese directors on the audit committee led to lower asymmetric timeliness.  
Contrasting results on the ethnic groups between the board and audit committee 
implies that ethnicity per se did not determine conservatism; and the results are 
inconsistent with the individualism concept.  Also, the results did not support the 
political hypothesis and compensation or tax incentives hypothesis. 
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Haniffa and Cooke (2002) also found contradictory results when they developed their 
prediction based on the individualism concept.  They argued that the result could be 
influenced by other intervening factors, such as government policy, economic 
incentives and religion.  Tsakumis (2007) noted that the individualism concept may 
be flawed because the direction of conservatism in his study was not consistent with 
the level of individualism showed on his sample study.  Mixed results from this 
thesis suggest that the level of individualism, political and compensation or tax 
incentives did not explain the conservatism practices of the ethnic groups.  Instead of 
ethnicity per se, plausibly other factors could explain directors’ attitude on 
conservatism.  A. Abdullah (2001) and Fontaine and Richardson (2005) found that 
Bumiputera and Chinese ethnic groups did not differ except in terms of religiosity; 
and this factor is yet to be explored on its relation with conservatism. 
 
6.6. Moderating effect of ownership concentration on the 
relationship between firms’ governance and conservatism 
(H11) 
 
The results show that firms’ governance is effective when there is no interference 
from the concentrated owners.  However, as evident in the CONACCR and AT 
models, the firms’ governance led to lower conservatism when it is interacted with 
the concentrated owners.  Inside substantial shareholders did not moderate the effect 
of firms’ governance on CONACCR possibly because they have a strong direct 
impact on the CONACCR, regardless of the firms’ governance.  In contrast, the 
inside and outside substantial shareholders had no direct impact on asymmetric 
timeliness, therefore they used their controlling power to influence the firms’ 
governance to speed up the recognition of good news into earnings; and delay the 
recognition of bad news into earnings.  The outcome is advantageous to the 
concentrated owners because they are less restricted from pursuing personal agenda 
and their expropriation activities are conceal from the financial reports.   
 
This findings are consistent with Dahya, Dimitrov et al. (2009) who reported that 
firm value was higher when the firms’ board were independent of controlling 
shareholders.  Further, the results of this thesis support Cho and Kim (2007) and V. 
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Z. Chen et al. (2011) that concentrated owners hinder the firms’ governance from 
function effectively.  Also, confirms the argument that corporate governance in 
Asian countries is ineffective due to their high concentrated ownership (Allen, 2000; 
Globerman et al., 2011) and the copying of best practices from the developed 
countries does not work in countries where firms’ ownership is highly concentrated. 
(V. Z. Chen et al., 2011). 
 
This thesis affirmed that although Malaysian listed firms are seen adopting good 
governance structure, it is however, only in appearance.  For instance, Allen (2000) 
pointed out that independent directors who are being appointed by the controlling 
shareholders may not be independent in fact.  The mechanisms employed are in fact 
ineffective because they are subject to the control of the concentrated owners.   
 
6.7. Conclusions  
 
Concentrated ownership has remained in Malaysia for quite a long time.  The 
literature has discussed this issue since M. H. Lim (1981) and it continues to be a 
focal issue until the present time (see:  Tam & Tan, 2007).  This condition implies 
that it is quite impossible, to suggest these controlling owners should sell their shares 
in the market, and to apply dispersed ownership in practice.  There is a lack of 
supporting mechanisms such as takeover markets, effective board of directors, laws 
and enforcement that will left managerial opportunism unchecked (Young et al., 
2008).  The controlling owners are “immortal” as a result of weak investor 
protection, poor monitoring from the debt holders, ineffective governance 
mechanisms and also the lower accounting conservatism found in this thesis.  
Previous studies documented that accounting conservatism is effective to reduce 
managerial opportunistic behaviours.  However, this thesis found that accounting 
conservatism was not a useful tool in monitoring the controlling shareholders 
because they would choose to apply less conservative financial reports.  Based on the 
two measures of conservatism; accrual-based conservatism and asymmetric 
timeliness, it was revealed that inside and outside substantial shareholders employed 
lower conservatism.  However, the controlling shareholders had a significant effect 
only on accrual-based conservatism.  Since accrual-based conservatism is an income 
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statement measure as opposed to asymmetric timeliness, which is a market-based 
measure, this finding is consistent with Dalton and Dalton’s (2005) argument that 
managers have more control over accounting measures than the market measures.   
 
This thesis found that good governance practices did not improve the quality of the 
financial statements as none of the board of directors and audit committee attributes 
influenced accrual-based conservatism.  The direction of relationship on the 
attributes however, signalled that they influenced conservatism but were not strong 
enough to challenge the power of the controlling shareholders.  Significant effects of 
board composition, board financial expertise, audit committee composition, audit 
committee financial expertise and frequent audit committee meetings on asymmetric 
timeliness proved that these structures could function effectively when there were 
less influenced from the controlling shareholders.  These findings provided evidence 
to the argument made by Vichitsarawong et al. (2010) that corporate governance 
reforms in Malaysia improved conservatism as measured by asymmetric timeliness. 
 
The insignificant findings on the attributes of board of directors and audit committee 
in the accrual-based conservatism model suggest that the power of the controlling 
shareholders on the financial reporting process superseded the monitoring capability 
of the board and audit committee.  These results are not consistent with the US and 
UK evidence due to the interference of controlling shareholders on the Malaysian 
firms’ board.  The results of this thesis showed that concentrated owners had no 
direct impact on asymmetric timeliness; but the results from the moderating effect 
suggest that they influence firms’ governance so that it leads to lower conservatism.  
The results provide a clear indication that a good internal governance structure is not 
effective to monitor the controlling shareholders because these shareholders 
determine the performance of the governance mechanisms in the firms.  The results 
support Singam (2003) who claimed that, high concentrated ownership make it 
difficult to achieve sound corporate governance systems in Malaysia.  Evidence in 
this thesis therefore, confirms the Cohen et al.’s (2004) argument that in some 
cultures, corporate governance mechanisms are not effective tools to control 
management opportunistic behaviour; and they suggested the court and legal systems 
as effective governance tools.   
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In respect to the separate board leadership structure, there was no evidence to suggest 
that the split structure increased conservatism.  However, the negative coefficient on 
CEO duality signalled that combining the roles was damaging especially in firms 
where insiders dominate the board.  In respect to director’s skill, directors who had 
financial expertise will enhance the quality of the financial statements relative to 
longer tenure and multiple directorships.  Additionally, this thesis showed that 
financial expertise on the board strongly led to more conservatism, while financial 
expertise on the audit committee had no influence on conservatism.  It may imply 
that financial expertise on the board is more important than having it on the audit 
committee.  Hence, the adverse effect of independent directors on the audit 
committee on conservatism may not be caused by their lack of financial expertise but 
other factors that impede them from performing their oversight role.  This thesis 
highlighted that having majority independent directors on the audit committee did 
not result in quality financial reports.  This result contradicts evidence reported for 
the US and UK studies on the positive effect of audit committee independence on its 
effectiveness, but it is supporting Bedard and Gendron’s (2010) suggestion that the 
effectiveness of governance mechanism varies between countries due to their 
different environments. 
 
Further, this thesis concludes that ethnicity per se did not explain accounting 
conservatism in Malaysian firms.  The results showed that an increase in the 
proportion of Bumiputera and Chinese directors on the board led to higher 
accounting conservatism but led to lower conservatism if they were on the audit 
committee.  Hence, the ethnic effects on accounting conservatism neither support the 
individualism concept nor was it consistent with the political and compensation or 
tax incentive hypotheses.  This evidence indicated that comparing Malaysian 
financial reports with other countries may be possible, evidence that is favourable to 
the proponents of harmonisation. 
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6.8. Implications of this thesis 
 
6.8.1. Implications for Theory 
 
The findings of this thesis imply that there is no one superior theory to support the 
behaviour of the governance practices in Malaysian firms.  Generally, the ownership 
structure in Malaysian firms follows the agency theory on the use of managerial 
ownership to reduce agency conflict.  Also following agency theory, the structure of 
the board of directors and audit committee are designed to be consistent with their 
ability to monitor management. 
 
Results from this thesis showed that the board of directors and audit committee did 
not determine accrual-based conservatism; while inside and outside substantial 
shareholders had strong negative effect on accrual-based conservatism.  Positive 
accounting theory suggests firms to employ accounting conservatism to reduce 
agency conflict; but results in this thesis indicate that the decision to apply 
conservatism is in the hands of the controlling shareholders.  The findings are 
consistent with managerial hegemony theory that a board dominated by management 
is not effective to reduce agency conflict; and thus does not employ more 
conservatism. 
 
The significant effect of some of the board and audit committee attributes on 
asymmetric timeliness suggests that the internal governance mechanisms have some 
control over measures that are beyond the discretion of the controlling shareholders.  
It seems that the recommendation of good practice by the agency theory and resource 
dependence theory are applicable to a certain extent.  Nevertheless, the presence of 
ownership concentration in Malaysian firms impede an effective role of firms’ 
governance as this thesis showed that concentrated owners influenced firms’ 
governance to employ less conservatism. 
 
Results in this thesis further suggest that, to make good governance structure and 
conservatism workable, they should be accompanied by an effective market 
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mechanism.  That may be an effective method to reduce the total power of the 
controlling shareholders. 
 
6.8.2. Implications for Policy Makers and Regulatory Agencies 
 
The adverse effect of outside substantial shareholders on conservative accounting 
suggests that outside investors do not play an active role in improving the quality of 
financial statements.  In fact, their high investment in firms reduced conservatism.  
The Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance or Bursa Malaysia must educate 
and provide awareness to the substantial outside shareholders on their importance to 
demand for better financial reports.  Outsiders who are not involved with the firm’s 
management have no access to managers’ private information but have to rely on the 
financial reports to make investment decisions.  Since their wealth depends on the 
accuracy of the information in the financial reports, they should demand more 
conservative accounting to ensure that the reported figures reflect the true value of 
the firm.   
 
In respect of directors’ competency, this thesis found that only financial expertise led 
to more conservatism although previous studies reported the advantage of longer 
tenure and multiple directorships.  Hence, Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance and Bursa Malaysia should strictly emphasise a balance of the skills of 
the board members.  The Mandatory Accreditation Programme and continuing 
education program organised by the Bursa Malaysia are good channels for directors 
to enhance their competencies, but components of the program must be revised 
regularly to reflect existing condition in Malaysia as reported by empirical evidence. 
 
The effect of the controlling shareholders is huge because they can conceal their 
opportunistic behaviour from the financial reports by adopting less conservatism.  
Or, if they have no direct impact on conservatism, the controlling shareholders can 
influence governance mechanisms in the firm to adopt lower conservatism.  Results 
from this thesis suggest that the regulators must first emphasise the market tools to 
control agency conflicts in Malaysian firms before strengthening the internal 
governance structure.  According to Thillainathan (1999), limited power of the Bursa 
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Malaysia listing rules to only suspend or delist firms for breaking its rules, will only 
compound the damage already suffered by the minority shareholders.  The insiders 
who are the actual offenders remain safe.  Evidence in this thesis suggests that the 
authorities should consider refining the law to increase the punishment of controlling 
shareholders who violate their fair share of wealth relative to minority shareholders.  
The regulators should strengthen the enforcement of legal protection of shareholders 
as its poor enforcement is one of the reasons for highly concentrated ownerships in 
Asian countries (La Porta et al., 1998; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997).  Leuz et al.’s (2003) 
findings show that the legal system can be effective in reducing earnings 
management because insiders enjoy less personal control benefits which then reduce 
their incentive to mask firm performance.  Learning from their evidence, this thesis 
urges the relevant authority to focus on strengthening the law, a system that already 
exists in Malaysia, rather than implementing mechanisms that can be manipulated by 
the controlling shareholders. 
 
6.8.3. Implications for the Researchers 
 
Several previous studies on Malaysian firms concluded that ownership concentration 
and strong governance attributes do not determine the financial reports.  However, 
the outcome from this thesis highlights that using alternative measures for the 
variables of interest can change our results.  This thesis adds to the understanding 
that concentrated owners had a strong influence on the accrual based measure of 
accounting but not the market measure of accounting.  Firms’ governance however, 
did not determine the accrual based measure of accounting but had a strong influence 
on the market measure of accounting.   
 
The significant effect of concentrated owners on accrual-based conservatism 
indicates that closely held firms do not encourage better governance via conservative 
accounting, and ultimately produce lower quality financial reports.  This outcome 
should encourage researchers to use an appropriate proxy to measure the ownership 
concentration; otherwise they will draw an incorrect conclusion about the ownership 
concentration.  Researchers should also be aware that financial expertise should 
include directors having qualifications and experiences in accounting and finance 
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and not merely focusing on directors who are members of a professional accounting 
body.  This thesis proves that financial expertise by this definition can lead to more 
conservatism.  Nevertheless, the negative effect of independent directors on the audit 
committee on conservatism requires further investigation.  It is unlikely that the 
finding is caused by the members’ lack of expertise in accounting as financial 
expertise on the audit committee does not influence conservatism when there is 
financial expertise on the board.  Other factors not explored in this thesis may 
influence their behaviour. 
 
Since this thesis shows that conservatism is not a useful tool to control the behaviour 
of the controlling shareholders; it should encourage researchers to investigate other 
mechanisms that can overcome the power of the controlling shareholders.  Also, the 
area of this thesis is worth extending to other emerging markets and transition 
economies. 
 
6.8.4. Implications for Users of financial statements 
 
The adverse effect of concentrated owners on accrual-based conservatism indicates 
that the users should apply caution when relying on the financial statements.  The 
financial analyst in Malaysia may need to perform an outstanding role in monitoring 
the firms consistent with the Sun and Liu’s (2011) findings that firms employed more 
conservative financial reports when they were closely monitored by the financial 
analyst.  Otherwise, financial analysts may need to apply higher conservatism when 
assessing the financial position of firms with high concentrated ownership.  This 
thesis also acknowledges for investors that Malaysian financial reports are 
comparable with those in other countries because ethnicity per se does not appear to 
explain the conservatism practices of the directors.   
 
Creditors will also benefit from the findings in this thesis because they have better 
understanding of how characteristics of firms, concentration of the ownership 
structure and attributes of internal governance affect conservatism.  Based on result 
of this thesis, the creditors must be aware that they cannot simply rely on the 
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reported financial statements but may demand additional information to assist them 
in making appropriate decisions.   
 
Auditors should learn from the finding that, internal governance mechanisms in firms 
with concentrated ownership are not effective in monitoring management.  Hence, 
the auditors should not assume that the reported financial statements to have been 
closely monitored by the board and audit committee.  The auditors should demand 
more information and perform independent audit tasks to ensure that they enhance 
the quality of the financial reports.  The auditors should also identify what possible 
factors cause the independent directors on the audit committee to employ less 
conservatism.  
 
6.9. Limitations of this thesis 
 
This thesis has significantly contributed to our understanding that concentrated 
owners reduce conservatism practices and they also influence firms’ governance to 
employ less conservatism.  However, as with any research, this thesis is subject to a 
number of limitations as listed below: 
 
1. The sample in this thesis excludes all financial related firms as they are 
regulated by a different act.  Hence, the outcomes from this thesis cannot be 
generalised to these institutions.  
 
2. This thesis explores three important governance mechanisms namely, 
ownership concentration, board of directors and audit committee.  While this 
thesis only examined internal governance mechanisms, it is possible that 
external governance factors not explored in this thesis also determined the 
conservatism practices. 
 
3. Data used in this thesis were extracted from the annual reports, and hence 
qualitative nature of the board of directors and audit committee characteristics 
are not examined.  For instance, the relationship between members of the board 
with those of the audit committee or shareholders is not explored.  As such, the 
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effectiveness of their activities, the scope of reference for the audit committee 
or support given by the internal auditor on the audit committee, which may 
have impact on the conservatism practices, are not included in this thesis.   
 
4. This thesis does not explore the possibility of endogeneity between ownership 
structure and internal governance structures.  Similar limitations were also 
acknowledged by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) and Korczak and Korczak 
(2009).  However, it is believed that the panel data methodology employed in 
this thesis mitigates the concerns of an endogeneity problem as the standard 
errors are corrected for cross sectional dependence, heterogeneity and 
autocorrelation.  Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia (1999) pointed out that panel 
data with a fixed effect effectively eliminates potential bias caused by 
endogeneity.  Bhattacharya et al. (2003) further noted that if the standard errors 
are corrected for the presence of cross sectional dependence, heterogeneity and 
autocorrelation, the coefficient estimates will not be affected by the 
endogeneity problem. 
 
5. Research and development and advertising expenditure (R & D) capture 
economic rent generated by assets in place, growth opportunities and GAAP 
mandated conservatism (A. S. Ahmed & Duellman, 2007).  This thesis does 
not control for the effect of R & D on conservatism because there are very few 
companies in the sample with such expenditures.  Out of 2031 firm-year 
observations, 83.65% of the sample have zero R & D.  Low innovation 
expenses in Asia generally and Malaysia in particular were acknowledged in 
Othman and Ameer (2009).  However, it is believed that results in this thesis 
are not affected by this shortcoming because this thesis employs a firm fixed 
effects method; notably A. S. Ahmed et al. (2002) showed that using firm fixed 
effects controls for the effects of GAAP mandated conservatism.  
 
6. As there are various alternative mechanisms to compute an aggregate measure 
of governance, mechanisms considered in this thesis are limited to the firms’ 
internal governance mechanisms.  Whilst this thesis found that concentrated 
owners have strong negative influence on the internal governance, their control 
over external mechanisms are open to future research. 
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Despite the above-mentioned limitations, findings from this thesis have deepened our 
understanding of the impact of ownership concentration on financial reporting and 
provided awareness of the effectiveness of internal governance in Malaysian firms.  
The limitations outlined above both acknowledge their existence, and encourage the 
need for future research. 
 
6.10. Future Research 
 
Extension of this thesis is possible in the following areas: 
 
1. This thesis provides a clear understanding of how the controlling shareholders, 
both insiders and outsiders, influence accounting conservatism.  This thesis 
identified that outside controlling shareholders employed lower conservatism 
but the identity of who these shareholders are, is beyond the scope of this 
thesis.  Further research needs to be undertaken to identify the identity of those 
shareholders that have a significant negative influence on conservatism.  
Exploring this issue will help to answer why these outsiders, who are supposed 
to demand strong governance, lead to lower conservatism.   
 
2. This thesis found that audit committee composition is associated with lower 
conservatism.  This finding is inconsistent with agency theory and resource 
dependence theory, where outside directors who provide independent 
judgement are perceived as an effective monitor.  Results from this thesis 
however are limited to the quantitative aspect of the audit committee structure.  
Applying conservatism requires judgement; hence qualitative factors such as 
perception or behaviour of the directors or shareholders are relevant.  Future 
studies can complement this result to obtain further insight in this area.  For 
instance, a behavioural study is suitable to investigate factors that influence 
directors conservative reporting.  Additionally, an experimental study to 
explore the relationship between independent directors and the management 
will provide an interesting input if their judgement is influenced by 
management. 
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3. Mixed findings on ethnicity are not consistent with the individualism concept, 
and fail to support the political hypothesis and compensation incentive 
hypothesis.  The results from this thesis imply that there could be other factors 
that influence the directors instead of their ethnicity per se.  Ball et al. (2003) 
stated that the political factors influence the Chinese to report lower earnings 
but influence Bumiputera to report higher earnings.  Future studies may 
explore this issue further by focusing on government related firms and non-
government related firms and examine if their conservatism practices differ.  
Additionally, future studies may examine if religiosity factors determine 
conservative reporting as none currently exist in the literature.  The findings 
will provide an understanding to achieve harmonisation of financial reporting. 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness 
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit כ OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit  
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit כ OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it  
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit 
(a) One-year estimate (b) Three-year estimate 
Predicted 
signs Coefficients t-statistic 
Coefficient
s t-statistic 
constant -1.307 -8.89*** -0.937 -0.55 
R 0.034 0.16 0.050 0.13 
D -0.056 -0.46 -0.306 -1.02 
RD -0.734 -2.72*** -0.829 -1.21 
OCIN 0.002 4.2*** 0.007 4.93*** 
OCIN*R + 0.000 -0.6 -0.002 -1.76* 
OCIN*D -0.001 -1.35 -0.004 -8.49*** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -1.82* -0.001 -0.7 
OCOUT 0.002 3.57*** 0.004 3.92*** 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.56 -0.001 -1.34 
OCOUT*D -0.001 -1.85* -0.003 -3.2*** 
OCOUT*RD + -0.001 -0.83 -0.002 -0.4 
BID -0.087 -1.36 -0.133 -2.14** 
BID*R - -0.020 -0.15 -0.421 -4.96*** 
BID*D -0.021 -0.52 0.058 0.32 
BID*RD + -0.124 -0.32 1.351 3.23*** 
BS 0.004 0.08 -0.055 -0.98 
BS*R + 0.009 0.16 -0.089 -2.83*** 
BS*D 0.016 0.63 -0.160 -2.73*** 
BS*RD - 0.041 0.29 -0.169 -0.83 
BT -0.002 -1.89* -0.001 -0.47 
BT*R - 0.010 2.56** 0.006 1.92* 
BT*D 0.003 1.88* 0.001 0.45 
BT*RD + -0.007 -1.32 -0.002 -0.31 
BF -0.043 -0.6 0.211 2.13** 
BF*R - -0.139 -0.88 -1.017 -8.31*** 
BF*D 0.100 0.86 -0.607 -2.37** 
BF*RD + 0.310 4.08*** 0.571 2.07** 
BSHIP 0.048 0.91 0.180 3.74*** 
BSHIP*R + -0.090 -1.59 -0.058 -1.29 
BSHIP*D 0.010 0.54 -0.024 -0.65 
BSHIP*RD - 0.207 3.72*** -0.075 -1.1 
BCD 0.026 0.71 0.230 2** 
BCD*R + 0.017 0.42 -0.101 -4.87*** 
BCD*D -0.027 -1.61 -0.120 -3.68*** 
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(a) One-year estimate (b) Three-year estimate 
Predicted 
signs Coefficients t-statistic 
Coefficient
s t-statistic 
BCD*RD - -0.043 -0.61 0.038 0.51
ACID 0.009 0.18 -0.207 -3.83***
ACID*R - -0.084 -0.8 0.130 1.73*
ACID*D -0.081 -1.83* 0.048 0.49
ACID*RD + 0.053 0.28 -0.355 -4.12***
ACF -0.067 -1.38 -0.095 -1.68*
ACF*R - 0.356 5.26*** 0.412 4.25***
ACF*D 0.028 0.53 0.377 2.46**
ACF*RD + -0.540 -2.81*** 0.199 0.88
ACM -0.003 -0.89 -0.031 -4.15***
ACM*R - 0.006 0.76 0.043 2.87***
ACM*D 0.005 0.75 0.011 0.51
ACM*RD + 0.007 0.18 -0.042 -0.82
BBR -0.192 -2.23** -0.061 -0.37
BBR*R + 0.117 0.99 -0.283 -1.35
BBR*D 0.078 1.02 -0.166 -1.41
BBR*RD - 0.075 0.51 0.848 5.88***
ACBR 0.102 4.81*** 0.020 0.13
ACBR*R + -0.179 -1.35 0.211 1.35
ACBR*D -0.139 -1.84* 0.064 0.36
ACBR*RD - -0.005 -0.03 -0.803 -2.14**
BCR 0.002 0.02 -0.225 -2.83***
BCR*R - -0.123 -0.93 -0.224 -1.33
BCR*D 0.008 0.11 0.004 0.03
BCR*RD + 0.320 3.07*** 0.461 2.71***
ACCR 0.038 0.85 0.067 0.53
ACCR*R - -0.076 -0.47 0.100 0.81
ACCR*D -0.038 -0.52 -0.142 -0.71
ACCR*RD + 0.055 0.38 -0.664 -2.18**
AUD 0.003 0.21 0.054 1.05
AUD*R - -0.084 -2.46** -0.172 -2.69***
AUD*D -0.063 -3.53*** -0.072 -2.42**
AUD*RD + 0.071 1.4 0.218 2.85***
TA 0.069 5.16*** 0.066 0.73
TA*R + 0.008 0.6 0.028 1.46
TA*D 0.005 1.66* 0.045 3.12***
TA*RD - 0.025 1.01 0.056 1.15
PROF 0.342 7.1*** 0.155 0.88
PROF*R - -0.165 -0.84 0.474 1.91*
PROF*D 0.068 1.26 -0.005 -0.02
PROF*RD + 0.449 1.77* -0.392 -0.53
LEV -0.324 -3.47*** -0.313 -2.65***
LEV*R - 0.319 1.45 -0.265 -1.34
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(a) One-year estimate (b) Three-year estimate 
Predicted 
signs Coefficients t-statistic 
Coefficient
s t-statistic 
LEV*D 0.008 0.1 -0.556 -3.14*** 
LEV*RD + -0.778 -3.32*** -0.639 -3.89*** 
MTB -0.031 -7.37*** -0.162 -3.88*** 
MTB*R + 0.013 0.5 0.082 6.35*** 
MTB*D 0.020 1.37 0.040 1.77* 
F- value  8.25*** 27.02*** 
R2 within  .1472 .2374 
N  2002 2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial 
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, 
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= 
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on 
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit 
committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural 
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to 
book value. 
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APPENDIX B 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Board Size using Binary Variables 
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit כ OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit  
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit כ OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUTit  
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit 
Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients t-statistic 
constant  -1.138 -0.7 
R  0.019 0.06 
D  -0.465 -1.68* 
RD  -1.189 -1.35 
OCIN  0.007 5.1*** 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.99** 
OCIN*D  -0.004 -10.24*** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -0.75 
OCOUT  0.004 3.99*** 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.34 
OCOUT*D  -0.003 -3.51*** 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.44 
BID  -0.134 -1.9* 
BID*R - -0.365 -6.25*** 
BID*D  0.152 0.63 
BID*RD + 1.436 3.3*** 
DUMMY_BS  -0.044 -1.6 
DUMMY_BS*R + 0.024 0.75 
DUMMY_BS*D  0.000 0.01 
DUMMY_BS*RD - -0.048 -0.75 
BT  -0.001 -0.44 
BT*R - 0.006 1.85* 
BT*D  0.001 0.47 
BT*RD + -0.001 -0.17 
BF  0.204 2.25** 
BF*R - -0.988 -9.1*** 
BF*D  -0.550 -2.27** 
BF*RD + 0.645 2.2** 
BSHIP  0.171 3.9*** 
BSHIP*R + -0.036 -0.77 
BSHIP*D  -0.010 -0.24 
BSHIP*RD - -0.100 -1.4 
BCD  0.235 2.05** 
BCD*R + -0.089 -4.36*** 
BCD*D  -0.100 -3.36*** 
BCD*RD - 0.061 0.68 
ACID  -0.214 -3.6*** 
ACID*R - 0.107 1.35 
ACID*D  0.005 0.05 
ACID*RD + -0.414 -3.59*** 
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Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients t-statistic 
ACF  -0.099 -2.09** 
ACF*R - 0.404 4.38*** 
ACF*D  0.365 2.34** 
ACF*RD + 0.190 0.83 
ACM  -0.028 -4.01*** 
ACM*R - 0.041 2.71*** 
ACM*D  0.009 0.37 
ACM*RD + -0.043 -0.81 
BBR  -0.035 -0.21 
BBR*R + -0.336 -1.54 
BBR*D  -0.160 -1.24 
BBR*RD - 0.962 7.01*** 
ACBR  0.034 0.22 
ACBR*R + 0.221 1.35 
ACBR*D  0.061 0.32 
ACBR*RD - -0.841 -2.28** 
BCR  -0.209 -2.11** 
BCR*R - -0.231 -1.27 
BCR*D  0.022 0.13 
BCR*RD + 0.538 3.06*** 
ACCR  0.085 0.64 
ACCR*R - 0.088 0.68 
ACCR*D  -0.153 -0.73 
ACCR*RD + -0.679 -2.2** 
AUD  0.062 1.08 
AUD*R - -0.187 -2.69*** 
AUD*D  -0.081 -2.45** 
AUD*RD + 0.233 2.87*** 
TA  0.070 0.8 
TA*R + 0.021 1.14 
TA*D  0.037 3.49*** 
TA*RD - 0.056 1.17 
PROF  0.136 0.8 
PROF*R - 0.527 1.93* 
PROF*D  -0.031 -0.09 
PROF*RD + -0.529 -0.66 
LEV  -0.320 -2.68*** 
LEV*R - -0.256 -1.33 
LEV*D  -0.564 -3.1*** 
LEV*RD + -0.661 -4.24*** 
MTB  -0.161 -3.96*** 
MTB*R + 0.079 5.56*** 
MTB*D  0.040 1.69* 
MTB*RD - -0.197 -8.5*** 
F- value   25.50*** 
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Variables Predicted Sign Coefficients t-statistic 
R2 within   .2358 
N   2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
independence, DUMMY_BS= Dummy equals 1 if board size more and equal 8, 0 if 
otherwise, BT= Board tenure, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, ACID= Audit 
committee independence, ACF= Audit committee members with financial expertise, ACM= 
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on 
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit 
committee, AUD= Dummy equals 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural 
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to 
book value. 
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APPENDIX C 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:  
Audit Committee Composition using Binary Variables 
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit כ OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit  
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit כ OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it  
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit 
 Dummy1= 
All independent 
Dummy1= 
Majority independent 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
constant  -0.052 -0.03 -0.910 -0.56 
R  -1.020 -2.68*** 0.045 0.13 
D  -1.037 -2.51** -0.335 -1.2 
RD  0.158 0.19 -1.041 -1.46 
OCIN  0.007 4.78*** 0.007 4.85*** 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.58 -0.002 -1.64 
OCIN*D  -0.004 -6.62*** -0.004 -9.99*** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -0.71 -0.002 -0.65 
OCOUT  0.004 3.84*** 0.004 3.87*** 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.23 -0.001 -1.21 
OCOUT*D  -0.003 -2.68*** -0.003 -3.14*** 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.39 -0.001 -0.34 
BID  -0.240 -3.12*** -0.105 -1.08 
BID*R - -0.394 -4.74*** -0.400 -5.01*** 
BID*D  0.097 0.56 -0.018 -0.11 
BID*RD + 1.226 2.94*** 1.167 2.58** 
BS  -0.067 -1.2 -0.052 -0.95 
BS*R + -0.099 -3.11*** -0.088 -3.45*** 
BS*D  -0.166 -2.77*** -0.175 -2.78*** 
BS*RD - -0.188 -0.87 -0.216 -1.09 
BT  -0.001 -0.37 -0.001 -0.39 
BT*R - 0.005 1.7* 0.006 1.77* 
BT*D  0.001 0.46 0.002 0.64 
BT*RD + -0.001 -0.1 0.001 0.08 
BF  0.223 2.4** 0.190 2.17** 
BF*R - -1.025 -8.86*** -1.011 -8.65*** 
BF*D  -0.614 -2.45** -0.598 -2.35** 
BF*RD + 0.576 2.04** 0.595 2.08** 
BSHIP  0.182 3.62*** 0.164 3.31*** 
BSHIP*R + -0.053 -1.24 -0.052 -1.18 
BSHIP*D  -0.032 -0.9 -0.026 -0.71 
BSHIP*RD - -0.100 -1.48 -0.117 -1.52 
BCD  0.251 2.15** 0.217 2.06** 
BCD*R + -0.118 -5.12*** -0.088 -4.2*** 
BCD*D  -0.132 -4.02*** -0.127 -4.05*** 
BCD*RD - 0.055 0.73 0.000 0 
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 Dummy1= 
All independent 
Dummy1= 
Majority independent 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
DUMMY_ACID  -0.780 -6.23*** -0.159 -5.15*** 
DUMMY_ACID*R - 1.160 8.02*** 0.050 1.47 
DUMMY_ACID*D  0.716 3.85*** 0.124 3.12*** 
DUMMY_ACID*RD + -1.176 -4.16*** 0.054 0.88 
ACF  -0.106 -2.1** -0.065 -1.1 
ACF*R - 0.391 4.25*** 0.404 4.15*** 
ACF*D  0.382 2.51** 0.376 2.62*** 
ACF*RD + 0.236 0.97 0.265 1.15 
ACM  -0.034 -4.45*** -0.030 -4.49*** 
ACM*R - 0.046 3.02*** 0.042 2.94*** 
ACM*D  0.015 0.64 0.012 0.54 
ACM*RD + -0.041 -0.78 -0.040 -0.75 
BBR  -0.091 -0.53 -0.062 -0.38 
BBR*R + -0.288 -1.38 -0.262 -1.18 
BBR*D  -0.153 -1.21 -0.178 -1.54 
BBR*RD - 0.853 5.6*** 0.771 3.97*** 
ACBR  0.014 0.09 0.019 0.13 
ACBR*R + 0.240 1.49 0.194 1.17 
ACBR*D  0.055 0.29 0.054 0.3 
ACBR*RD - -0.874 -2.37** -0.818 -2.25** 
BCR  -0.219 -3.06*** -0.185 -2.9*** 
BCR*R - -0.229 -1.38 -0.202 -1.15 
BCR*D  0.020 0.14 0.003 0.02 
BCR*RD + 0.487 3.1*** 0.424 2.23** 
ACCR  0.055 0.44 0.044 0.4 
ACCR*R - 0.121 0.98 0.084 0.66 
ACCR*D  -0.149 -0.74 -0.147 -0.77 
ACCR*RD + -0.717 -2.42** -0.656 -2.23** 
AUD  0.051 1.05 0.057 1.14 
AUD*R - -0.172 -2.76*** -0.177 -2.87*** 
AUD*D  -0.074 -2.57** -0.071 -2.52** 
AUD*RD + 0.214 2.74*** 0.227 2.87*** 
TA  0.058 0.65 0.063 0.73 
TA*R + 0.028 1.49 0.031 1.73* 
TA*D  0.046 3.08*** 0.046 3.47*** 
TA*RD - 0.058 1.22 0.061 1.28 
PROF  0.143 0.82 0.145 0.87 
PROF*R - 0.474 1.99** 0.466 1.96* 
PROF*D  -0.013 -0.04 -0.016 -0.05 
PROF*RD + -0.402 -0.54 -0.447 -0.59 
LEV  -0.317 -3.13*** -0.299 -2.71*** 
LEV*R - -0.282 -1.38 -0.278 -1.42 
LEV*D  -0.543 -3.05*** -0.569 -3.04*** 
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 Dummy1= 
All independent 
Dummy1= 
Majority independent 
Predicted 
Sign Coefficients t-statistic Coefficients t-statistic 
LEV*RD + -0.604 -3.9*** -0.656 -3.79*** 
MTB  -0.159 -3.72*** -0.163 -3.85*** 
MTB*R + 0.079 5.42*** 0.081 5.98*** 
MTB*D  0.046 2.19** 0.047 2.07** 
MTB*RD - -0.188 -11.11*** -0.188 -11.31*** 
F-value   9.53***  1.53*** 
R2 within   .2384  .2411 
N   2012  2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside substantial 
shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board composition, BS= Natural 
logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple 
directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, DUMMY_ACID= Dummy equals 1 if all audit 
committee members are independent, 0 otherwise, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= 
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACBR= 
Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy 
equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= 
Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
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APPENDIX D 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Excluding Board Financial Expertise  
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit כ OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit  
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit כ OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it  
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit 
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
constant -0.860 -0.48 
R 0.111 0.24 
D -0.423 -1.16 
RD -1.248 -1.52 
OCIN 0.007 4.95*** 
OCIN*R + -0.001 -1.02 
OCIN*D -0.003 -8.18*** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -0.94 
OCOUT 0.004 4.21*** 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -0.98 
OCOUT*D -0.003 -3.08*** 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.57 
BID -0.153 -3.14*** 
BID*R - -0.430 -5.65*** 
BID*D 0.055 0.29 
BID*RD + 1.431 3.39*** 
BS -0.098 -2.05** 
BS*R + 0.031 1.47 
BS*D -0.073 -1.47 
BS*RD - -0.191 -0.89 
BT -0.004 -1.36 
BT*R - 0.008 2.1** 
BT*D 0.002 0.73 
BT*RD + -0.002 -0.31 
BSHIP 0.165 3.28*** 
BSHIP*R + -0.056 -0.86 
BSHIP*D -0.019 -0.42 
BSHIP*RD - -0.051 -0.56 
BCD 0.202 1.75* 
BCD*R + -0.076 -5.32*** 
BCD*D -0.111 -3.49*** 
BCD*RD - 0.006 0.09 
ACID -0.227 -2.96*** 
ACID*R - 0.125 0.88 
ACID*D 0.043 0.32 
ACID*RD + -0.397 -5.72*** 
ACF 0.020 0.39 
ACF*R - -0.049 -0.54 
ACF*D 0.083 1.27 
ACF*RD + 0.435 2.17** 
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Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
ACM -0.014 -2.48** 
ACM*R - 0.005 0.38 
ACM*D -0.008 -0.39 
ACM*RD + -0.012 -0.2 
BBR -0.146 -0.7 
BBR*R + -0.225 -1.05 
BBR*D -0.116 -0.87 
BBR*RD - 0.899 6.31*** 
ACBR 0.051 0.28 
ACBR*R + 0.200 1.31 
ACBR*D 0.071 0.35 
ACBR*RD - -0.791 -2.18** 
BCR -0.312 -3.32*** 
BCR*R - -0.148 -0.97 
BCR*D 0.050 0.3 
BCR*RD + 0.488 2.13** 
ACCR 0.132 0.85 
ACCR*R - 0.026 0.22 
ACCR*D -0.133 -0.64 
ACCR*RD + -0.571 -1.84* 
AUD 0.061 1.17 
AUD*R - -0.179 -2.82*** 
AUD*D -0.085 -2.22** 
AUD*RD + 0.214 3.41*** 
TA 0.068 0.73 
TA*R + 0.013 0.65 
TA*D 0.040 3.68*** 
TA*RD - 0.073 1.45 
PROF 0.184 1.18 
PROF*R - 0.453 2.02** 
PROF*D -0.046 -0.15 
PROF*RD + -0.429 -0.57 
LEV -0.331 -2.16** 
LEV*R - -0.286 -1.38 
LEV*D -0.564 -3.56*** 
LEV*RD + -0.677 -3.09*** 
MTB -0.164 -3.88*** 
MTB*R + 0.090 7.02*** 
MTB*D 0.044 1.73* 
MTB*RD - -0.196 -9.24*** 
F- value   2.33*** 
R2 within   .2156 
N   2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
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R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BSHIP= Board 
multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, ACID= Audit committee 
independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= Audit committee meeting, 
BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACBR= Ratio 
Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy 
equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), 
PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
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APPENDIX E 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness:  
Audit Committee Meeting using Binary Variables 
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit כ OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit  
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit כ OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it  
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit 
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
constant -1.012 -0.58 
R 0.113 0.26 
D -0.228 -0.71 
RD -0.918 -1.25 
OCIN 0.007 5.14*** 
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.68* 
OCIN*D -0.004 -7.63*** 
OCIN*RD - -0.002 -1.13 
OCOUT 0.004 3.88*** 
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.06 
OCOUT*D -0.003 -2.68*** 
OCOUT*RD + -0.002 -0.55 
BID -0.148 -2.67*** 
BID*R - -0.396 -4.46*** 
BID*D 0.071 0.38 
BID*RD + 1.309 3.42*** 
BS -0.065 -1.17 
BS*R + -0.075 -2.27** 
BS*D -0.152 -2.59** 
BS*RD - -0.199 -1.02 
BT -0.001 -0.54 
BT*R - 0.006 1.77* 
BT*D 0.001 0.29 
BT*RD + -0.003 -0.43 
BF 0.164 1.92* 
BF*R - -0.942 -9.45*** 
BF*D -0.569 -2.16** 
BF*RD + 0.492 1.46 
BSHIP 0.181 3.75*** 
BSHIP*R + -0.067 -1.38 
BSHIP*D -0.029 -0.79 
BSHIP*RD - -0.055 -0.77 
BCD 0.227 1.96* 
BCD*R + -0.100 -4.5*** 
BCD*D -0.119 -3.37*** 
BCD*RD - 0.025 0.35 
ACID -0.234 -4.3*** 
ACID*R - 0.165 1.9* 
ACID*D 0.063 0.5 
211 
 
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
ACID*RD + -0.414 -4.09***
ACF -0.092 -2.08**
ACF*R - 0.399 4.1***
ACF*D 0.363 2.28**
ACF*RD + 0.180 0.86
DUMMY_ACM 0.072 1.08
DUMMY_ACM*R - -0.036 -0.63
DUMMY_ACM*D -0.040 -1.18
DUMMY_ACM*RD + 0.260 2.33**
BBR -0.081 -0.48
BBR*R + -0.254 -1.15
BBR*D -0.162 -1.15
BBR*RD - 0.823 7.52***
ACBR 0.008 0.05
ACBR*R + 0.219 1.33
ACBR*D 0.074 0.4
ACBR*RD - -0.794 -2.25**
BCR -0.208 -2.64***
BCR*R - -0.225 -1.36
BCR*D -0.006 -0.04
BCR*RD + 0.485 3.29***
ACCR 0.032 0.26
ACCR*R - 0.116 0.9
ACCR*D -0.124 -0.62
ACCR*RD + -0.690 -2.27**
AUD 0.064 1.3
AUD*R - -0.189 -2.85***
AUD*D -0.081 -2.94***
AUD*RD + 0.231 2.7***
TA 0.063 0.7
TA*R + 0.032 1.58
TA*D 0.044 3.92***
TA*RD - 0.047 0.89
PROF 0.154 0.86
PROF*R - 0.490 1.95*
PROF*D 0.006 0.02
PROF*RD + -0.421 -0.55
LEV -0.321 -2.42**
LEV*R - -0.276 -1.12
LEV*D -0.539 -2.94***
LEV*RD + -0.598 -2.87***
MTB -0.165 -3.64***
MTB*R + 0.086 6.87***
MTB*D 0.044 1.64
MTB*RD - -0.201 -9.66***
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Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
F- value  16.23*** 
R2 within  .2363 
N  2012 
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial 
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, 
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, 
DUMMY_ACM= Dummy equals 1 if audit committee meeting is four and more, 0 
otherwise, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on board, ACBR= Ratio 
Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit committee, AUD= Dummy 
equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural logarithm of total assets (Firm size), 
PROF= Profitability, LEV= Leverage, MTB= Market to book value. 
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APPENDIX F 
Results of Asymmetric Timeliness: Leverage using Binary Variables 
Eit/Pit – 1 = α0 + β1Rit + β2Dit + β3RDit + β4 OCINit + β5 Rit כ OCINit + β6 Dit * OCINit  
+ β7 RDit * OCINit + β8 OCOUTit + β9 Rit כ OCOUT it + β10 Dit * OCOUT it  
+ β11 RDit t * OCOUTit + Board Attributes, Audit Committee Attributes, 
Ethnicity & Control Variables it + εit 
Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
constant -0.279 -0.17
R -0.015 -0.05
D 0.031 0.15
RD 0.035 0.05
OCIN 0.007 4.7***
OCIN*R + -0.002 -1.87*
OCIN*D -0.003 -6.13***
OCIN*RD - 0.000 -0.11
OCOUT 0.004 3.29***
OCOUT*R - -0.001 -1.41
OCOUT*D -0.003 -2.46**
OCOUT*RD + -0.001 -0.25
BID -0.110 -1.43
BID*R - -0.533 -6.1***
BID*D 0.036 0.22
BID*RD + 1.399 2.92***
BS -0.033 -0.58
BS*R + -0.135 -3.94***
BS*D -0.192 -3.07***
BS*RD - -0.133 -0.72
BT 0.001 0.32
BT*R - 0.005 1.75*
BT*D -0.001 -0.2
BT*RD + -0.005 -0.99
BF 0.246 2.54**
BF*R - -1.091 -8.55***
BF*D -0.616 -2.32**
BF*RD + 0.715 2.44**
BSHIP 0.201 4.58***
BSHIP*R + -0.081 -1.87*
BSHIP*D -0.031 -0.72
BSHIP*RD - -0.051 -0.75
BCD 0.211 1.91*
BCD*R + -0.053 -2.04**
BCD*D -0.093 -2.64***
BCD*RD - -0.005 -0.06
ACID -0.238 -4.03***
ACID*R - 0.228 2.22**
ACID*D 0.057 0.57
ACID*RD + -0.473 -5.69***
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Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
ACF -0.084 -1.51 
ACF*R - 0.392 4.16*** 
ACF*D 0.314 2.28** 
ACF*RD + 0.082 0.42 
ACM -0.028 -3.76*** 
ACM*R - 0.036 2.69*** 
ACM*D 0.013 0.55 
ACM*RD + -0.031 -0.62 
BBR -0.100 -0.67 
BBR*R + -0.236 -1.2 
BBR*D -0.173 -1.58 
BBR*RD - 0.708 4.43*** 
ACBR 0.029 0.22 
ACBR*R + 0.224 1.41 
ACBR*D 0.079 0.47 
ACBR*RD - -0.753 -2.06** 
BCR -0.228 -4.78*** 
BCR*R - -0.276 -1.84* 
BCR*D 0.000 0 
BCR*RD + 0.485 2.56** 
ACCR 0.046 0.42 
ACCR*R - 0.198 1.6 
ACCR*D -0.104 -0.53 
ACCR*RD + -0.732 -2.35** 
AUD 0.066 1.3 
AUD*R - -0.193 -3.16*** 
AUD*D -0.073 -3.01*** 
AUD*RD + 0.245 3.36*** 
TA 0.025 0.29 
TA*R + 0.045 2.82*** 
TA*D 0.032 2.68*** 
TA*RD - -0.002 -0.05 
PROF 0.177 1.05 
PROF*R - 0.458 1.9* 
PROF*D 0.015 0.04 
PROF*RD + -0.350 -0.45 
DUMMY_LEV 0.051 2.07** 
DUMMY_LEV*R - -0.175 -2.86*** 
DUMMY_LEV*D -0.071 -2.25** 
DUMMY_LEV*RD + 0.191 4.59*** 
MTB -0.155 -4.14*** 
MTB*R + 0.075 5.17*** 
MTB*D 0.029 1.37 
MTB*RD - -0.203 -13.35*** 
F- value  28.73*** 
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Predicted signs Coefficients t-statistic 
R2 within   .2321
N   2012
***p<0.01; **p<0.05;* p<0.10 
R= Stock return, D= dummy 1 if R is negative and 0 otherwise, RD= R*D, OCIN=Inside 
substantial shareholders, OCOUT= Outside substantial shareholders, BID= Board 
composition, BS= Natural logarithm of board size, BT= Board tenure, BF= Board financial 
expertise, BSHIP= Board multiple directorships, BCD= Combine CEO-Chairman roles, 
ACID= Audit committee independence, ACF= Audit committee financial expertise, ACM= 
Audit committee meeting, BBR= Ratio Bumiputera on board, BCR= Ratio Chinese on 
board, ACBR= Ratio Bumiputera on audit committee, ACCR= Ratio Chinese on audit 
committee, AUD= Dummy equal 1 if big four audit firm, 0 otherwise, TA= Natural 
logarithm of total assets (Firm size), PROF= Profitability, DUMMY_LEV= Dummy equals 
1 for levered firms, 0 otherwise, MTB= Market to book value. 
 
 
 
